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The Placebo effect
- a therapeutical phenomenon 
between science & humanities, 
body & mind.
W hy do doctors begin by practising on the credulity of their 
patients with so many false promises of a cure, if not to call the 
pow er o f the imagination ...? They know ... that there are men on 
whom the mere sight of medicine is operative.
Montaigne1
1 Montaigne, Michel Eyquem. In Essays: "On The Power of the Imagination". 
Penguin Classics. Bungey, Suffulk 1981: p.44
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Introduction
A Clinical example
Mr. W alker had a pain in the back. It had bothered him before, and 
the doctors he had consulted had given him analgesics, prescribed 
massage and even made him do push-ups in a gym. Nothing had 
helped. He had heard that his new physician, Dr. Pascal, could do 
wonders. W ell, that was at least what Mrs. W atson said, and she 
used to have lots of troubles with her own back.
A fter waiting the usual hour Mr. W alker entered the consultation 
room. He explained his story. Dr. Pascal listened carefully and asked 
detailed questions about when, where and how his back hurt. 
Suddenly Mr. W alker found himself explaining things that he had 
never before told a doctor. They were usually so quick to prescribe, 
that one hardly got the chair warmed up before one was outside 
again fum bling with the prescription. After twenty minutes Dr. 
Pascal looked at him and with a self-confident voice said: "I have a 
cure for your problem". He reached for a syringe and filled it with 
m edicine from an impressive looking red bottle. He concentrated on
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its content as he eased out some drops that appeared to be 
superfluous, while at the same time saying: " this might hurt a bit 
in the beginning, but that is just because it is such a strong 
medicine. I t 'l l  get your back better again”. Then he injected the 
m edicine. The injection did hurt, but Mr. W alker soon forgot it 
when Dr. Pascal asked him to see him again in a week ju st to 
confirm  the im provem ent.
A week later Mr. W alker's back pain was much better. He saw Dr. 
Pascal, who smiled an enigmatic smile. An injection of the powerful 
m edicine was repeated, and Mr. walker went home again.
Later that afternoon the physician sat in front of his desk looking 
with contem plation at the red bottle of medicine. Approxim ately at 
the same time Mr. W alker was playing football for the first time in 
months. Dr. Pascal opened the bottle and inspected the colourless 
contents. He was a successful doctor thanks to that medicine. The 
thing that only he knew was that the liquid so resembling a 
panacea was nothing but salt water. His face showed an expression 
of slight wondering. “A placebo is a strange thing” he thought. His 
speculation was interrupted by the knocking on the door and he 
quickly transform ed into his usual calmness, as he opened the door 
for his next patient: Mrs. Watson...
W hat Dr. Pascal was prescribing is called a placebo, a medicine that 
has no pharm acological effect. The improvement of Mr. W alker's 
back pain is the effect of a placebo and is called a placebo effect.
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Dr. Pascal is derived from the character in the novel by Emile Zola 
bearing the same name2. The novel is about a physician who thinks 
he has invented a panacea, but realises to his astonishment that an 
injection of salt water has the same effect on his patients. Zola is 
describing an example of the placebo effect.
M e th o d o lo g y
This thesis is part of an emerging subdivision of the field of 
philosophy known as the philosophy of medicine. M edicine gains 
from  the philosophical approach to its fundamental concepts and 
routines. Philosophical analysis has already shown itself to be 
fruitful in the field of medical ethics. However, I am also quite 
certain that philosophy as such can gain much from focusing on 
m edicine. There is in the theory of knowledge a strange reluctance 
to look further than to mathematics and physics for examples and 
inspiration. I believe, as well, that metaphysics can discover new 
versions of old problems relating to fundamentals such as life, 
death, nature, truth and normality. Sometimes it is discussed
w hether philosophy of medicine is fundamentally a philosophical or
a m edical discipline. Such a discussion is rather futile, but possibly 
indicates a m ethodological uncertainty: how are the problems of 
philosophy of medicine to be approached. A reasonable first answer 
to such a question is that the method is philosophical but the 
subject m atter is medical. Though basically a good division of 
labour I think that if philosophy of medicine in the future is to be
accepted as an autonomous academical discipline a more detailed
2 Zola, Emile. Le Docteur Pascal. Paris: NRF, 1986 (La Pleiade, vol. 5).
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and structured m ethodological discussion is necessary. The method 
of this thesis is fundam entally philosophical. The discussions that I 
engage in and the concepts that I make use of are for the most part 
established philosophical term inology and problems. However, the 
m edical dimension is not totally restricted from the methodological 
approach. Firstly I consider the placebo effect, not only as an 
academical concept, but also as a therapeutical notion. From a 
m edical m ethodological perspective the therapeutical im plications 
of a research subject m atter cannot be omitted. The second medical 
m ethodological feature that I emphasise is the approach to the 
substantiation of the placebo effect. A classical philosophical 
analysis of the subject would probably accept the standard medical 
description of the phenomenon and regard it as a foundation on 
which the discussion is built. A critical approach to the articles that 
substantiate the range and structure of the placebo effect does not 
only reflect m edical problems regarding clinical research 
methodology, but also have implications to the philosophical 
problems, for example, regarding defining the placebo effect. In 
general a more critical approach to the empirical phenomenon 
founding a philosophical analysis could be one of the medical 
aspects of a future methodology of philosophy of medicine, a 
methodology that is more subtle than an automatic application of 
philosophical problem s.
The range of the field of medical philosophy is as uncertain as its 
methodology, but one academical pursuit has in the last decades 
established itself as the m ost important: medical ethics. It is so 
dominant in medical philosophy that I find it necessary to make 
explicit why I do not engage in a medical ethical analysis of the
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placebo effect. One of the reasons is that medical ethics is already a 
recognized synthesis of medicine and philosophy, and also in the 
specific field of placebo much attention has been focused on the 
moral implications of placebo controlled trials and placebo 
prescriptions. I would like to promote a broader field of m edical 
philosophy, where epistem ology and m etaphysics are ju st as 
natural to engage in as ethics. Another reason is that ethical 
dilem mas sometimes resolve themselves once they are realised as 
conflicts whose nature is either empirical or m etaphysical. W ithout 
asserting that this is the case with placebo, I am convinced that an 
ethical analysis could gain precision from a metaphysical and 
epistem ological basis.
Investiga tion  D em arcation
The thesis is constructed as consisting of two phases. Beside a 
general introduction and a conceptual analysis, it is divided in two 
sections, the first is an analysis of the implication of placebo effect 
on scientific medicine, the second is an analysis of the implication of 
the placebo effect on the mind-body problem. In some respects the 
two approaches to the placebo effect are rather separate, one being 
predom inantly  epistem ological and the other m etaphysical.
However, theory of medical science and the mind-body problem  are 
them atically intim ately connected. For example in the m ind-body 
discussion the materialists emphasise that a sc ien tific  world view 
is lost if  one accepts a dualistic position. The classical Cartesian 
conception of mind and body operated with a deterministic 
c a u sa lity  notion. Last but not least, one of the most important
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problem atic fields of contemporary medicine is the role of the 
p sy c h e  or the mind in relation, not only to disease, but also to 
therapy. I could have chosen to fit in the necessary mind-body 
discussions in a predom inantly epistem ological analysis, or the 
other way around, fitted the most im portant medical scientific 
concepts to the mind-body problem. However, to focus on one level 
of discussion, for example epistemological, would mean treating 
im portant problem s, like the complexity of m ind-body interaction 
superficially. The placebo effect is a phenomenon that is ubiquitous 
to such a degree that a predom inant epistemological or ontological 
analysis would be insufficient. Instead I have chosen a two legged 
disposition where the epistem ological and m ind-body approach to 
the placebo effect are treated consecutively. W ith this construction 
the two approaches m utually support each other, while still 
indiv idually  represent com prehensible analyses.
That a pharm acologically inert pill can change symptoms and 
influence bodily disease is a phenomenon conflicting with a normal 
conception of the nature of both medical science and the relation 
between body and mind. How does the placebo effect fit with 
scientific m edicine? Is it a phenomenon that contrasts with the 
scientific biological framework of medicine or is it possible to 
integrate the placebo effect within this framework? In an analysis 
of the role of the placebo effect within the medical scientific 
fram ework I will focus on an apparent self-contradiction. The 
placebo effect is simultaneously regarded as a central concept in 
clinical investigation, and in other contexts is frowned upon as an 
unreal and peripheral phenomenon. With a theory of science 
approach to the placebo effect I will partly illustrate the limits of
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im portant concepts that serve as a foundation for scientific 
medicine, and as well, provide notions that are necessary for the 
characterisation and analysis of such a puzzling and provocating 
phenomenon as the placebo effect.
How can a patient's interpretation of a clinical situation affect 
bodily functions, symptoms and diseases? The m etaphysical 
problem  of the status of the mind and its eventual interaction with 
the body can fruitfully be approached from a m edical angle. The 
placebo effect is an example of a very special interaction between 
m ind and body. Normally mind-body interactions in m edicine are 
physiological or pathological. But that the mind is able, not only to 
decide to move the body, but actually therapeutically affects and 
cures diseases is new. W hat implications does the placebo effect 
have on the most important mind-body theories? Is it possible to 
integrate the placebo effect in a theory of mind?
The placebo effect is an intriguing phenomenon that is placed in a 
field of tension between subject and object, between body and 
mind. The eight chapters of the thesis contain different analyses of 
how this field of tension is constructed and its relation to the 
placebo effect . The problem I intend to investigate is : W hat are 
the implications of the placebo effect on the Scientific Medical 
M odel, and in continuation, what implications does the placebo 
effect have for the mind-body problem?
D isposition
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The thesis is constructed in three main parts, each focusing on 
respectively general, epistem ological and m etaphysical aspects of 
the placebo effect. The first part aims at answering the question: 
"What is a placebo and what is the placebo effect?"  and includes 
chapters one and two. The first chapter is a broad introduction and 
the second is an analysis of placebo definitions.
The second part of the thesis concerns itself with the theory of 
m edical knowledge, and intends to answer the question: "W h a t  
implications does placebo have on the scientific medical m odel?" 
and contains chapters three to six. Chapter three is a discussion 
about the notion of medical models, chapter four contrasts the 
placebo effect with the Bio-mechanical position while chapter five 
contrasts the placebo effect with the empirical position. The final 
chapter in the second part of the thesis is a broad herm eneutical 
approach with the intention of contrasting it with the scientific 
model and providing a hypothesis concerning the causal 
m echanism s of the placebo effect.
The third part offers a metaphysical approach and is intended to 
answer the question: "What implications does the placebo effect 
have fo r  the mind-body problem?" The final part consists in 
chapters seven and eight. Chapter seven is a discussion of the 
general theories of mind and their applicability on m edicine and 
the placebo effect. In chapter eight I focus on a specific theory of 
mind, biological naturalism, and discuss whether it can provide a 
philosophical framework for the placebo effect.
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Chapter one:
What is this thing called 
placebo?
The etymology of the word “placebo"
Today placebo is mostly associated with medicine, but originally 
"placebo” was a clerical expression. ’’Placebo” derives from the 
vulgar Latin verb "placere", meaning to please (it is the first person 
singular of the future indicative). It can be traced back to the 116th 
psalm 's ninth verse, which begins with: Placebo Domino in regio 
vivorum, meaning ”1 shall please The Lord in the land of the living". 
The Latin text is a translation from the Greek Septuagint Bible. Here 
the verse started with "euarestiso” (to please), which is rather 
m isleading as the Hebrew original text uses "et-ha-lach", m eaning I 
shall walk. It is believed that the Greek translator made an error. 
Regardless of this the psalm was sung in its Latin version in the
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thirteenth century as vespers for the dead in the Catholic services, 
and soon "placebo" entered English as the common name for the 
v e sp e rs3,4.
Some centuries later placebo took on a derivative secular m eaning 
as a term  for professional mourners who sang placebos, instead of 
or with the family but, in addition, acquired a more general and 
negative meaning as a servile toady. It was also used as a synonym 
for a sycophant, flatterer or parasite.
It was not until 1785 that the term entered the formal m edical 
vocabulary. M otherby's New Medical Dictionary from that year 
defines placebo as "a commonplace method or m edicine". The 1795 
edition includes as well "calculated to amuse for a time, rather than 
for any other purpose". In 1811 the last feature had taken over, 
and placebo is in Hooper's Medical Dictionary described as "an 
epithet given to any medicine adopted to please rather than to 
benefit the p a tien t”. A modern dictionary quotation reflects the 
changes since the early nineteenth century. Dorland's Medical 
D ictionary from 1988 describes placebo as ”.. any dummy medical 
treatment; originally a medical preparation having no specific  
pharm acological activity against the patient's illness... M ore recently  
a dummy treatment administered to the control group in a 
controlled clinical trial..."
3 Shapiro, AK. A Contribution to the History o f the Placebo Effect. 
Behavioural Science 1960;5:115.
4 Lasagna, L. The Placebo Effect. J. Allergy Clin. Immunol. 1986;78(1):161.
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The Characteristic features of Placebos and the Placebo Effect
In many discussions about the placebo effect, including the present 
one, the placebo prescription often takes the form of a 
pharmacological inert pill. The focus on the placebo as a pill is 
reasonable insofar as most placebo prescriptions actually are given
as pills. Possibly the emphasis on placebo pills also serves a
heuristic purpose. Except for special metabolic disorders, for
exam ple diabetes, it is extremely unlikely that the content of the
typical placebo pill, sugar, has any hidden pharm acological effects 
explaining its therapeutical success. This is less clear with respect to 
other forms of placebos. Bretlau5 expresses doubt in an article 
about placebo effect in surgery for Meniere's disease whether he is 
describing a placebo effect or a unknown specific effect. The high 
effect rates (70 %) in both control and treatment group could be 
explained by an unknown effect of mastoidectomy on the inner ear. 
However, despite the heuristic and statistical reasons for focusing 
on placebo as pills it is important to emphasize that other medical 
manipulations can cause a placebo effect as well. Injections or 
surgery can act as placebos, but also being hospitalised or even the 
fact of being on a waiting list for a psychiatric interview have been 
reported to cause placebo effects.6 In principle any kind of medical 
m anipulation has the potential to cause a placebo effect. Brody7 
claim s the different placebo treatment types can be placed in a 
hierarchical order after their potency: surgery is as placebo more
6 Bretlau, P. et al. Placebo effect in surgery for Meniere's disease: nine-year 
follow-up. The American Journal of Otology 1989;10(4):259-261.
6 Brody, H. Placebos and the Philosophy of medicine. The University of  
Chicago Press. Chicago and London 1980: p. 11.
7 Ibid: p. 14
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effective than an injection. An injection is more potent than a pill. 
Huskinson even ascribes the colour of the pill an importance, red 
pills have been shown to be more important than for example 
w h ite 8.
If any kind of medical manipulation can cause a placebo effect, 
what about the diseases in question: can a placebo effect influence 
all kind of disorders? The general nature of the placebo effect is 
illustrated by the fact that almost every kind of symptoms and 
disease have been reported as influenced by a placebo. One list of 
conditions relieved by placebo include cough, mood changes, angina 
pectoris, headache, seasickness, anxiety, hypertension, status 
asm aticus, depression and common cold9. Shapiro adds "organic . 
illnesses, including incurable m alignancies"10. However, despite its 
very general influence, there are certain conditions where placebos 
have been reported more frequently and with higher effect rates. 
Possibly the most important of these conditions is pain. The 
literature on placebo’s influence on pain is one of the most well 
researched. Another type of diseases prone to a high placebo 
response rate is chronic disorders with cyclic pattern as for 
example chronic migraine or ulcer. A third type is psychosomatic 
d iseases. B eecher11 has done an influential review of the response 
rates of placebo treatment and concludes that the response rate is 
typically around 35 %, meaning that about one out of three patients 
will respond to a placebo treatment. The degree of respond vary
8 Huskinson. Simple Analgesics for Arthritis. Br. Med. J. 1974;4:196-200.
9 See note 4: p. 14
10 Shapiro, AK. The placebo respons. In Modern perspectives in world 
psychiatry, ed. Howells,'JG. Oliver & Boyd. Edinburgh 1968.
11 Beecher, H. The Powerful Placebo. JAMA 1955;17:1602-6.
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from  a noticeable effect to a full recovery. Finally it is important to 
distinguish between "positive" and "negative placebo" effects. A 
positive placebo has therapeutical effects. A negative placebo, also 
called “nocebo” , enhances symptoms. Headache, pain, arterial 
hypotension, urticaria and other symptoms have been reported as a 
consequence of a nocebo prescription.12
Are there any detectable difference between the patients that 
respond to a placebo and those who do not? The search for the 
"placebo receptor personality" has been on the agenda for many 
years. The hope was to detect some personality features that 
enabled a researcher to predict with a reasonable level of certainty 
who would respond to a placebo and who not. The project has not 
been very successful. There is no stability in the placebo responses. 
A patient who responds on one occasion might possible not do so 
later, and another patient who was not effected by a placebo, might 
possibly react later. There is very little correlation between 
personality type and placebo effect. However, other mental features 
than personality are regarded important. Patient anxiety is one. 
Anxious and nervous patients are more prone to respond to a 
placebo. Another important feature is positive patient expectancy. 
The expectancy of a patient works as a kind of self promising 
prophecy. If he believes in the treatment he is receiving, he is 
prone for a placebo effect.
12 Kaada, B. Nocebo-The opposite o f Placebo. Tidskr. Norske Laegeforen. 1989; 
109, 7-8: 814-21
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F re u n d 13 has focused on the role of the physician. Some doctors 
seem to be good "placebo inducers" and some less good. A good 
placebo inducer communicates his own expectancy of treatm ent 
success to the patient and can be linked with high placebo effects. 
This process of communication is non-verbal and of a subtle and 
complex nature. There is a lack of quality articles on the physician's 
contribution to the placebo effect, and especially on the elements of 
the process o f communication. However, Shapiro14 claims that the 
self-assured and enthusiastic physician is the ideal placebo inducer. 
The authority and status of the doctor is important, as well as the 
active interest of the physician in the patient or treatm ent.
Out of the futile attempts to isolate definite personality features 
that could be linked to the placebo effect has grown the notion of 
"the clinical setting". The clinical setting is the dynamic situation 
around a clinical encounter between a doctor and a patient. Though 
a notoriously vague notion it emphasises the dynamic complexity of 
the placebo effect. It points out that not only the psychological 
features of an enthusiastic physician and an anxious patient are of 
im portance for a placebo effect, but more generally the setting, the 
fram ew ork in which the doctor and the patients find them selves. In 
a classical study Beecher15 describes how the soldiers wounded in a 
battle in the second world war required half as much morphine as 
civilians after surgery. He interprets this example of a placebo 
effect as closely associated with the soldier’s clinical setting. Their 
perception of their general situation, their clinical setting, was
13 Freund, J. et al. The doctor-patient relationship and drug effect. Clinical 
pharm acology and therapeutics 1972;13:172-80.
14 See note 10: p.603-5.
15 Beecher, H. Control of Suffering in Severe Trauma. JAMA 1960;173:534-6.
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fundam entally different from that of normal civilian post-operative 
patients. Instead of the horrors of more combat, the wounded 
soldiers could look forward to a safe journey home. That they had 
escaped the horrors of war overshadowed the normal anxiety of the 
outcome of the operation and the unfamiliar environment of a 
h o sp ita l.
W hat is the mechanism of the placebo effect? This very im portant 
question has not yet any substantial answer. There have been some 
attem pts to explain the placebo effect in terms of psycho-neuro­
endocrinology. A study supporting psycho-neuro-endocrinology 
was made by Levine, Gordon and Fields16. They demonstrated that 
placebo adm inistration is linked with increased circulating 
endorphine concentration. Furthermore, they showed that naloxone, 
an opioid antagonist, reversed the pain reduction induced by the 
placebo prescription. Levine's results has been criticised, for 
exam ple by Skovlund17, and is anyway nothing more than one 
interm ediary mechanism. The opoid theory does not provide us 
with an explanation w hy  endorphines are released, and more 
general how non-analgesia placebos work. Others have tried to 
explain the placebo effect as classical conditioning18, Freudian 
tra n s fe re n c e 19 or hypnotic suggestibility20. None of the theories 
have had the explanatory power to create a theoretical consensus.
16 Levine,JD. Gordon, NC. Fields, HL. The mechanism of placebo analgesia. 
Lancet 1978;2:654-57.
17 Skovlund, Eva. Tidskr. Nor. Laegeforen. 1991;111:2728-31.
18 Wickramasekera, I. A Conditioned Response Model of the Placebo Effect: 
Predictions from the Model. In White, L et al, eds. Placebo: Theory Research 
and Mechanisms. The Guilford Press. New York 1985: 255-87.
19 Forrer, GR. Psychoanalytic Theory o f Placebo. Diseases in the Nervous 
System 1964;25:655-61.
20 Deltito, JA. Suggestibility and Placebo Effect. Clinical and Experimental 
Reumatology 1985;3: 97-98.
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At the present moment the underlying causes of the placebo effect 
are badly understood. However, what most researchers today agree 
on is that the placebo effect has to be seen as a result of the doctor- 
patient relationship and the clinical setting. In an, at present, 
unexplainable way the clinical setting and the doctor-patient 
relationship are the initiators of the placebo effect.
I will end this presentation of the central features of the placebo 
effect by making clear some distinctions of the different types of 
placebos that until now I have treated as one. The distinctions will 
serve as a terminology that I will make use of throughout the 
thesis, but are presented in this section as they each illustrate 
d ifferent aspects of the general term "placebo". One subclass of 
placebo I call "intended placebo."  This term describes the classic 
situation when a doctor believes the substance he is prescribing is a 
placebo and deliberately gives it to a patient. Dr. Pascal’s injection 
of salt water in the introductory section is a example of intended
r
placebo. However, one can also speak of "unintended p lacebon. T he  
unintended placebo is a term describing the situation when a doctor 
believes that the treatment he is offering has a specific effect, but 
where the doctor is in fact wrong. Many historical treatments have 
been unintended placebos, as for example blood letting. A third 
category of placebos are "impure placebos " The term "impure 
placebo" describes the situation when a doctor knowingly and 
intendingly prescribes an active medicine, but based on a very 
doubtful indication. For example most sore throats or colds have a 
viral etiology, but very often a doctor will prescribe penicillin, only 
active against bacterial infections. The penicillin tablet is not an 
intended placebo, because it has a pharmacological effect. However,
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Iits pharm acological effect does not influence the disease in 
question. The fourth type of placebo I will call "parallel p la ceb o ". 
"Parallel p lacebo” is a term that aims at describing the situation 
where the placebo effect and the pharmacological effect work 
parallel. Imagine a situation where an intended placebo works, for 
exam ple, on a patient with a bacterial throat infection. W ithout the 
patients knowledge the placebo tablet is exchanged with the normal
treatm ent, penicillin. In such a case it is implausible that the
previously active placebo effect would suddenly stop working at 
the m om ent the specific treatment is initiated. A more reasonable 
suggestion is that a placebo effect is paralleled, or complemented, 
by the ordinary treatm ent.
The history of placebos
Placebos have been prescribed for a long time, but there are few
historical references to placebos, and it is difficult to get an
impression of how frequently they were used. Still there is 
something to be said for the view that placebo prescriptions were 
not altogether rare. Thomas Jefferson writes to a friend in 1807:
” One of the m ost successful physicians I have ever known, has 
: ensured me, that he used more bread pills, drops of coloured water,
; & powders of hickory ashes, than of all other medicine put 
to g e th e r .2 1
21 Blanton, WB, M edicine in Virginia in the eighteenth century. Garret and 
Massie. Richmond 1931: p. 198-199.
I
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A different aspect of the history of placebo is the prescription of 
the unintended placebo. Medical history is full of illustrative 
exam ples, but maybe "the K ing's disease" (scrofula) is one of the 
m ost spectacular. The cure for this form of TB was the touch of the 
k ing 's hand, called "the royal touch". It is believed that Charles the 
Second treated nearly a hundred thousand patients in his lifetime. 
S h a p iro 26 describes enthusiastically the whole pre-scientific history 
of m edicine as the history of placebos. I assume he means the 
history of unintended placebos, but his rather strong claim does not 
take into account other factors than the treatment itself influencing 
the recovery from  a disease. Natural remission is but one example. 
Still, the relative success of many obsolete therapies suggest that 
the placebo effect was a crucial element of many historical 
th erapeu tica l p rocedures.
Intended placebos have been part of medical praxis for centuries, 
unintended placebos probably since early days of mankind.
r
However, placebos have not played any role in medical research 
before the m iddle of this century. Placebos got a fundamentally 
new role as a result of the pharmacological revolution after the 
Second W orld War. It became linked with what is known as the 
"Critical Clinical School" of medicine. The Critical Clinical School 
focuses on assessing efficiency of different therapies, and use 
controlled trials and statistical methods for that end. Before I will 
discuss the importance of placebos in what today is the 
paradigm atic m ethod of clinical research I will trace the historical 
roots of the Critical Clinical School.
26 See note 3: p. 114.
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The French m edical historian and philosopher Michel Foucault27 
discusses in his book “The Birth of the Clinic” when clinical science 
was "born". He argues that a turning point was reached in 1801 
with the publication of what can be regarded as one of the m ost 
im portant books in the history of medicine: "Anatomie Generale", 
written by the Frenchman Xavier Bichat. The rem arkable 
achievem ent of Bichat was that the scientific knowledge of anatomy 
became linked to the clinical practice, resulting in the field of 
pathological anatomy. As expressed by Michel Foucault the 
"clinical gaze"28 was introduced. In the next half century a major 
interest in the clinical aspect of medicine followed. The stethoscope 
was introduced and the entire system of diseases were renam ed 
within the pathological framework. In the 1840 J. Gavaret then 
published "Principes generaux de statestique medicate". A book 
focusing on the application of statistical methods in evaluation of 
clinical practice, Gavaret describes in principle the procedures, that 
not before the last decades have changed clinical science. He speaks 
of the necessity of a control group, and discusses the problems 
regarding patient allocation and the statistical and structural biases 
in the assessm ent of a therapy. This type of clinical investigation 
soon produced practical results. During the 19th century m ost of 
the old panaceas, such as unicorn horn, were subjected to the new 
m ethodological acid bath and were all judged worthless. This 
depressing result was part of the background prom oting the trend 
in 19th century m edicine known as "therapeutical nihilism ". The
27 Foucault, M. The Birth o f the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception. 
Vintage Books. New York 1975.
28 Ibid.
21
acid bath was so strong that it destroyed its container. M ost doctors 
turned their scientific interest away from the clinic and entered the 
laboratory. Claude Bernard was an important pioneer in 
experim ental physiology. Bacteriology and anaesthesiology as well, 
soon proved their worth, and G avaret's exact "numerical method"
was forgotten for alm ost 100 years.
Placebo and the modern controlled clinical trial
V ast numbers of therapeutically active, but also potentially harm ful 
drugs have been introduced since the pharm acological revolution of 
the fifties. Penicillin and the other antibiotics have radically
changed the treatm ent of infectious diseases but, for exam ple, the
thalidom ide catastrophe illustrates in a m orbid way the danger of 
not m ethodologically thoroughly testing the effects of a drug.
Britain pioneered the field of clinical trials that now dom inates 
clinical research. In 1931 the Therapeutics trial comm ittee was 
formed by the Medical research Council and in 1948 the same 
council im plem ented its study on streptomycin treatm ent of 
tuberculosis. The streptomycin trial was the first m ajor clinical trial 
using the m ethodology of placebo controls. Since then alm ost every 
clinical trial with some credibility has a design were the placebo 
effect is an integrated part. It is no exaggeration to say that the 
placebo effect today is of massive importance to clinical research 
m eth odo logy .
The im portant streptom ycin study from '48 shows the basic 
characteristics of a modern clinical trial. The idea behind a clinical
2 2
trial is to select a representative group of patients and divide them 
in two in principle identical groups. One group will receive a 
treatm ent and the other a placebo. The difference in therapeutical 
outcome is assessed statistically. If the difference is accepted as 
statistically significant, the treatm ent is regarded as the cause for 
the therapeutical effect. The result of the trial is then extrapolated 
to clinical practice. To enable any reasonable correlation between 
cause and effect, and any valid extrapolation from the small 
selected group of patients to the general population, an impressive 
num ber of potential biases must be thwarted. One im portant bias is 
selection bias. The ideal situation to have two identical groups of 
patients is not possible, so to minimise any im portant difference 
between the two groups it is paramount to randomly allocate 
patients to the two groups. There has to be a defined inclusion or 
exclusion criteria for the patients that are going to be part of the 
trial and any kind of active selection has to be avoided.
Furtherm ore there are many structural problems and possible 
biases that have to do with the statistical analysis of the results of 
the trial.
The type of structural bias that is most relevant for the placebo 
effect has to do with the "double blinded design". The patients and 
the implicated doctors of a modern trial are "blinded" so that they 
have no knowledge of who is in the control group, or as it is often 
called "the placebo group"- and who receives the potential active 
treatm ent. The major reason for this new feature of clinical trial is 
an attem pt to prevent a certain type of bias. There are two 
im portant sources of structural biases concerning the blinding 
procedure. One has to do with observer bias. The examination of a
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physician who knows that the patient he is examining is in the 
control group is often more superficial. The doctor's expectation 
that nothing is going to happen to a patient might prevent the 
physician from  observing im portant signs, and as well com m unicate 
non-verbaly to the patient the fact that he is not receiving active 
treatment. The second source of bias is the placebo effect. It is 
estim ated that patients believing they are in the treatm ent group 
will be more prone to a placebo effect than those who are certain 
they are receiving sugar pills. There are many examples of modern 
uncontrolled, or single blinded trials that have erroneously 
concluded that a tested treatment was specific. A famous exam ple 
of the importance of placebo bias is described by Beecher29. In the 
fifties before the introduction of new operations demanded a 
double blind trial, a promising surgical procedure for treating 
angina was advocated. It consisted in the ligation of the inner 
mam m ary artery, and the idea behind the operation was to 
increase the collateral cardiac blood flow through a local increase in 
blood pressure. The results were regarded positive. Three years 
later, after a considerable number of operations, a double blind trial 
was carried out that showed that an exposure of the artery w ithout 
the ligation gave the same effects. The operational procedure was 
im m ediately stopped. Beecher interprets the trial as an evidence of 
a strong surgical placebo effect.30
29 Beecher, HK. Surgery as Placebo. JAMA 1961; 176(13):88-92.
30 There is no attempt in Beechers analysis to assess how much o f the 
"effect" was placebo effect and what has to be ascribed to observer bias. 
However, I assume that at least a considerable part o f the reported 
therapeutical success is a placebo effect.
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Chapter two:
Defining ’’Placebo effect”
Definitions are one of the corner stones of any scientific or academic 
pursuit. In the attempt to analyse a complex and veiled subject 
m atter the process of defining and redefining becomes param ount. 
In this aspect the research on placebo differs little from other 
scientific projects. Much attention has been focused on a formal 
definition of placebo. However, the reasonable degree of consensus 
usually existing within a scientific community framing a definition,
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seems not present with regard to the placebo effect. B rody31 
discusses pros and cons of restrictive and broad definitions. 
P e p p e r32 represents the restrictive end of the scale since he sees 
placebo as totally inert, whereas M odell33 represents the other 
extreme position when he states that the placebo effect is "the only 
single action which all drugs have in common". One of the most 
respected researchers in the field, Shapiro34, bases his definition on 
the notion of specificity. Placebo has an "unspecific" effect whereas 
pharm acological treatm ent is supposedly "specific". G runbaum 35 
criticises this terminology, and suggests his own, based on the 
difference between what he calls "characteristic" and "incidental" 
treatm ent factors. I will discuss their terminology later, and at 
present restrict m yself to note the difficulty many researchers have 
had in defining placebo. At the moment there exists no general 
accepted definition of the much used medical term: “the placebo 
effec t” .
Real and nominal definitions
A concern with definitions can be traced back to Aristotle. He 
describes the act of defining in his “Topics” as:
"a phrase signifying a thing's essence"36.
31 See note 6: p.9.
32 Pepper, O. A note on placebos. American Journal o f Pharmacy 
1945;117:409-12.
33 Modell, W. The relief o f symptoms. Saunders and Co. Philadelfia 1955: p.55.
34 See note 10: p.599.
35 Grunbaum, A. The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry. 
Psychological M edicine 1986;16:19-38
36 Aristotle. Topics, 100a-102b26
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However, in his “Posterior Analytics” he also describes a definition 
as:
"... a "thesis" or "laying something down", since the arithmetician  
lays it down that to be a unit is to be quantitatively indivisible; but 
it is not a hypothesis, fo r  to define what a unit is is not the same as 
to affirm  its existence."37
The logical tradition evolving from his works distinguishes between 
the two different approaches: the "laying down”, and "formulating 
the essence" as respectively "nominal defin itions" and"real 
d e fin itio n s"  . The former tries to grasp the essence of an entity, and 
is based on the ontological assumption that the world around us is 
real and not imaginary, and that it consists of entities which have 
describeable properties, that distinguish them from other entities.
A real definition crystalises the distinguishing properties for the 
phenom enon in question. Sometimes it is formulated scholasticly as 
a definition "per genus proximum et differentiam  specificam". Here 
the phenomenon to be defined is categorised as a species relating to 
a special class or genus. Today many philosophers are uneasy about 
the term, and want to restrict the notion of a definition to a nominal 
definition. Many phenomena are undefinable as real definitions, but 
still rea l like love, angst or even health38. Some definitions can not 
be rushed to before a scrutiny, and are the results, not the initiators 
of an analysis, for example the redefinition of a gene as DNA. Often
37 Aristotle. Posterior Analytics, 71al-72b25
38 On the definitorical problems of "health" see e.g. Boorse, C. Health as a 
Theoretical Concept. Philosophy of science 1977;44:542-73, or Kraupl-Taylor, 
F. The Concepts o f Illness, Disease and Morbus. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge 1979.
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the intention of the real definition: to get a precise description of an 
entity, is better taken care of by a scientific or philosophical 
an a ly sis .
The real definition is historically linked with the classification 
endeavours of the 18th century. The well-known botanical system 
of L inne39, and also his less known nosological classification, are 
typical of a scientific approach that presupposes nature as so 
complying that grasping its real essence is a question of defining 
more than analysing. The French nosologist Francois de Sauvages 
introduced a classification system in m edicine with his "M ethodica 
sistens morborum  classes, genera et species" from 1763. He divides 
asthma into 19 species and angina into 18. The idea of a critical, 
and often empirically guided, analysis of "the real" in clinical 
m edicine was not implemented before the pathological anatom ical 
revolution circa 1800. However, even today one can detect certain 
tendencies in medical terminology that indicate the historical 
heritage from  Sauvages. M ost textbooks in medicine "define" a 
disease in the beginning of each chapter. But when one reads the so 
called definition it becomes clear that it is really an ultra-short 
d e s c r ip tio n 40. The tendency to regard definitions as real definitions 
is still a part of modern medicine.
A nominal definition, on the contrary, does not involve making the 
ontological claim  of having arrived at an essential or complete 
description of an entity. Rather it accepts the common experience
39 Linng, C. Systema Natura, and Genera Morborum. Quoted in Faber, K. 
Nosography. P. B. Hoeber. New York 1930: p. 22.
40 W ulff, HR. Rationel Klinik. Munksgaard. Kpbenhavn 198l:p. 75.
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that we often hold different meanings for the same word, and that 
we often claim  to know "essentials" about the "real", that we later 
find to be erroneous. Nominal definitions do not claim to say 
anything c er ta in  about the "real world", but are useful heuristic 
tools in the continuous wrestling game with obstinate entities like 
"truth" and "reality". Some nominal definitions are tautologies, but 
their usefulness would be minimal if they were not related to "the 
real" in some sense: if they were only word-word relations and not
w ord-thing reflections. The im portant difference, though, is that 
they do not claim  to be  the essence. They are a linguistic apparatus 
in the construction of what we regard as the essence. W ittgen­
s te in 41 argues in his "Philosophical Investigations" against the belief 
that everything can be defined. He exemplifies this by 
dem onstrating the im possibility of defining even well-known 
entities like a "chair" or a "leaf". This could be seen as a general 
je ttison  of definitions. However, a more constructive interpretation 
is to regard it as an rejection of real definitions. If I were to define 
"placamba" as the placebo effect caused by dancing samba with 
your doctor, this definition would be logically possible, and the 
term  can be used, though of course in a practical sense it is 
hopelessly useless. Euclideus" definition of a line as a length w ithout 
a breadth has had immense influence, but would be im possible to 
defend as a real definition. It is simply something that never has 
been seen in the real world. A nominal definition, however, does 
not m ake that claim , and can be regarded as a tentative attem pt to 
m ake explicit, sharpen or even reconstruct the rules of a specific 
"language game".
41 W itgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Basil Blackwell. Oxford 1958: 
pp. 32e-39e.
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One variant of the nominal definition is the "ostensive"  definition. 
That is giving an example. Explaining a colour is often done with 
reference to an object having that colour. In the introduction I 
described a clinical situation that exemplified the placebo. In other 
words I gave an ostensive definition of the phenomenon. Another 
type of nominal definition is the "lexical" definition. It is the 
reportive description of how a term is actually used. The definition 
or short description in a dictionary is the typical example. The 
different dictionary quotations I gave in the historical section were 
lexical definitions of placebo. A third variant of the nominal 
definition is called " s tip u la tiv e ". It is what authors often aim at 
when attem pting "conceptual clarification". A stipulative definition 
selects one preferred meaning of the word with the object to 
rem ove ambiguity. It often explains why this meaning is preferable 
to a certain purpose, and also often tries to explain form er 
disagreem ents as "term inological m isunderstandings". The placebo 
definitions offered for exam ple by Grunbaum42 have certain 
features in common with the stipulative definition.
Two definitions of placebo
In the following I have shortened, but not in any im portant way 
changed, the definition of "placebo" that Shapiro43 offers in his 
article "The placebo response":
42 See note 35
43 See note 10
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A placebo is any therapy that is deliberately used for its 
nonspecific psychological effects, or that is used for its presumed 
effect, but which, unknown to patient and doctor, has no specific
Shapiro's approach does not include a consideration of the potential 
inclusions or exclusions following from his definition. Though he 
claims that his definition provides "a good model for research" I 
think his definition runs into fundamental problems. W hat Shapiro 
here is offering is an ultra short description of placebos. His 
"definition" is analogous to how a textbook of medicine would 
describe, or "define" a disease entity, and is in fact a real definition. 
In a practical context this may matter little if the definition did not 
contain ambiguity. However, the central clarifying notions of 
"specific" and "nonspecific" are not elaborated and are concepts that 
are notoriously  am biguous.
G runbaum ’s article “The placebo concept in medicine and 
psychiatry" criticises Shapiro's' use of ambiguous terms like 
“specific” and “unspecific” , and offers his own alternative definition. 
Grunbaum  builds his definition on the following model:
e ffec t.
THERAPEUTIC THEORY
Therapy Patient's life 
target disordercharacteristic treatment
incidental treatm ent 
factors
factors
placebo-
other factors of 
patient's life
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In the left hand side of the figure above, the ’’characteristic 
treatm ent factors” are the therapeutical procedures a clinical theory 
will point out as the treatment. They are the factors that constitute 
the intentional treatm ent, for example penicillin w ithin present 
m icrobiological theory. However, other factors can be of clinical 
im portance to a therapy, factors Grunbaum calls “incidental” . The 
water a patient drinks to swallow his penicillin is an example of an 
incidental treatm ent factor. In the right hand side a "target 
disorder" is the disease that the therapeutic theory predicts as 
being effected by the characteristic treatm ent factors. Bacterial 
Tonsillitis is one example. Side effects are characteristic treatm ent 
factors that affects "other factors of patient’s life". Placebo is 
defined as an "incidental treatm ent factor" affecting a “target 
d iso rd e r” .
Grunbaum 's definition has the advantage that it more clearly than 
Shapiro's points out the importance of the therapeutical background 
theory for the categorisation of a therapy as a placebo. Furtherm ore 
his definition is based on detailed considerations of the 
consequences of his definition on medicine and especially on 
psychiatry. Regardless of other points of criticism  one cannot claim  
that Grunbaum  offers a real definition. His definition is a stipulative 
nominal definition. However, despite the formal character of 
Grunbaum 's definition there still are objections to be made about 
his definition.
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A consequence of his definition is that the structure of the 
therapeutical theory constitutes what is an incidental treatm ent 
factor. Thus one can have two alternative theories constituting the 
same therapeutical procedure as belonging to two incongruous 
categories. One theory considers a therapy as incidental and the 
other theory m ight consider the same therapy as characteristic. 
W hat is a placebo in one theory is not a placebo in another. The 
historical evolution of placebo therapy tends to support his 
definition. The historical reinterpretation of therapies like blood 
letting, once believed to have specific properties, now believed to 
be a placebo, is at least partly a result of change in therapeutical 
theory. However, seen with contemporary eyes the strict conceptual 
link between the placebo notion and the background theory is 
problem atic because it does not incorporate an em pirical dim ension 
into the placebo definition. The discussion whether a therapy is a 
placebo or not, reaches back to which of several theories one 
prefers, thereby constituting a therapy as either placebo or non­
placebo. There is no indication in his paper of what makes one 
theory preferable to the other. From an empirical position this is 
u n sa tis fa c to ry .
A paradox follows his line of arguments. Suppose one gives placebo 
a status as a therapy proven effective in for example chronic pain 
treatm ent (m igraine), and with the limitations of its use, parallel to 
the lim itation of indication area of every treatm ent, integrate it in 
the pain treatm ent apparatus. This could happen, as pain 
perception is one of the areas were the placebo effect is 
docum ented the best. Many other therapies that work are 
unexplainable at the moment, for example shock therapy for
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depressive psychosis. This incorporation of placebo in the 
therapeutical arsenal would mean placebo changed status from  an 
incidental to a characteristic treatm ent factor, and thus the therapy 
known as placebo would at the same time not be a placebo.
A possible explanation why Grunbaum so radically avoids the 
em pirical dimension in his definition is that one of his intentions is 
to distinguish psychotherapy from the placebo effect. It is worth 
noting that there exists a general disagreement about the specificity 
and effectivity of psychotherapy. Some see it as specific, others as 
unspecific, and others again as an therapeutical illusion. Grunbaum 
wants to distinguish sharply between psychotherapy and placebo 
effect, thereby imm unising psychotherapy from  the critique that it 
is nothing more than placebo. In a conceptual way Grunbaum does 
that. It is a consequence of his definition that the theory behind 
psychotherapy points out characteristic treatm ent factors, for 
exam ple that a therapist should interpret the patien t’s free 
associations in special ways; any therapeutical effect not explained 
by the psycho-analytical theory is based on incidental treatm ent 
factors. The incidental treatm ent factors having effect on the target 
disorder are placebos. The empirical problem  not addressed by 
Grunbaum is whether psychotherapy as such has an effect.
I m ust conclude that though Grunbaum intends a stipulative 
definition, and correctly points out weak points in Shapiro’s 
definition his alternative is problematic as well. In a semantic way 
he "saves" psychoanalysis from the critics saying it is nothing but 
placebo, but he does not clarify the terminology for either m edicine 
or psychiatry in general. His suggestion, though possible as a form al
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procedure, similar to defining "placamba", is not clarifying for the 
praxis of understanding, researching and using placebos. It is a 
word-word definition, not a word-thing definition.
The em pirical substantiation of the placebo effect
To be able to make a useful word-thing definition one has at least 
to have a good idea of what this "thing" is. The most elaborated 
definition cannot hide the fact that "defining" an entity whose 
nature is not properly documented is like searching for one's 
glasses blind-folded. All working on the placebo effect agree that 
more research is necessary, and that we know fairly little about the 
central mechanisms of the placebo effect. This lack of knowledge of 
the causal relations leading to a placebo effect is less im portant 
because it is integrated in most placebo definitions, for example 
both Shapiro’s and Grunbaum's. However, there is little m istrust in 
the em pirical m aterial documenting the size and structure of the 
placebo response. M ost researchers in the field of placebo regard 
the placebo effect as well documented. My review of the features of 
the placebo effect in the previous chapter is an intended loyal 
account of the general accepted position. The problem is that many 
of the articles referred to as documentation for the features of the 
placebo effect have methodological flaws. My assertion is that the 
em pirical m aterial on which definition and a philosophical analysis 
should rest is not as certain as many would hope. To substantiate 
this claim  in any reasonable degree of detail would extend the 
scope of this work, but I will in the following illustrate that it is not 
taken out of the blue.
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Before I point out the m ost eye-catching m ethodological problem s 
of the placebo articles, I think it would be useful to distinguish 
between two periods of research on placebo, and therefore between 
two generations of articles. One class of articles are ’’the classical” 
articles. They are written from Pepper’s44 first ever published 
article on placebo in 1948 to the mid-sixties where the placebo 
effect become increasingly conceptualised as a research bias. The 
period following thereafter showed a decline in the interest in the 
placebo effect, a decline that not until recently has been challenged. 
A problem  shared by both the modern and the classical articles is 
that there exists no trial that is designed especially to m easure the 
placebo effect. Double blind trails are designed to m easure a 
pharm acological or surgical effect and for that end they subtract all 
other therapeutical factors as bias, including the placebo effect. Any 
conclusion of the nature and size of the placebo effect on that basis 
runs the risk of being distorted. The major problem is that what are 
regarded as placebo effects in clinical trials often cover many 
d ifferent therapeutical factors. The m ost im portant non-placebo 
and non-pharm acological factor is the natural rem ission. M ost 
patients get well without the interference of a doctor or a therapy. 
This self-healing capacity of the body most not be included in a 
m eaningful placebo quantification. However, in articles reporting 
high placebo rates there is very rarely even a discussion about the 
distinction between the placebo effect and the natural rem ission. 
One popular myth is that the placebo effect for analgesia for 
headache reaches 80 %. Possibly this myth can be traced back to an
44 See note 32
3 6
article by Jelinek45 who found that 79 out of 120 patients with 
headache got considerably better on placebo. The problem  not 
addressed in this, and many more studies, is that m ost patients get 
better anyway. A headache normally only lasts for a few hours. It 
corresponds to saying that the placebo effect in common colds is 
100 % after three weeks, as practically all common colds m aximally 
lasts for a few weeks. W hat is needed for a sound substantiation of 
the placebo effect is a trial design focusing on the placebo and 
integrating the other therapeutic factors as biases. I will in one of 
the following chapters discus the possibility of such a trial design.
A problem  prim arily regarding the classical articles is that not only 
do their design focus on the pharmacological effect of a treatment, 
but seen with contemporary critical eyes, that design in itself 
contains several m ethodological flaws, making them even more 
unsuited for conclusive evidence. This would not m atter very much 
if they only had historical importance, but actually many of the 
classical articles are quoted repeatedly as substantiation in 
contem porary papers. One of the most im portant classical articles is 
written by Beecher46 in 1955: "The powerful placebo". It is a m eta­
analysis of fifteen trials with the aim of substantiating the 
effectivity and range of the placebo effect. A considerable 
proportion of contemporary articles quote Beecher for two radical 
conclusions. One is that the placebo effect produces "satisfactorial 
relief" in about 35 % of patients. The second is that placebo 
generally affects all kinds of symptoms and diseases. Are the 
conclusions defensible if one scrutinizes the article? Beecher's
45 Jalinek, 1946, quoted in note 46.
46 Beecher, HK. The Powerful Placebo. JAMA 1955; 159(17): 1602-6
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m ethod consists in pooling both the conditions and the patients 
used in the different trials into 9 categories: post-operative pain, 
cough, drug-induced mood changes, angina pectoris pain, headache, 
seasickness, anxiety, experimental cough and common cold. He 
notes the placebo effect in each trial and calculates the mean. 
However impressive it may be to refer to the 1082 patients 
partitioning, his approach would not be accepted to day. A good 
m eta-analysis m ust distinguish and intend to counter certain 
possible biases, that are left uncommented in Beecher's article, for 
exam ple, "com binabillity". Sacks47 writes: "A major issue in pooling  
data is whether the results o f  the separate trials can be 
m eaning fu lly  com bined."  In Beecher's article there is no discussion 
w hether the different trials he is pooling have sim ilar 
inclusion/exclusion criteria, furtherm ore there is no operational 
definition of the diagnostic criteria for the used therapeutical units, 
what constitutes for example the difference between the two used 
units "cough" and "common cold"?
The second major problem with the article is its applicability. There 
is no discussion about the validity of the range of the article's 
conclusion. Possibly the placebo effect has an significant influence 
on the used diagnostic units, but that does not imply that the 
placebo effect affects all other diseases and ailments. The recorded 
placebo effects in pain, cough and seasickness is 35 %. That placebo 
is effective in certain conditions where pain is a strong component 
would be a more prudent conclusion. However, the article is used to
47 Sacks, HS. et al. Meta-analyses of Randomized Controlled Trials. The New 
England Journal o f Medicine 1987;316(8):451
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substantiate that the placebo effect is generally 35 %, thus including 
placebo responses in conditions like cancer or AMI.
S p iro 48 in his critical review of the material regarding the placebo 
effect concludes that placebo has no effect on illness but only on 
disease. That is to say it modulates symptoms, but has no effect on 
the underlying pathological processes. I think his conclusion is too 
square cut, and based on a too simple distinction between 
symptoms and disease. However, it is but one example that there is 
a general lack of consensus about even such a fundamental 
question. My intention here is not to answer the questions, but to 
point out that the uncertainty is not restricted to the causal nature 
of the placebo effect, but also to the substantiation of its range and 
size, carrying implication for a philosophical analysis of the notion. 
Firstly, it does not necessarily effect a philosophical approach 
whether the placebo effect is 15% or 75% effective in a given 
disease (of course this is of paramount clinical importance), but it 
does m ake a substantial difference if central qualitative features 
are to be questioned, thus transposing the problem from  a 
theoretical m edical to a philosophical discussion. If placebo for 
exam ple is only symptomatically effective, as Spiro claim s, what are 
the im plications to for example medical ethics or the m ind-body 
problem ? Secondly, a useful word-thing definition of the placebo 
effect is difficult to make if both the causal mechanisms are 
unknown and the empirical substantiation of the size and range of 
the effect is uncertain. An important aspect of the problem s of 
defining the placebo effect has to do with the fact that the
48 See note 25: p.75-97.
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knowledge on which a formal definition should rest is not as rock- 
bottom  as one m ight wish.
A cartographic definition
Instead of m aking another stipulative definition, a more useful 
definition is one that could be called a "cartographic” definition. A 
cartographic definition is a detailed lexical definition focusing on 
the different ways the term "placebo" and "placebo effect" is used 
in the literature, but distinguishes itself from a lexical definition by 
including a focus on which sense of the term I intend to use in this 
work. The following takes the form of a guide to the way the notion 
"placebo" and "placebo effect" is actually used in the literature, 
supplem ented by my concluding working definition.
One of the most striking features of the general medical approach to 
the placebo effect is the disharmony between the vast use of the 
term  and the lack of research focusing on it. In m ost textbooks on 
m edicine there are no references to the placebo effect. This 
includes Kumar and C lark 's49 describing itself as "the most used 
textbook on clinical medicine in the UK". Some textbooks on 
p h a rm a c o lo g y 50 have a section on placebos, but mostly strictly 
viewed as a research bias. Even W ulff's51 in other aspects 
im pressive book on medical methodology treats the placebo notion
49 Textbook o f Clinical Medicine. Ed. Kumar, PS & Clark, ML. Bailliere Tindall. 
London 1990
50 L ew is's Pharmacology, 5th. ed. Churchill Livingstone. Edinburgh 1980: 
p .144-145.
51 See note 40: p. 206-209.
4 0
stepm otherly. This contrasts the immense use of the term in 
research articles. Alone in 1992 there were internationally 
published about 1500 articles where placebo appears in the 
a b s tra c t52. The vast majority had titles of the following character: A 
placebo controlled trail of the effect of drug X on disease Y. A small 
m inority were concerned about the phenomenon itself, and 
consisted of editorials, letters to the editor, clinical studies and a 
few review  articles.
Firstly I will focus on the use of the term that expresses common 
logical errors. Some commentators see placebo as a purely linguistic 
construction. Usually they put inverted commas on the noun: 
"effect", and treat the phenomenon as a reminiscence from a pre- 
scientific period. In an illogical way they do not see the clinical 
effect as real, as it is not explicable in biological terms. This attitude 
is paradoxically often paired with the emphasis on placebo as an 
irritating, but real, research bias. One could call this "the fallacy of 
the effect in inverted commas". Many authors express it 
im p lic itly 53. A good example, however, of an explicit fallacy is in a 
letter to the editor of the JAMA, where Gaudet54, in a discussion 
about placebo in migraine trials, uses the phrase "the true effect o f  a 
m e d ic a tio n ", relating it to the total effect minus the placebo effect.
A more frequent and systematic problematic use of the term is 
related to the terminology of the double blind trial. One variant of 
names given to the modern trials is placebo controlled trials. M ost
52 Search on the MEDLINE search system for the year 1992. Searchword: 
"placebo", Limitation: "abstracts".
53 Dicket, LG & Rees, TS. Placebo Effect in Tinnitus Management. 
Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery 1984;92(6):696-9.
54 Gaudet, RJ. Migraine Prevention with 6-blockers: A Placebo effect? JAMA 
1985 ;254(22):3183-4.
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of the articles call the control group the placebo group, and the 
pharm acological inert tablet the p la ceb o -ta b le t. This is conceptually 
unsatisfying because the phrase "placebo-group" disguises the fact 
that other factors than placebo are involved in the im provem ent of 
the control group, and furthermore because a placebo effect is 
present in the treatm ent group as well. Some investigators use an 
unctuous vocabulary when praising their research object and refer 
to placebo effects close to 100 %. Couch and Dobrilla55 rapport 
placebo effects in ventricular ulcers and in chronic headache that 
are as high as 60-80 %. However, as I have pointed out in the 
previous heading, the quantification of the placebo effect is highly 
uncertain. Many articles include in the placebo effect what m ust be 
attributed to natural healing processes, or what sometimes is called 
"spontaneous rem ission". This is even more im portant when dealing 
with a disease with cyclic symptoms as ventricular ulcer or chronic 
headache. There is as well a tendency to regard p la c e b o - ta b le t"  
as having a m ystical power of a pseudo-pharm acological character, 
as if the tablet was the cause of the placebo effect. The tablet 
probably has some effect, as trials show a difference in the placebo 
effect that for example can be attributed to the colour and size of 
the tablet. But its importance is only as a part of the general clinical 
setting. The importance of the pill or any other placebo procedure 
or prescription is of a symbolic nature.
Now I will turn to the use of the placebo notion that differs in the 
in terpretation of the clinical data on the phenomenon.
5 5 Couch Jr, JR. Placebo Effect and Clinical Trails in Migraine Therapy. 
Neuroepidemiology 1987;6:178-85, and:
Dobrilla, G. Placebo in Evaluation of Antiulcer Drugs. Int. J. Tiss. Reac 1983; 
V (4):329-337
4 2
Possibly the m ost common view among physicians is that placebo 
has no effect on the illness itself, but "only" affects the symptoms. 
S p iro 56 and Skrabanek57 represent this view. Brody regards 
placebos as having effects both on symptoms and on illness but 
with different efficiency on different conditions. Pain perception is 
m ore effected by a placebo than for example an infection, and even 
less so a malign cancer. A last position regard placebo as a 
panaceas. A kind of wonder cure with no limits to its ability: it 
causes death, heals the lame and make the blind see. Lasagne58 and 
S h a p iro 59 are close to this view.
W ithin the practical clinical context the placebo effect is generally 
accepted as a phenomenon, but the attitudes towards it can be 
divided into three standard positions. The “softliners” regard the 
placebo effect as a therapeutic tool, maybe not in line with 
pharm acological active drugs, but one procedure of many that at 
least sometimes work. In special circumstances it is ethical and 
scientifically defendable to use. The “hardliners” regard the use of 
placebos as a residue from a pre-scientific period and 
unprofessional, as the effect is regarded as unspecific, only related 
to symptoms, or even a therapeutical illusion. The use of placebos is 
also seen as unethical because it involves deceiving your patients. A 
third group, possibly the biggest, prescribe impure placebos, often 
antibiotics or vitamins on pseudo-indications. They want to make
56 See note 25: p.75-97.
57 Skrabanek, P & McCormick. Follies and Fallacies in Medicine. The 
Tarragon Press. Glasgow 1989: p.6
58 See note 4:161-3.
59 See note 10
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use of the potential therapeutic effect, but recognise the criticism  of 
the hard liners.
As a concluding paragraph I will summarise the discussions above.
I regard "the placebo effect" as the therapeutical effect caused by 
the patient's interpretation of the clinical setting and the 
psychological interaction with the physician. I regard the effect as 
m ost dom inant in pain conditions. Other symptoms and diseases are 
in a various degree affected. I regard "the placebo" as the 
procedure the physician presents as the apparent therapy, but 
which is surgically and pharmacologically inert. The placebo serves 
as a token symbol having an important, but not necessary, role in 
the initiation of the placebo effect. However, the placebo effect can, 
in certain situations, be initiated without such a specific token, 
solely as a result of the doctor-patient relation. It is im portant to 
separate the placebo as a token from the placebo effect. The causal 
background of the placebo effect is a m ultifactorial complex often 
including a token placebo, but important to recognise in itself. The 
causal mechanisms initiating the placebo effect, the clinical setting 
and the doctor-patient relationship, are better described in the 
term "the placebogenic complex." The placebo is thus one of many 
factors in the placebogenic complex. In chapter six I will in more 
detail discuss the notion of placebogenic complex. The rest of the 
thesis will emphasise the notion of placebo effect compared to the 
p lacebo .
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Chapter three
The scientific medical model
M odels and paradigms
In theory of medicine, discussions of different "m odels” of m edicine 
are predom inant. In many textbooks on social m edicine, philosophy 
of m edicine or psychiatry, different medical m odels are discussed 
and elaborated. A general trend in these discussions of models is a 
critique and refutation of the "bio-medical" model, and a prom otion 
of a broader "bio-psycho-social model". The Bio-medical model is 
norm ally conceived to be the present dominant scientific and 
technical way of practicing medicine. The Bio-psycho-social model 
is regarded as an alternative that incorporates psychological and 
social explanations of disease. Other medical models have been 
form ulated. M edical anthropologists talk about the "mythico- 
religious medical model" and in social medicine the "folk m edicine 
model" have attracted interest. The different m edical models 
contrast with each other in many ways, but it is im portant to 
em phasise that they all have one thing in common. They represent 
concepts and routines that enable individuals in a specific 
comm unity to "understand" and cope with disease. In that sense 
there is no difference between the interpretation of a headache as 
either a intrusion of an evil spirit or as migraine. Both 
interpretations provide concepts that explain the pain, and provide 
a fram ework for a possible (and often ineffective) therapy.
In m ost articles on medical models, there is little elaboration of 
what is actually meant by the central term "model". This lack of
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conceptual clarification is unsatisfactory. When the purpose of an 
article is to criticise what is called the Bio-medical model it is 
im portant to make explicit what is more precisely m eant by such a 
model and to reflect whether that model roughly corresponds to 
our intuitions about the content of contemporary m edicine. A 
superficial account of the concept of a "model" induces the risk of 
aiming one's arguments at a straw man instead of focusing on the 
real weakness and strength of modern medicine. An alternatively 
sound way of avoiding a theoretical discussion on "model" is to 
refer to a previous elaboration. The works of Thomas Kuhn60 comes 
to m ind. Hahn61 discusses the placebo effect as an example of a 
deviant phenomenon within the bio-medical model. In his article "A 
Sociocultural Model of Illness and healing" he writes: "I  contend  
that ... the placebo phenomena represents a profound anomaly to 
the paradigm o f  B i o - m e d i c i n e Hahn's approach is typical in the 
sense that he does not develop his central term of a model; 
however, he does use a Kuhnian terminology when he speaks of 
"anomalies" and "paradigms", thus implying that his conception of a 
"model" corresponds to the Kuhnian "paradigm". The lack of 
elaboration of "model" would not matter very much if Kuhn's 
theory of science automatically could be transformed to the area of 
m edicine. However, there are certain features in medicine and in 
Kuhn's theory that makes such a transference problem atic. Before I 
continue with an presentation of what I mean by the "Scientific
60 Kuhn, TS. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2.ed.) The University o f  
Chicago Press. Chicago 1970
61 Hahn, RA. A Sociocultural Model of Illness and Healing. In White, L (Ed.) 
"Placebo-Theory, Research and Mechanisms". The Guilford Press. New York 
and London 1985: p. 167-95.
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medical model", I will discus the applicability of a Kuhnian 
paradigm  in m edicine.
W ith the publication of "The structure of Scientific Revolutions"
Kuhn opposes the conception shared by both the logical positivists 
and Popper that science develops in an evolutionary manner. On 
the basis of studies in history of science Kuhn emphasises the
revolutionary aspect of scientific development. He describes science
as consisting of two fundamentally different phases. One he calls 
"normal science" and the other "extraordinary science". Normal 
science is more or less a cumulative process. A leading m etaphor in 
"The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" is the jigsaw  puzzle. 
Scientists solve the "puzzles" of science. W hat a scientists and jigsaw  
puzzle solvers have in common is that neither question why the
puzzle has the form it has. Kuhn says that the shared tacit
assum ptions and routines that are the tools of scientists, their 
conceptual framework, constitute a scientific paradigm. U nder the 
guiding lines of the "paradigm" grounding the specific period of 
norm al science, the working scientist solves the different "puzzles" 
that the paradigm  presents. Scientists do not question the basic 
assum ptions that his research is built on. If he tried to do that he 
would come nowhere and would not be able to produce any results. 
By concentrating on the problems within the fram ework or 
paradigm  of his time a scientist will be able to solve the questions 
the paradigm  focuses on. Slowly empirical facts will accumulate 
that are in contrast to the theoretical assumptions of the paradigm. 
E ither such "anomalies" are regarded as not im portant or they are 
regarded as observations that are not certain enough. The initial 
response to an anomaly is to try to deny its importance. However, if
48
the anomaly is fundamental enough to the paradigm, and if other 
anomalies have accumulated as well, they become part of a 
scientific crises. If the old paradigm cannot handle that crisis a 
scientific revolution will occur where a new paradigm  with a 
greater ability to explain both the old phenomena and the 
anomalies is developed. After a short period of turmoil, where the 
fundam ental assumptions of the area in question are discussed, the 
new paradigm  is established. Normal science is at work again, but 
under a new paradigm.
Kuhn's concept of paradigm have become known in much wider 
circles than m ost concepts from theory of knowledge. In the 
postscript to the second edition he, sour-sweetly, writes that the 
term "has a life o f  its own" 62, implying that frequently "paradigm" 
is used isolated from its theoretical context and sometimes is 
diluted to mean little more than a change of perspective. Though 
Hahn's use of the term is more sophisticated there still are three 
problem s that make me oppose Hahn's use of the concept 
"paradigm" in a medical context. One is based on the analysis of 
M argret M asterm ann63. She demonstrates that Kuhn uses the 
concept in twenty two different ways. In the postscript to the 
second edition Kuhn acknowledges this, but points out that m any of 
the supposedly different forms are semantic variations. How ever, 
one fundam ental difficulty with the term is that there is no attem pt 
to distinguish different forms of paradigms. At least in m edicine 
there is a huge difference between paradigm as scientific world
62 See note 60: p. 187.
63 Mastermann, M. The Nature o f a Paradigm in "Criticism and the Growth o f  
knowledge" edited by Lakatos, I & Musgrave, A. Cambridge 1970.
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view and paradigm  as a specific research program  within a 
em erging sub-discipline of for example bio-chemistry. The second 
problem  touches on the range of the field of medicine. As the title 
o f Kuhn's work indicates, he is interested in the structure of 
scientific development. Medicine is, however, not only a pure 
science as it has a much broader field than, for example, physics. In 
the following paragraph the range and structure of the field of 
m edicine will be discussed in more detail. At the moment it is 
sufficient to refer to Kuhn's own emphasis that medicine is one area 
that possibly has a different status of autonomy with regard to 
society in general, and might be ruled by other forces than the ones 
he describes64. A third problem is the lack of coherence between 
the many different medical sub-disciplines. Does social m edicine 
and clinical physiology share a medical paradigm? One possible 
response is that medicine consists of many different closely related 
paradigm s, sharing what W ittgenstein call "family resem blance". 
However, this leads back to Mastermann's critique of Kuhn, because 
it em phasises the lack of systematic distinction between different 
sub-paradigm s and more fundam ental paradigm s. Though the 
concept of a model is inspired and in many way similar to a 
paradigm , I think it is useful not to regard them as identical. Hahn’s 
use of a Kuhnian terminology does not imply that a conceptual 
clarification of "medical model" can be omitted.
The Scientific Model of medicine
64 See note 60: p. 165. 
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There are surprisingly few analyses, not only of what a m edical 
model is generally, but also of what constitutes the specific "Bio­
m edical" m odel65. However, for example the textbook on social 
m edicine used at the University of Copenhagen focuses on a central 
analogy: the error-in -the-m achine-analogy66. A human being is 
regarded as a machine, a highly complex biological machine. Some 
times an error develops in the machine and people get sick. The 
errors are related to organs or cells in the complex machine, and 
the logical therapy is to change the biological param eters that have 
caused the errors. Organs are transplanted or m edicine that change 
the function of special cells is prescribed. The relevant causes of the 
error in the machine are to be found in the intrinsic complexity of 
the machine, almost like the error of a clock hanging on the wall is 
due to bad construction or wear, not to an interaction with the 
surroundings. Though persuasive in its characterising of a narrow 
causality conception in medicine the analogy, like m ost analogies, 
runs the risk of being too simple.
The contem porary dom inant medical model has been called the 
"Bio-medical model". However, I prefer to call it the "Scientific 
medical model". Why do I bother renaming a phrase that is close to 
be an established terminology? If nothing more than a name is at 
stake such a change would make little sense. The new name signal 
that the Bio-medical model focuses on a too narrow conception of 
m odern m edicine. "Bio-medical" is an adjective implying that
65 An important exception is an article by C. Boorse: Health as a theoretical 
Concept. Philosophy o f Science 1977;44:542-73.
66 Holstein, BE; Iversen, L; Kristensen, TS. Medicinsk Sociologi (2.ed). FadL's 
Forlag 1992: p. 19
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m edicine is restricted to a biological framework. Many discussions 
of the "Bio-medical Model" focus simplistic on one aspect of medical 
science revolting around the simple E rror-in-the-m achine-analogy. 
Though in many ways worthy of criticism I think medical science is 
more complex, dynamic and resistant than the Bio-medical M odel 
pictures it. The name of "scientific" model focuses the attention on a 
broader field than the strict biological subject m atter, and places 
m edicine in the philosophical and scientific tradition. The scientific 
m edical model that will be sketched in this and the following 
chapters could be constructed differently in a different context. I 
make no claim  of completeness; however, the intention is to 
enframe a discussion about the anomaly of the placebo effect 
within a model that is as flexible and resistant as scientific 
medicine has shown itself to be, and to avoid the typical pitfall of 
the Bio-m edical straw man.
The term  medical model is not restricted to pure science, and the 
use of the term is not correlated to a special theory of the dynamics 
of m edical history. In that respect it differs from a paradigm. I 
regard a medical model as a concentrated description of the 
"medical world view", the complex and often tacit concepts, way of 
thinking and organisation that enables a specific comm unity to 
conceptualise and cope with disease.
M edicine and three levels of knowledge
W u lff67 discusses the field of medicine and relates it to the 
distinctions science-technology-technic. Physics, for exam ple, is a 
science that has the prime goal of unveiling rules that describe the 
nature of our physical surroundings. Engineers work on adapting 
the general physical theory on a special project, for example, 
building a hydroelectric plant. The engineers do research too, but 
have a fundam entally different goal than the physicist. W here 
science pursue truth for its own sake, an engineer solves a practical 
problem . Finally, the craftsmen who built the plant represent the 
technical dimension. A technician reproduces a learned conduct, a 
series of technics, but without asking any questions of way the 
technics work, without doing research. As an academic field 
m edicine is special because it integrates all three levels of 
knowledge. The science dimension is in m edicine represented by 
m edical biology. The technology dimension is represented by 
researchers conducting clinical science, and finally m ost doctors are 
technicians in so far they work as clinical practicioners.
The analogy between m edicine and the three levels of technology 
should not be driven too far. As W ulff mentions68, the distinction is 
not only illuminating, but also problematic insofar it is based on a 
rather sim ple relation between science and technology. One 
m isunderstanding is im portant to prevent. Clinical science is not 
ju st applied pure science, in the sense that the results of clinical 
science follow logically from the theories of human biology. The 
com plexity of human biology, the biological variation, and constant
67 Wulff, HR. The Philosophy of Medicine. Blackwell Scientific Publications 
Ltd. Oxford 1990: p. 40
68 Ibid: p.41
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interaction between a variable environm ent and the human body 
makes clinical science more than applied. Of course clinical science 
makes use of the theories of human biology, but only as one of 
several founding elements. The deductions from theory are on a 
practical clinical level very unreliable. Another difference is that 
the high level of integration between the three levels of m edical
thinking make the notion of pure science problematic. Even the
m ost remote part of biological research is influenced by the prime 
goal of medicine: ideally to create health which in praxis means 
treat diseases. W hereas the physicist never has to think in the 
means of practicability, it is always a relevant question in m edical 
research to ask what is the practical potential of a particular 
research? This problem  of practicability guidance is partly what 
Kuhn hints at when he mentions medicine as a field where his 
theory of scientific revolutions is incomplete.
It is fruitful to conceive medicine as a field in constant tension with 
itself, a tension between the two notions of objectivity and therapy, 
notions m ost clearly expressed in the scientific, respectively 
practical, dimensions of medicine. Therapy is historically the m ost 
im portant notion. As I discussed in the section on history of the 
placebo effect, medical history is full of examples of therapies that 
later have shown to be inert. The therapies regarded effective in a 
given time have mostly either been deductions from the theory of 
that tim e or treatments handled down through tradition. The social 
demand for a therapy is stronger that one normally thinks. Any 
society has institutions whose role it is to "cope" with disease, roles 
that are embodied in persons whose function it is to cure diseases,
in some cultures he is called the medicine man or the shaman, in
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others the physician. One could call this strong social demand for 
disease handling the therapeutical imperative. Regardless o f the 
objective efficiency of a treatm ent most theories of medicine have a
very few diseases categorised as incurable. The therapeutical
im perative has to be confronted with very hard evidence of lack of 
efficiency before accepting a disease as untreatable. Probably the 
therapeutical imperative is the factor, beside the placebo effect, 
responsible for the "success" of m ost historical treatments. There is 
a very strong tendency to relate causally the treatm ent to the fact 
that the patient recovered. The post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is 
probably the most common fallacy in medicine: I was sick, I was 
treated, I became well. Ergo, the treatment cured me. The biological
scientific dimension of medicine is primarily concerned with
objectivity, and less with therapy. The construction of theories 
describing dys-function and disease which corresponds to reality  is 
the main goal of the scientific dimension of medicine. This 
bipolarity  between therapy and objectivity should not be conceived 
as exclusive. In an ideal situation the therapy is objectively 
effective; however, in the border areas or conflicting situations, the 
scientific dimension of medicine will tend to put weight on 
objectivity and the practical dimension put weight on the 
therapeutical implications. The field of medicine that tries to 
incorporate harmoniously both the notions of objectivity and 
therapy is clinical science. The scientific medical model concerns 
itself prim arily with the two aspects of medical science, the 
biological scientific and the clinical scientific. In the following the 
two dim ensions of scientific medicine are confronted with central 
notions from  theory of knowledge.
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Medicine as realism under empirical control
It is useful to distinguish between philosophical positions and 
philosophical levels of discussions. There are, at least, two 
im portant levels of philosophical discussion, the ontological and the 
epistemological. The ontological level focuses on how the world is in 
itself. Ontology can be understood as the knowlegde of what exists. 
Epistem ology focuses on how we gain access to the world that 
exists, and is synonymous with theory of knowledge. The 
philosophical positions that I will make use of are realism  and anti­
realism , rationalism  and empiricism. Realism is the ontological 
position that the world exists independently of any observer, that it 
is an objective phenomenon, not a kind of sham, a subjective dream  
or an illusion. Rationalism is the epistemological position that 
human reason can by itself grasp central features of the world.
Pure reason has the ability to provide certain knowledge about the 
world, w ithout any empirical initiation or control. Empiricism  is the 
epistem ological position that we really can not say anything about 
the world if it is not initiated and confirmed by empirical facts, by 
observation or experim ents.
The follow ing figure illustrates the relations:
Level of discussion Philosophical position:
Ontological: Realism Anti-realism
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Epistemological: Rationalism Empiricism
How can contemporary scientific medicine be characterised by the 
notions mentioned above? One central feature of scientific m edicine 
is that it is founded on a realist position. Both medicine and 
philosophy are the end products of a rem arkable developm ent that 
started in Greece about five centuries BC, where the Ionian 
philosophers rejected the religious or mythical explanations of 
natural events. They based their philosophy on two axiomatic 
principles. The first was their belief in the "first substance", a single 
fundam ental physical entity from which everything derives. Their 
second assum ption was that the diversity of nature causally could 
be explained as effects of that first thing. The idea of causes as such 
is part of every explanatory system religious, m ystical or scientific. 
W hat was new was the more restrictive idea that events in nature 
were caused only by other natural events: "The ruler o f  the world is 
whirlwind, that has unseated Zeus" 69. Causes and effects were part 
of nature and therefore explicable. Most of our knowledge about 
the Greek medical scientific tradition derives from the H ippocratic 
C o rp u s70. They document a reaction against the prescientific 
m ythico-religious conception represented by the Ascleipian cult71.
69 A History o f Western Philosophy (2.ed.). Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich inc. 
New York 1970: quoting Aristophanes on p. 0.
70 Hippocratic Writings. Penguin Classics. London 1983
71 The Cult o f Ascleipus was a religious healing cult dominant in Greece 
about 6oo BC. The cult introduces "temple-cures", in special buildings for the 
sick, later developed to hospitals. The snake had an important role in the cult. 
One often practised therapy was to let (non-venominous) snakes lick the 
wounds o f the sick. Later the role o f the snake transformed from magical 
therapy to a symbol o f scientific medicine: the snake that curies around the 
stick on the signs outside most pharmacies is Ascleipus' snake and stick.
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The Hippocratic Corpus stress that also in the field of medicine 
causes are to be regarded as natural phenomena and not a question 
of Demons or Divine influence. The cause of a disease was explained 
by reference to for example climate, diet or lack of exercise. The 
treatise "The sacred disease"72 on epilepsy begins with the 
following lines: "I do not believe that the "Sacred D isease" is any 
more divine or sacred than any other disease but, on the contrary , 
has specific characteristics and a definite cause."
The second feature of scientific medicine is a characterisation of the 
epistem ological level. Before the empirical dimension of scientific 
m edicine will be stressed it is necessary to present in more detail 
the notions of rationalism  and empiricism. The philosophical 
dichotom y between rationalism  and empiricism is useful to 
describe central differences between the clinical and biological 
aspects o f m edical science. Today the historical disagreem ent 
betw een continental rationalists (Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza) and 
the British em piricists (Locke, Berkley, Hume) may seem som ewhat 
outdated, in the sense that their positions were so radical. The 
rationalists regarded the empirical refutation of human reason and 
innate human qualities as superficial, and the em piricists regarded 
the rationalistic approach as pure figment of the imagination. Seen 
retrospectivly both had something to say. The rationalist had a 
naive conception of the complexity of the world. In m edicine Du 
Savages" classification of diseases is a good example of a naive 
rationalistic approach. On the other hand they were right in 
insisting on the possibility of gaining knowledge of the world by
72 See note 70: p. 237-51
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reason. Today medical knowledge is quite at a different level, and 
few would doubt that the physiological and biochemical knowledge 
of the human body describes reality in a fairly precise way. The 
em piricists on their side were right in focusing on the limits of 
human reason and knowledge, and the emphasis on experim ent.
If  one looks at some contemporary m edical theories norm ally 
considered non-scientific, for example homoepathy, they make no 
reference to spirits or religious forces, but must by characterised as 
realist theories. In what way do scientific m edicine differ from  for 
exam ple hom oepathy? One difference is that scientific m edicine 
has a critical attitude to its subject matter and methods. Though the 
process of falsification probably is more complex than initially 
suggested by Popper, the knowledge that a theory or hypothesis 
can be wrong is an integrated part of the scientific process. At an 
epistem ological level homoepathy is best described as a rationalistic 
theory. From  a few central principles the therapy is deduced, but 
seldom  system atically subjected to a thorough em pirical testing. 
Scientific medicine does not only rest on a realist non-m ythical 
conception of its subject matter, it also has a systematic em pirical 
dim ension, exem plified by the scientific experim ent or the double 
blind trial. The logical positivists emphasise the empirical 
dim ension, and try to construct a theory of science where the 
theoretical apparatus is strictly distinguished from  the em pirical 
dimension. Both Popper and Kuhn have showed that this simply is 
not how science is conducted. Empirical facts in medicine are not 
gathered randomly, on the contrary, they are a result of careful 
considerations within a specific theory. But the refutation of the
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positivists should not produce an overkill, and initiate a general 
refutation of the empirical epistemological dimension in medicine. 
M odern scientific medicine can, with the notions here adopted, be 
described as "realism under empirical con tro l”. 73
Before the concluding presentation of the two m edical scientific 
positions that will be confronted with the placebo effect, I will 
m ention one more conceptual dichotomy that I will use. The notions 
of nom inalism  and essentialism  are historically linked to the 
scholastic discussion in the 16th century regarding the true nature 
of the wafer. Was it really the body of Christ or just a name, a 
human invention? In spite the discussion’s historically intense and 
fierce character m ost today think the question rather irrelevant.
The terminology as I apply it to the discussion about the concept of 
disease, has little to do with its original role, and is intended to 
capture a central problem in theory of knowledge: to what extend 
do our description of nature capture an essence, nature in it self, or 
w hat Saul Kripke74 calls ’’natural kinds”, and to what extend is our 
description a human construction, a relative game of name giving. 
The discussion between essentialism  and nom inalism  is a specific 
expression of the more general discussion considering the relevance 
of the ontological and epistemological level in the pursuit of 
knowledge. W here is the bottle neck of medical knowledge, on the 
ontological-essentialistic level, or on the epistem ological- 
nom inalistic level? Essentialism  is sometimes called conceptual 
realism , but should not be confused with ontological realism.
73 See note 67: p.38
74 Kripke, S. Naming and Necessity. Basil Blackwell. Oxford 1981: see for 
example pp. 116 and 134.
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Ontological realism  is the general metaphysical concept concerning 
the existence of an objective external world, whereas conceptual 
realism /essentialism  is specifically concerned with the nature of 
notions, in the present context, mostly the notion of disease.
Plato, describing the ideal doctor in “The Republic”, says '."And it's 
disgraceful too to need a doctor not only fo r  injury or regular 
disease, but because living the idle life .... (have) driven the 
medical profession to invent names fo r  our diseases, like fla tu lence  
and ca tarrh ..." "These new-fangled names fo r  diseases are very fa r ­
fe tch e d " . From an essentialistic position, Plato criticises his 
contem porary physicians for nom enalisticly inventing names for (in 
his view) non-existing diseases. As an example of a pure 
nom inalistic position, one could mention Rousseau: “There are no 
diseases, only sick persons". 75In modern m edicine a nom inalistic 
tendency is expressed for example in psychiatric diagnostic 
categories regarding abnorm al sexual behaviour. H istorically 
hom osexuality is a disease entity. Most people today would regard 
that diagnosis as a pure nominalistic construction. The discussion 
sometimes gives the impression that only a nominalistic or an 
essentialistic position is possible. However, I want to make use of 
the notions in a different way, focusing on the tension between the 
two extrem e notions, asserting that though different weight can be 
put on the epistemological or ontological level of a description one 
cannot om it or reduce the one to the other. I regard diseases as 
some kind of natural class, objectively describable to a certain
7  ^ Quoted in note 67: p.78
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extent. However, every description needs names, and the im portant 
question is what hides in the uncertainty of “a certain extent"?
Ontological realism  has an affinity to epistemological rationalism , 
and ontological anti-realism  has an affinity to empiricism. There is 
nothing principally wrong with a "diagonal" position, for example, to 
ontologically claim  a realist position, and epistem ologically an 
em pirical position, however, the traditional association between 
realism  and rationalism , and anti-realism  and em piricism , initiates 
a tension in such a diagonal position. The characterisation of 
contem porary m edical science as "realism under em pirical control" 
is such a diagonal position. Thus medicine does not only contain a 
tension between a clinical scientific and a biological scientific 
aspect, but also on a conceptual level, contain a tension between its 
ontological and epistemological levels. The m edical scientific model 
incorporates the two conflicting dimensions within contem porary 
medicine by conceiving scientific medicine as consisting of two 
positions: the Bio-mechanical and the Clinico-em pirical position. The 
B io-m echanical position is at a conceptual level primarily 
ontologically founded. With regard to the three levels of m edical 
knowledge it circumscribes the biological scientific level. In praxis 
the Bio-m echanical position is mostly expressed in the laboratory, 
through biological scientific research. The Clinico-em pirical position 
is at a conceptual level primarily epistem ologically founded. W ith 
regard to the three levels of medical knowledge, it circum scribes 
clinical science, and is mostly expressed in clinical research on 
patients through clinical trials. Though the two positions, as will be 
clear, in many ways contrast with each other, it is param ount to 
regard them as positions within the same scientific model. The bio­
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m echanical position does make considerable use of empirical 
research, and the Clinico-empirical position does not jettison the use 
of realist theories. W hat differs is not the general framework: 
realism  under empirical control, but the emphasis put on realism  
and scientific objectivity within the Bio-mechanical position, and 
em piricism  and therapeutical objectivity within the Clinico- 
em pirical position.
In a previous section I described a medical model as the concepts, 
the way of thinking and organisation that enables a community to 
cope with disease. However, any analysis of a reasonable length 
including the complexity of concepts, routines and organisation 
expressed in a medical model would demand much more space than 
this thesis allows. I will restrict my approach to the two positions of 
the m edical model to a conceptual analysis. There are many 
im portant notions that can be included in such an analysis.
However, I assert that a number of central concepts constitute the 
"spine" of a medical model. The conceptual triad that I have 
choosen to focus on are: causality, disease and therapy. All three 
central concepts in a medical model are necessary and m utually 
support each other. However, different models and different 
positions have different weight on the concepts. The concept of 
causality is central both to science and philosophy and I will 
generally focus more on causality, regard disease as a supportive 
notion, and discuss therapy in more detail under the Clinico- 
em pirical position.
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Chapter four:
The bio-mechanical position
Generative Causality and Ontological D eterm inism
A realist sees causal connections as "something out there", as a 
feature of nature, as something real. The billiard cue hits the ball 
and this is the cause of its motion. This realist concept of causality, 
rooting back to the Ionians, was elaborated into its finest practical 
form by Newton. His revolutionary Philolosophia Naturalis Principia 
M atem atica from 1687 reduces what seemed as rem ote
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phenomena: the fall of an apple, the course of a cannon ball and the 
motion of planets to be effects of the same cause: gravity. Though 
very influenced m ethodologically by the empirical tradition of 
Galileo, his ontological position, as most scientists, was that of a 
realist. His notion of causality could be called a g en era tive  one. His 
laws of nature were realist descriptions of a cause generating an 
e ffec t.
In m edicine, the Newtonian notion of causality found its m ost 
precise form ulation, and promising practical application by Claude 
B e rn a rd 76. In his "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental 
M edicine" from  1865 he emphasized the importance of experim ents 
in m edicine, and like the later positivists looked at physics as a 
guiding ideal. The bodily complexity was at the end of the day 
reducible to causal laws that could be unveiled in the laboratory. 
B ernard 's discovery of the glycogenic capacity of the liver and of 
the vasom otor nerves revolutionised physiology and supported his 
claim  that biological events are causal in a similar m echanistic way 
as the movements of billiard balls, giving the name to the position: 
Bio-m echanical. There is a tendency in both Newton and Bernard to 
regard all natural phenomena as reducible to the effect of a few 
causes, preferable one single cause. The astonishing success of 
N ew ton's m echanics and Bernard's experim ental physiology showed 
that this was possible, at least in some cases.
76 The direct influence of Newton’s theories on medicine was the 
"iatrophysical school": a medical theory conceiving biology as applied 
physics with little lasting impact.The concept o f causality that Newton made 
use o f , however, is parallel to Bernerds, two centuries later.
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The philosopher who formulated most explicitly the ideas lying 
im plicitly in the work of Newton was the Frenchman Laplace 
(1749-1827). In his “Essai Philosophique sur les probabilites"77 he 
reflects on the possibility of a "world formula", a complete 
description of the world. He constructed a thought experim ent 
featuring a Demon with incredible brain power and knowledge of 
N ew ton 's laws. This creature would be able to know the initial 
conditions and the working forces of every physical body in the 
universe, and thus would be able to determine the future of the 
world. This onto logical determ inism  was paired with an awareness 
of the practical difficulty of such a project, and Laplace claimed that 
man would have to settle with an incomplete statistical description, 
a position that could be called epistem iological indeterm in ism . It is 
probably not as great a paradox as it looks like that the form ulator 
of the classical determinism also was the founder of the branch of 
m athem atics known as statistics. Laplace developed this field on 
the basis of his experience with dice gambling.
Causally Defined Diseases
There was no single philosopher or doctor who form ulated the 
corresponding Bio-mechanical concept of disease. The bio­
m echanical nosographic78 tradition grew stronger from the many 
scientific discoveries of the 19th century. Faber79 divides several
77 International Encyclopedia of Statistics. The Free Press. New York 1978: 
p.493 under "Laplace11.
78 I use the word "nosography", as a term not restricted to disease 
description but in a broader meaning the concept o f disease.
79 Faber, K. Nosography. P.B. Hoeber. New York 1930.
66
phases in the evolution of disease classification and the disease 
concept: the patho-anatom ical, the physiological, the 
m icrobiological, and the genetic. However, I will reduce the 
d ifferent approaches to two fundam entally different ways a disease 
entity is defined or essentially described from a bio-m echanical 
position. Some diseases are what can be called "clinical syndromes": 
diseases whose characteristics are the conjecture of the clinical 
symptoms of a patient. Crohn's disease or m ultiple sclerosis are 
exam ples of such syndromes. They are empirically defined with no 
reference to any underlying causes. Other diseases are so called 
"causally defined diseases". The paradigmatical example is a 
bacterial infection. The works of Koch and Pasteur supported 
Bernard’s old ideal of the single cause. The cause of pulmonar 
tuberculosis is the bacterium  that infects the lung: m ycobacterium  
tuberculoses. The bio-mechanical position conceptualises disease as 
the error-in-the-m achine, and though not essentially a part of the 
position, there is a strong tendency to emphasise the singular: error, 
not errors.
From a bio-mechanical point of view the clinical syndromes have 
less scientific status then the causally defined diseases. In the 
bipolarity  between essentialism  and nom inalism, the classical 
position is associated with the essentialism. There is a sharp 
distinction between the symptoms and the cause of a disease, and 
correspondingly between the illness and the disorder. The illness is 
what the patient feels, the pain and discomfort, whereas the 
disorder is the underlying pathological process, the “disease-in-it- 
self” . The impetus of the causally defined diseases pushes the 
balance between disease and illness in the favour of illness. In the
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process of the objectivisation of the illness, the subjectivity of the 
patient, his ill-ness, loses importance.
The Bio-mechanical position has difficulties explaining the nature of 
human psyche and its influence on disease. In later chapters I will 
discuss in detail the mind-body problem here expressed, and 
restrict m yself to note that the Bio-mechanical position is associated 
with the traditional Cartesian dualism. Here the psyche is 
acknowledged as of importance to disease, but not to science. The 
subjective experience of ill-ness is something priests and 
philosophers should handle, but has little interest for scientific 
m ed ic ine .
One cause-one cure
The bio-mechanical notion of therapy is in a way very simple. The 
whole idea of the strict deterministic disease description can be 
seen as structuring a clinical situation were the complexity of a 
disease is reversible by a single pill. The model revolves around the 
assum ption that to the single cause behind a disease there 
corresponds a singular causal therapy. The cure for tuberculosis is 
the antibiotic, that kills the mycobacterium: streptom ycin. Therapy 
is closely associated with theory. A therapy distinguishes itself 
from a treatm ent by relying on the guidance of a theory of the 
nature and causes of the disease to be stopped. One can call the 
ideal of the classical scientific position for curative or c a u sa l  
treatment The surgical removal of an inflamed appendix or the 
treatm ent of tuberculosis with drugs that kill m ycobacterium  
tuberculoses are regarded as curative therapy. When you have
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treated the cause of the disease you have cured the patient. 
However, this ideal is often not practicable. W hat can be done is to 
treat the pain relating to an illness. This is called p a llia t iv e  
treatm ent, or more general, when other symptoms than pain are 
targeted: sym ptom atic  trea tm ent
The placebo pill as an imitation- the placebo effect as a challenge
The placebo effect is a therapeutical result of the general clinical 
setting and the interaction between doctor and patient. The placebo 
is a sham treatment, often in the form of a inert pill. Such a 
treatm ent is, if not acceptable from a Bio-mechanical position, then 
at least acknowledged as a sham, an imitation or distorted 
reflection of the proper sort of medicine. A sugar pill is still a pill 
and im itates, and therefore reflects and confirms, the classical ideal 
of one cause, one cure. It is probably no coincidence that the 
concept of a placebo treatment grew out of a classical scientific 
tradition. The placebo e ffec t as such is much more problematic. The 
ideal of the somatic objective medicine is that the doctor and the 
patient as individuals essentially are irrelevant. The doctor is seen 
as a professional who treats disorders, not individuals, and he could 
in principle be swopped by a colleague with the same qualifications. 
The placebo effect’s emphasis on the clinical setting challenges this 
ideal. The real placebogenic complex has to do with the clinical 
setting and the personal interaction between doctor and patient. 
Entities that, from a Bio-mechanical position, ought to be utterly 
irrelevant to any therapy.
D oubt about the Bio-mechanical concepts
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Regardless of what aspect one focuses on, there is a disharm ony 
between the placebo effect and the Bio-mechanical position.
There is no organ or cell in the biological machine of man that, in 
any reasonable degree of detail, can explain the placebo 
phenomenon. The concept of one cause-one cure is, as well, very 
rem ote from  the m ulti-causal placebo effect. The im portance of the 
personalities of both doctor and patient, the influence of the psyche 
of the patient are all phenomena that contrasts the B io-m echanical 
position. When a part of a medical model, or in general a theoretical 
prediction, is confronted with an empirical phenomenon that the 
theory is unable to account for there are, in principle, two strategies 
one can adopt. The first is a defensive strategy where, in this case, 
the Bio-mechanical position is modified to fit the facts. The 
disharm ony between the placebo effect and the B io-m echanical 
position makes this strategy plausible and both Hahn and Brody 
regard the placebo effect as anomalies. I agree with them in so far 
as the the placebo effect raises severe doubt about the 
com pleteness and usefulness of the Bio-mechanical position.
However, another possible strategy, with regard to a disharm ony 
between empirical facts and theory, is to criticise the em pirical 
foundation. In an attem pt to immunize the Bio-m echanical position 
several offensive lines of arguments can be used. As I illustrated 
with the cartographic definition, the placebo effect can be regarded 
as either not "real” or it is criticised of only being a unspecific, and 
therefore undesired, therapy. Shapiro's placebo definition contained 
the ambiguous term “unspecific”. The placebo effect is an unspecific 
effect, where for example the effect of streptomycin is specific on
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m ycobacterium  tuberculosis. In the next chapter I w ill elaborate 
this more; at the moment it is sufficient to point out that “specific” 
in the bio-mechanical sense means causally explicable in a 
determ inistic sense. A specific therapy is here synonymous with a 
causal therapy. The placebo effect is regarded as unspecific, as only 
affecting symptoms. It is at best harmless as it does not influence 
the biology of a disorder, and at worst harmful as it can disguise 
relevant symptoms. Such attempts of ad hoc imm unization of the 
Bio-m echanical position are, after a review of the em pirical 
m aterial on the placebo effect, in themselves unplausible and raises 
not only severe doubt about the Bio-mechanical position as such, 
but also about the concepts that it is built on: the one cause-one 
cure notion, the strict distinction between causal and sym ptomatic 
therapy, and between disorders and illness. The Bio-m echanical 
position is left with a serious problem. The Error-in-the-m achine 
analogy has great difficulty in incorporating the influence of the 
psyche on disease in general.
C onclusion
Seen from  the Bio-mechanical position therapy and disease are not 
influenced by the patien t's perception of his situation, they are 
essentially objective, natural kinds. The cure is based on the 
isolation of a cause and a physical or pharmacological therapy 
thw arting that cause, not on a unspecific inter-personal relation 
between a doctor and a patient. The placebo effect represents a 
severe anomaly for the Bio-mechanical position. The possible 
attem pts of ad hoc immunization of the position are not plausible.
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The usefulness of the concepts on which the Bio-mechanical 
position stands, is doubted severely.
Chapter five:
Placebo and The Clinico- 
empirical position
Succession causality
David Hume is possibly the most important philosopher in the field 
of causality. Before him the concept was regarded as self-evidently 
real, m aybe complex to describe because, in a specific situation, we 
do not posses all relevant facts; but at a philosophical level 
causality was firmly and unchallenged rooted in the palm of the 
realists. David Hume criticises the realist concept of causality and 
introduces an empirical alternative, known as “su c c e ss io n  
causality”. In Hume's "A Treatise On Human Nature" from 1740 he 
underm ines the realist conception of causality with an em pirically 
m inded argumentation. He says that the only relation we can be 
sure of is that the "effect" follows successively from the "cause". 
Cause and effect are two events that we customarily relate to each
7 2
other in a specific way in which the first is responsible for the 
second. W hen two events are spatially and temporally conjoined so 
that one succeeds the other in a regular way we speak of causality. 
How ever, the necessary connection traditionally attributed to 
causality is nothing more than an idea, a felt expectation of the 
mind. Hume makes use of the so called induction problem to 
support his claim  that the necessary connection between cause and 
effect is only an idea: not “something out there” but “something in 
us” . That event A always has been temporally and spatially 
succeeded by event B can never make it logically valid to conclude 
that A in the future always will cause B. In the end of the section in 
the Treatise where causality is discussed Hume offers a list of rules 
used for practically judging relations of cause and effect: 1. Cause 
and effect must by contiguous in space and time. 2. The cause m ust 
be prior to the effect and 3. There must be a constant conjunction 
between case and effect.
Hume was immensely impressed by Newton, and his whole 
philosophical project can be seen as an attempt to apply the 
inductive and critical method of natural science on theory of 
know ledge and moral philosophy. However his succession causality 
is clearly fundam entally different from that of Newton and 
Bernard. They m ight have called themselves em piricists and were 
so in a methodological way, but when it came to the underlying 
m etaphysical position grounding their practical research they were 
realists. H um e's analyses did not have much influence on the 
practical scientific level. In a philosophical context however his 
im portance was immense, partly through his influence on I. Kant.
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Causality and quantum mechanics
In a scientific context the classical determ inism  was unchallenged 
as an ideal until early this century. Physics, the hard core natural 
science, then discovered that in the micro-cosmos of atoms and 
elem entary particles the classical way of describing causal relations 
was inadequate. Bohr and Heisenberg were the main creators of 
quantum  mechanics, as the new field was known. It challenged 
some of the basic assumptions that N ew ton's classical mechanics 
was built on, and revolutionized the concept of causality. One of the 
corner stones of the quantum theory is the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Relation. It can be formulated as:
P * Q = h.
”P" is the coordinates of position and "Q" of momentum of 
subatomaric particles as for example an electron, whereas h is the 
constant speed of light. The consequence of the formula is that with 
the greater certainty or determ inism  we measure for exam ple p the 
more indeterm inate or uncertain will our knowledge of q be. The 
causal connection of the particles in question is of such a character 
that the classical deterministic description is unsuitable. The 
highest degree of precision for that particular subject m atter is 
represented by the statistical formulae describing the possible 
events. We can not measure in a deterministic way both the 
m om entum  and the position of an electron, only describe with 
statistical uncertainty their relation. The importance of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Relation for the theory of knowledge is
twofold. Firstly, it exorcises the Demon of Laplace, and silences the 
classical determ inists. The only field of human knowledge where 
classical determ inism  had been practically endorsed on a grand 
scale: physics, now introduced a whole field, where the causal 
connections were of a fundamentally different character. It was not 
longer only a practical problem of gaining access to the forces and 
initial conditions of every physical body. It is on a theoretical level 
in principal impossible. Secondly, it focused attention on the nature 
of statistical description, or probability itself. Since the days of 
Laplace statistical methods were used many places, also in 
m edicine, but there was a tendency to regard them as an 
incom plete description. Statistical approaches to scientific facts 
were seen as an incomplete description of nature, as an 
epistem ological waiting place before the real description was 
attainable. The new quantum theory made that view problem atic. 
The philosophical interpretation of the quantum theory can be 
divided in two main groups80. The first position, represented by 
Einstein, gives it an epistemological status, it is our incomplete 
description of a fully determined nature. The second position gives 
it full ontological status, and is represented by the similar, but not 
identical views of Bohr and Heisenberg. Quantum theory is 
regarded by Heisenberg as an unavoidable interaction between 
nature as object and the human subject. The researcher changes 
nature in his act of observing it. The researcher is not any more 
describ ing  an observer-independent reality. The observer- 
dependence is, on the contrary, part of reality.
80 Petersen, A. Quantum Physics and the Philosophical Tradition. MIT Press. 
Cambridge 1968
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Necessary and sufficient conditions
A classical way of describing a causal relation is to define the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for an effect. The clarification of 
the terms is usually done by referring to a black box model where 
the causal relations are unknown to us and where we can only 
observe the events of cause and effect. It could for example be a 
coffee machine. I insert a coin in machine A and get a cup of coffee. 
This happens every time I insert a coin and does not happen if I 
do n 't insert the coin. The insertion of the coin is a necessary and 
sufficient reason for my cup of coffee. However a machine B is 
different in a very unpopular way. Sometimes, for example one out 
of three trails, it does not produce the wanted fluid. The coin 
insertion is a necessary, but not sufficient cause. A third machine 
differs from the two previous. It is very popular because beside 
serving a cup every time a coin is inserted, it sometimes produces 
coffee without a previously inserted coin. The coin insertion is here 
a sufficient, but not a necessary cause. In other words: the effect in 
question is always preceded by the neccesary cause, that, however,
is not sufficient a llw ays  to initiate the effect. The sufficient cause,
on the other hand, is always followed by the effect, which however, 
can be initiated without the specific sufficient cause.
The relation can be illustrated by a Venn diagram:
N N S S
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The area N represents the situations exemplified by m achine B: 
Every coffee was proceeded by a insertion of a coin. The area S 
represent the situations exemplified by machine C: every coin was 
followed by a coffee. The area N S represent the working of 
machine A: every coin insertion is followed by a coffee, and no 
coffee is not produced without a coin. This area represents the 
classical deterministic ideal of causal relation.
However clarificatory the notions are in rather simple black box
exam ples as above, every-day situations, and also many m edical 
situations, prove far too complex to be adequately described by 
them. Lung cancer and tobacco smoking have been linked together 
since the early fifties and represent one of the major health 
problem s in the world. It would be a grave m isunderstanding to 
regard the applicability of the notions of necessary and sufficient 
causes as a kind of indicator for the importance of a causal relation. 
Smoking is neither a sufficient nor necessary cause for lung cancer. 
The m ajority of smokers do not get cancer, and of those who get
lung cancer a m inority have never smoked.
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Causal fields and inus-factors
A different approach to causality is represented by John 
A n d e rso n 81. In an essay on difficulties with J.S. M ill's concept of 
causation he introduces the term "causal field". His starting point is 
interesting as he can be regarded as describing the notion of 
causality from  an every day language approach, and therefore 
differs from the starting point of most others who relate causality 
to science, often physics. Instead of focusing on the linear causality 
between event A and B, a coin causing a cup of coffee, he in the 
phrase "causal field" includes every causal interaction that has 
influenced the event one is interested in. The event one is 
interested in often relates to what is the abnormal outcome of a 
usually normal causal complex of events. Anderson claims that 
every causal statement is built on a question: what caused X? X is 
an event that sticks out compared to the normal causal field, for 
example the burning of your house. It would be absurd to ask why 
the house did not burn down today, because the house does not 
normally burn down. It is a part of the normal causal field that the 
house does not burn. If the house accidently does burn down, the 
question becomes very relevant: why did it burn down? Analogous 
to the difference in effect, the relevant causes that m ight be listed, 
would be the ones that are abnormal compared to the causal field. 
Maybe some would note that there was a gas leak, or that some 
children were experimenting with the art of sending smoke signals 
by making a bon-fire on the roof. However, no one would think of 
noting that the atmosphere consists of 20 % oxygen, because it is a
81 Anderson,J. The Problem of Causality. Australasien Journal o f Philosophy,
XVI 1938.
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fact that is part of the (tacit) normal causal field. It is interesting to 
note that in a black box situation the presence of oxygen would 
count as an necessary but not sufficient cause for any fire. If 
som eone, however, in the basement had illegally stored pressure 
tanks containing pure oxygen, such a fact would, if the tanks 
exploded and caused the fire to escalate, be regarded as relevant to 
any legal prosecution after the fire. The juridical concept of cause is, 
by the way, very close to the notion here sketched, as described by 
Hart and Honore82.
The causal field notion is also important for J.L. Mackie who, in his 
"The Cement of the Universe",83 suggests the notion of inus-factors. 
Inus-factors are insufficient but accessary parts of an a n n e c e s s a ry  
but sufficient causal complex. In other word, they are any part of a 
causal relation that, if not present, would change the outcom e or 
effect: they are non-redundant factors. The particular causal 
complex one is interseted in contains a series of events causally 
linked resulting in an effect contrasting the normal causal field, for 
example the gas leak leading to a burned down house. The single 
inus factor is an insufficient but necessary condition for the 
effective causal complex. The causal complex is initself 
unneccessary, other possible alternative series of events are 
possible, but sufficient for the outcome. The weakness of the term  
is that it is immensely open ended, there normaly are very many 
non-redundant factors. Smoking is an inus-factor in relation to lung 
cancer. It would be an Sisyphean labour to exhaustively list every
82 Hart, HLA & Honor6, AM. Causation in the Law. Oxford 1959.
83 Mackie, JL. The cement o f the Universe. A study of causation. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford 1974.
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thinkable inus-factor relating to for example lung cancer. Again 
oxygen in the atmosphere would be one, as it is necessary for 
smoking a cigarette. The list could continue ad absurdum and 
probably ad libitum. The strength of the term is that it emphasizes 
the strong connection between what we think is a relevant cause 
and the framework of the whole project of asking a causal question. 
The selection of a cause in a medical context mirrors what the
m edical society thinks is most relevant to the strategy that is to be
implemented. It points out that in many situations there is no 
evident way of distinguishing an event as a cause from  a condition. 
The interesting question still is what causes a disease, but the
Clinico-em pirical formulation would in stead be: what are the m ost
im portan t causes?
The illusion of one cause-one disease
M ackie’s analysis is relevant when looking at the concept of disease. 
The bio-m echanical nosographic ideal revolves around the concept 
of a causally described disease: to one cause there correlates one 
cure. The paradigmatic example is the bacterial infection. However, 
we know that the majority of persons infected with, for example,
TB are immunologically able to counter the bacterium, and never 
get sick. In the middle of the last century the risk of exposure to 
the m ycobacterium  during a life span must, in certain areas, have 
been close to 100 %. Its status as a cause can thus be compared 
with the presence of oxygen in the previous example of the burning 
house. The presence of mycobacterium is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for tuberculosis. Defining the cause of
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tuberculosis is to construct your point of view, selecting one or 
more factors from the causal complex leading to the disease, call 
them  causes and the rest conditions. A m icrobiologist will present 
the bacterium  as the cause, a family practicioner engaged in social 
m edicine will point out bad housing as the cause, and finally a 
imm unologist will tell you that the cause is to be found in a weak 
immune system. With this I am not trying to criticise scientific 
pursuit of causes of diseases, only showing that the ideal of a fully 
causally described disease is impossible to practice. Even the 
paradigm atic causally described disease: an infection, reveal itself 
as m ultifactorial. Its "causes” are relative to the perspective of the 
re s e a rc h e r .
In contrast to the Bio-mechanical concept of disease, an Clinico- 
em pirical position will have a strong affinity to nominalism. The 
patient as a subjective individual gains importance as the notion of 
causally fully described diseases reveal itself as an illusion. The 
natural classes of diseases are not so natural after all when the 
central features change character with the intentions of the 
interested researchers. The extent of indeterm inism  changes from  
what a realist regards as irritating statistical uncertainty, to a 
central part of the abstract notion of a disease. When the “real” 
existence of an illness is discussed, the evident real existence of the 
patient becomes a point of security. W hat a physician is treating is 
not a disease, but a person. The disease is only a conceptual tool in 
the pursuit of an effective therapy for that person.
P ragm atic Therapy 
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The Bio-m echanical position strictly distinguishes between 
"specific" and "non-specific" therapy, and regards "specific" therapy 
as synonymous with causal therapy. However, "specific" also has 
another meaning attached to it. Streptomycin is regarded as specific 
therapy, whereas good housing, and diet are regarded as non­
specific. In other words a non-specific therapy helps in a general 
way, whereas a specific therapy cures one or a few illnesses or 
symptoms. This nosographical, or scope limiting, aspect of "specific" 
can be regarded as the empirical interpretation of "specific". There 
are several unspecific therapies. The most well known is what is 
called “conservative treatm ent” . This is a regime where no specific 
surgical or medical action is taken, but where the healing powers of 
the body are supported by a number of unspecific treatm ent 
factors as for example hospitalisation, rest etc. A specific therapy is 
regarded as more efficient than an unspecific. This is generally true, 
but the point is that they are intimately intervined, and at least the 
specific treatm ent factor cannot be seen alone. The effect of a 
specific therapy is based on numerous unspecific factors, in a way 
analogous to a basis-superstructure relation. The specific therapy of 
TB, streptomycin, is build on the basis that the patient rests, gets 
enough to eat, is in the hospital where the hygiene is good etc.
The Bio-mechanical position insists as well that there is a 
fundam ental distinction between causal and sym ptom atic therapy. 
Though for some purposes the distinction is useful, the Clinico- 
em pirical position would claim  that the distinction is not 
fundam ental, because it is relative, what can be called a causal 
therapy. A m icrobiologist would regard a streptomycin cure for TB
82
as causal therapy, but an epidemiologist would call it symptomatic 
treatm ent, because he focuses on different causes (bad housing etc). 
W hat is regarded as causal therapy is relative to the point of view 
of the researcher, in the same way as what is regarded the cause of 
a disease is relative to the point of perspective.
The Clinico-em pirical position does not say that there is no 
difference between treating a fractured arm with pain killers or 
reponing the two fractured ends. However, it does not regard good 
therapy as synonymous with causal therapy. A Clinico-em pirical 
position will insist on the perspectivistic aspect of what is regarded 
as causal therapy. When a Bio-mechanical rock-bottom  concept is 
relativised an alternative empirical notion must take over as 
"anchor". There is in the Clinico-empirical position embedded a 
pragm atic concept of therapy: Regardless of the theoretical 
explanation, whatever helps, whatever works, is a therapy, and is 
worth pursuing.
Therapy and M anipulative Capacity
From  a Clinico-em pirical position it is not interesting whether or not 
psychological or social factors influence disease. There is no sharp 
distinction between biological and other causes, just as long as a 
causal relation has been established. The necessary question then 
is, on what grounds an em piricist will make his therapeutical 
priorities, what makes one therapy better than an others? There 
are several different reasons one could focus on, but in this context 
I will focus on two. The first is that the effect of the treatment must
8 3
be substantiated firmly. The second is that we are capable of 
m anipulating in such a way, that in the therapeutical process, we do 
not create a worse situation than we started out with. In this 
section I will focus on the manipulative aspect, and later return to 
the necessity of proper em pirical substantiation.
Health is always regarded as something valuable, sometimes one 
gets the impression that it is the only value in medicine. However, 
consider if health actually was the chief good: the knowledge of 
society’s prime value is embedded in the physicians who would get 
a kind of Philosopher King status. Smoking will be punished by 
hanging, food would be regulated by a personal com m issioner of 
diet, drinking would result in compulsory involvem ent in clinical 
trials. Traffic would be regulated so to avoid any traffic deaths: 
speed lim its down to 30 miles an hour, a policeman situated on 
every com er, and all cars and road sides protected by a thick layer 
of rubber. Most people would be horrified by the thought of living 
in this Utopia of health. With this little thought experim ent I am 
em phasizing the fact that behind every therapy there are 
considerations of non-scientific nature. A therapy being assessed 
with regard to its possible implementation will, apart from its 
clinical significance, always be measured by econom ical end ethical- 
political standards. The expense and inconvenience to the society as 
a whole connected to, for example, placing a policeman on every 
corner, overrules the importance of the decrease in traffic caused 
deaths. The necessary restriction of personal freedom in the U topia 
of health would for many be ethical and politically unacceptable.
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Apart from  the moral or political factors effecting the usefulness of 
a therapy, there is also a practical level to be addressed. Im agine 
that an immunological defect is a inus-factor in the etiology of a 
hypothetical form of hepatic failure. The immunological defect is 
not therapeutically potent if procedures are not invented that 
actually are able to counter that defect in a reasonable smooth 
m anner. The difference between penicillin therapy for pneum onia 
and liver transplantations for hepatic failure illustrates this. Giving 
a patient a tablet of penicillin is, at a practical level, easier than the 
technical complexity of whole organ transplantations. The 
difference in practicability alone makes penicillin a much more 
attractive therapy. If a pharm acon was invented that reversed the 
hepatic failure in question, the transplantation would be 
a b a n d o n e d .
The Placebo Effect and necessarv/sufficient conditions
The placebo effect cannot be incorporated in the Bio-m echanical 
position, and creates severe doubt about the usefulness of the 
conceptual apparatus of that position. However, the situation is 
different when it comes to the Clinico-empirical position. In the rest 
of the chapter I will show that the Clinico-empirical position on 
im portant areas provides a congruent conceptual frame for the 
placebo effect. The following section will discuss the im plications of 
the placebo effect on the causality notions elaborated previously.
Is it possible to describe the placebo effect in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions? Are there, to start with, any sufficient
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conditions for the placebo effect? The patient's anxiety and the 
doctor's professional personality could be candidates. However, 
beside the vagueness of the used terms, it is implausible that 
anxiety alone or even both factors together is sufficient for 
initiating a placebo effect. Possibly they are conspicuous conditions 
but not sufficient in the strict sense. W hat about necessary 
conditions? A vague list could include some of the aspects norm ally 
used to describe the placebo effect, for example the existence of a 
clinical setting, a patient, a doctor etc, but would have the character 
of a forced reformulation with little new information to present.
The classical terminology is, not surprisingly, difficult to apply 
system atically in an illuminating way; however, one aspect is worth 
dwelling on. A necessary condition for the placebo effect is that the 
patient is co n sc io u s . In that aspect the placebo effect differs from  
m ost other treatments. If a patient treated for TB was unconscious 
it would make the clinical process of diagnosis more difficult, but 
not, in principle, effect the outcome of the therapy. He would as 
well be treated by unspecific therapeutical factor, as he is in 
hospital, is washed and otherwise taken hand of. All of the 
therapeutical field of scientific medicine, except the placebo effect, 
would work on a comatose patient. One fundamental difference 
between therapy in general and placebo is that dealing with a 
person not conscious of the clinical setting, being comatose or 
otherw ise unconscious, shortcuts the placebo effect.
The only other therapy also based on the patient’s consciousness is 
psychotherapy. I omit any attem pt of discusing whether 
psychotherapy is placebo or not. The placebo notion is born out of a 
scientific world view as a kind of negative reflection, a distorted
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image, and is a very general term applying possibly to any clinical 
situation. It is as well associated with a Clinico-empirical position. 
Psychotherapy, on the other hand, is born out of a Freudian 
tradition, has a much narrower scope and is intimately connected to 
the theoretical apparatus of dynamic psychology. It is, as well, close 
to a non-em pirical realist position. To compare the one with the 
other in detail will be interesting when we know more about the 
underlying m echanism s, but at the moment I think such an attem pt 
quickly would muddle the general discussion of placebo84.
The placebo effect, though difficult to describe satisfactorily in the 
classical term s of necessary and sufficient conditions, fits the 
concept of inus-factor. Usually inus-factors are used to analyse the 
causal complex leading to a disease, however, there is nothing 
principally wrong with the application to the causal complex of a 
therapy. The question could be asked: what are the insufficient but 
necessary parts o f an unnecessary but sufficient causal complex 
leading to a placebo effect? Or shorter, what are the inus-factors 
that initiates a placebo effect? The specific factors to m ention will 
be the ones described earlier, however there is no term inological 
difficulty about, for example, the status of patient anxiety. It is 
highly uncertain whether patient anxiety is a sufficient condition, 
but not w hether it is an inus-factor. The different causal factors 
constituing the placebogenic complex are, when described as inus- 
factors or non-redundant conditions, acnowledged as im portant 
causal factors. That they at present are wagely understood makes a
84 I discuss Grunbaum’s article on psychiatry and the placebo effect in 
chapter two.
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selection of one or several factors as the most important ones a 
rather random  process.
Placebo and pragm atic therapy
The clinically most important symptom influenced by the placebo 
effect is pain. Pain perception, regardless of its acute or chronic 
character, is radically changed by the placebo effect. This factor 
alone is of great clinical importance. Pain is possibly the single m ost 
im portant symptom in medicine, it is part of alm ost every disease. 
However, placebo also affects diseases that usually, from a b io­
m echanical position, are categorised as causally defined. There is 
little doubt that the m ost important type of diseases influenced by 
the placebo effect have a reasonable large psychological or psycho­
somatic component, however, a causally defined disease as peptic 
ulcer is often cured by the placebo effect. The distinctions of 
specific/unspecific and causal/sym ptom atic are highly problem atic, 
as discussed previously in this chapter. They do not provide a good 
conceptual frame for the placebo effect either. From the point of 
view of the Clinico-empirical position it would be more appropriate 
to say that the placebo effect is a part of the broad therapeutical 
field, that is available to a physician on the line with hospitalisation, 
rest, penicillin, surgery etc. Off course it is a problem that the 
m echanism s of the placebo effect are so poorly understood, 
however, the Clinico-empirical position is more interested in the 
therapeutical potential than in the theoretical coherence. The 
C linico-em pirical position's acceptance of a theoretical biological 
ignorance is compensated by the param ount im portance connected 
to the em pirical substantiation of a real therapeutical effect. The
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em pirical docum entation becomes the positive scientific bench­
m ark of the Clinico-empirical position. In the second chapter I 
discussed some m ethodological problems concerning the classical 
articles on placebo, the next section will touch on the possibility of a 
trial specially designed to measure the placebo effect.
A trial m easuring placebo
Can one construct a trial where the placebo effect is measured in 
itself, and isolated from any pharmacological effect, natural 
rem ission or other factors? Most documentation of the placebo 
effect has been done by extrapolating results from trials that were 
intended to measure a pharmacological or surgical effect, and as I 
discussed in chapter one, there are certain flaws connected to such 
an approach, prim arily concerning the lack of systematic distinction 
between the placebo effect and the natural remission. A trial that is 
designed to m easure the placebo effect must incorporate a way to 
overcome this structural bias. Assume that we have a group of 
patients that randomly are allocated in a control group and a 
placebo treatm ent group. The basic idea of such a trial would be to 
induce a placebo effect in the treatm ent group and to make sure 
that a placebo effect is not initiated in the control group. In that 
way the spontaneous rem ission (and other factors) would be 
checked for by subtracting the effect outcome in the two groups.
The size of difference would be the real size of the placebo effect. 
The problem  is, however, that the placebo effect is not initiated 
only by a sham pill, but by the clinical setting, patient anxiety, 
physic ian 's expectancy etc. In other words it seems extremely
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difficult theoretically to ensure that a placebo effect is not initiated 
in the control group.
A m ethodologically less satisfactory, but practically im plem entable 
approach, consists in defining the placebo group as a placebo- 
m axim ising group and the control group as a placebo m inim ising 
group. The physicians involved would then in short behave by two 
different strategies. The half of the patients would be treated in a 
way that one believes do not initiate a placebo effect. The patients 
would be superficially examined, the doctor would try to make the 
im pression he does not believe in the treatment etc. The other half 
of the patients would be treated in a way that is believed to 
enhance a placebo effect, they would be examined thoroughly by an 
enthusiastic doctor with great faith in the treatment. However, the 
placebo m inimising group would still potentially be affected by a 
placebo effect. They are a part of a clinical setting and some of the 
older patients would even expect a “proper “doctor to behave like 
that. To be absolutely sure one has escaped the placebo effect, and 
thereby created the basis for an placebo free control group, is 
im possible. One is forced to look at the patient's symptoms without 
the patient knows he is in a clinical setting. Is that possible? W ell, 
w ithout getting in to the m assive ethical problems of such an 
approach, I see just as severe m ethodological problems. One cannot 
practically gain detailed clinical information without the patient 
knowing about it. A rather desperate avoidance strategy would be 
to use unconscious patients. Unconscious patients cannot react with 
a placebo effect. However, this would introduce a selection bias, 
because one will never be certain that what makes the patients 
unconscious does not in some way effect the clinical param eters
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focused on, thereby introducing a structural difference between the 
control group and the placebo group. An methodologically satisfying 
placebo measuring trial seems to be impossible to design. The 
control group can never fulfil the necessary demand that it m ust be 
im possible to induce a placebo effect there.
The epistem ological status of the placebo effect in medicine 
resem bles on im portant areas the status of Heisenberg's 
uncertainty relation in physics. H eisenberg 's own philosophical 
interpretation of his relation can be summarised as follows: the 
apparatus necessary to m easure entities as the momentum of 
electrons interact with the electron in such a way that its 
m om entum  or position changes. The process of objectivisation in 
itse lf initiates subjective or indetermined behaviour of the electron. 
A fundam ental new aspect of quantum mechanics is the im portance 
the experim ental setting obtains. In one setting the electron 
behaves as a wave, in another setting it behaves as a particle. The 
subjectivity of the researcher, expressed through his choice of 
experim ental setting, becomes a part of the theory. In a sim ilar way 
is it in principle impossible to measure the placebo effect in itself.
As discussed in the previous paragraph, the only thing one can 
quantify is the difference between a small and a large effect. In the 
process of measuring the placebo effect, what one wants to 
measure, is enhanced. The role of the physician with regard to the 
placebo effect is analogous to the role of the researcher with regard 
to the uncertainty relation. The clinical setting gains a radically new 
importance through the placebo effect. W hat used to be a 
fram ework for a working process aiming at a pharm acological or 
surgical therapy suddenly, in certain situations, becomes
91
therapeutical itself. The experimental setting of quantum  m echanics 
and the clinical setting of the placebo effect are analogous in so far 
both are examples of a scientific "setting" that is not a passive 
frame but an active component of the measuring or therapeutical 
p ro cess .
Does this affect the realist foundation of the Clinico-em pirical 
position? At a first glance the imm easurability principle seems to 
be a problem. Realism  is the position that the reality exists 
independently from the fact that it is being observed or can be 
observed. In the process of observing the placebo effect, reality, in 
this case the placebo effect, is manipulated, is not independent. 
However, one thing is that it is manipulated or changed by the 
observation process, another thing is if it can exist independent 
from  it. The placebo effect is mostly initiated in a clinical context 
with no intention of observing the phenomenon. H istorically a 
m ultitude of therapies were given that later have been interpreted 
as placebos, but, which at the time, were regarded lege artis. 
Observing the placebo effect, through a clinical trial, is not a 
necessary condition for its initiation. The im m easurability of the 
placebo effect is in accord with a realist foundation. W hat about the 
em pirical foundation? The im m easurabillity principle o f the placebo 
effect contrasts the bench-mark of scientific credibility o f the 
em pirical position. That the subject matter of interest elopes a 
concise empirical substantiation is a problem that the Clinico- 
em pirical position has to address. One possible avoidance strategy is 
to redefine the placebo effect so it becomes m easurable, 
operationalize it. One could redefine the placebo effect negatively, 
and regard it as the therapeutical effect in the control group of a
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double blind clinical trial. In that sense we would have a fixed 
em pirical focus, however, it would be a muddled and uninteresting 
focus. The intriguing character of the placebo effect is that it 
changes the status of the therapeutical meeting. W ithout the 
placebo effect a therapeutical encounter is a form into which the 
real treatm ent can be filled. The placebo effect changes this strict 
division between form and content because it insists that the 
clinical encounter as form has a therapeutical content. To redefine 
the placebo effect to a measurable entity would fit with an 
em pirical position, but muddle the specific character of the placebo 
effect, because it would be pooled with other therapeutical factors 
as for exam ple natural remission.
Placebo as practicable therapy
The second feature of the placebo effect that the Clinico-em pirical 
position has certain problem  addressing is the practicability of the 
placebo therapy. Im portant from a Clinico-empirical position is the 
m anipulative capacity of any possible therapy. The reshaping of 
Africas economy would, for example, have a huge impact on health 
in general and also on the AIDS and TB epidemics. It is, though, 
extremely naive to suggest this as a therapy. It is, at least from a 
m edical position, impossible to manipulate in a practicable m anner. 
The question of this section is whether the placebo effect is a 
therapy possible to m anipulate, or a phenomenon academ ically 
in teresting , but therapeutically  im potent?
To give a placebo as for example a sugar-pill, presents no practical 
problem s (lots of ethical problems, however). As argued before, the
9 3
pill in itself is not placebogenic, and must be distinguished from the 
placebo effect. The placebo effect must be subscribed to the 
placebogenic complex. The question important to ask for the 
Clinico-em pirical position is then how a physician can enhance the 
placebo effect? There has been done very little work on that 
question, and at the moment it would be to push the subject pas the 
lim itations of the knowledge to try to say something substantially. 
The articles on the subject85, however, mention two general 
features related to a high placebo effect. The one is the patient’s 
anxiety. The more frightened and nervous a patient is the more 
liable he is to be affected by a placebo. The second factor is a 
paternalistic and enthusiastic physician, who believes strongly in 
his therapy, signals confidence. Noting the subjective quality of the 
placebogenic complex, the factors mentioned are fruitful as rules of 
thumbs, but can disguise the complexity of the individual process.
It would be too superficial to conclude that if the doctor takes his 
time, explains the situation and create an anchor of certainty in a 
stressful moment of illness, a placebo effect will be enforced. There 
needs to be done much more research on the specific placebogenic 
elements of the clinical setting. At the moment there is no 
reasonable security that a certain behaviour from a physician or a 
certain design of the clinical setting are sufficient for the initiation 
of a placebo effect in a patient.
C onclusion
85 See for example: Schindel, L. Placebo und Placebo-Effecte in Klinik und 
Forschung. Artzneim ittelforsch. 1967;17:892-918.
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The placebo effect corresponds in important areas to the concepts 
of the Clinico-empirical position. Most important is that the placebo 
effect as a multicausal phenomenon can be fram ed in terms of inus- 
factors. Also the pragmatic concept of therapy and m ulticausal 
disease conception correlates to the placebo phenomenon. So far the 
placebo effect is not only born out of the Clinico-em pirical position, 
through the terminology and methods of clinical trials, it also is a 
phenom enon that in im portant areas reflect the concepts of the 
Clinico-em pirical position. However, there are two features of the 
placebo effect that the Clinico-em pirical position have to address. 
The first is that the practical therapeutical im plications of the 
placebo effect are minimal. The second is the im possibility of 
designing a trial that can quantify the placebo effect.
The m anipulative capacity of the placebo effect is enhanced by the 
fact that it is basically a question of a relation between two persons 
in a clinical setting. Maximising the placebo effect is not analogous 
to changing the economy of Africa. Its problem is, though, that the 
placebogenic complex possibly is so complicated, that simple rules 
of thumbs will be inadequate. The complexity of the placebogenic 
situation is intim ately connected to cultural, psychological and 
individual factors. The objectivity of natural science will have 
difficulty grasping a fruitful level of precision. However, regardless 
of the strategy of research, if more factors enhancing the placebo 
effect are found, or the dynamic of the placebogenic complex is 
described, the manipulative capacity of the therapy will be much 
greater. That we at the moment do not know enough about the 
placebogenic factors, from an empirical point of view, is not so 
im portant, if  the knowledge is regarded obtainable. This leads to
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the second problem: the lack of a placebo effect trial. More research 
on the placebo implies, from a Clinico-empirical position, that the 
em pirical substantiation of the placebo effect is precise and 
reproducible. This is not the case. The placebo effect is a kind of 
m edical uncertainty relation. This "principle of placebo effect 
im m easurability" is very difficult for the C linico-em pirical position 
to handle. It is the scientific bench-mark of that position that the 
subject m atter on which it focuses is measurable. Though generally 
the implication of the placebo effect on the Clinico-empirical 
position is a verification of the usefulness of its central concepts, 
the principle of placebo effect immeasurability sticks out, and 
makes the placebo effect if not a provocation, then a puzzle.
Placebo and the Scientific Medical Model
W hat is the implication of the placebo effect on the scientific m odel 
as such? In the beginning of the introduction I described the 
placebo effect as " a provocation and a puzzle to the present way of 
conceptualising medicine". This conclusion elaborates on that 
sentence. The placebo effect is a provocation to the Bio-m echanical 
position, but a puzzle to the Clinico-empirical position. There exists 
a general tension between the two positions of the scientific m odel, 
but with regard to the placebo effect the difference is polarised.
The Bio-m echanical position cannot incorporate the placebo effect, 
but the Clinico-empirical position can. In that sense I do not regard 
the implication of the placebo effect to be a refutation of scientific 
m edicine in general. The implication of the placebo effect on the 
scientific m edical model is that the tension between the two 
position is intensified.
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Chapter six:
Placebo and Hermeneutics
H um anities and m edicine
M ost lay men would classify medicine as a science, but as I 
m entioned earlier in chapter three, medicine has a much broader 
field than, for example, physics. Beside applied scientific and 
craftsm anship aspects m edicine has an im portant hum anistic 
dim ension, as the whole discipline of medical philosophy illustrates. 
The results of scientific m edicine are impressive; however, science 
cannot explain feelings and notions like: life crises, grief, angst, 
despair, sorrow etc. Most of us have experienced them, but what 
makes them of special interest to medicine is that they are closely 
linked with moments of troubles when one calls for a doctor - when 
one’s every-day life is ruptured by threats of serious disease and 
d e a th .
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The placebo effect is in a scientific context most precisely described 
as an empirical phenomenon and as a part of clinical research 
m ethodology. However, the causal mechanisms initiating the 
placebo effect are better accounted for by a humanistic approach. 
How an individual patient reacts to the symbolic components of the 
clinical setting and the psychological interaction with the physician 
is more comprehensively described in a humanistic context.
Fram ing the discussion about the scientific and humanistic elem ent 
in medicine is a strict dualistic conception that science "cures" and 
hum anities "cares". In the coming chapters I will address this 
dualism. At present I will give a sketch of a humanistic "model" of 
m edicine. The sketch is not very detailed because my prime 
intention is not to develop an alternative humanistic m edical m odel 
to the scientific one, but partly to contrast the scientific medical 
model, and partly to elaborate what I call the "the placebogenic 
complex" hypothesis. At the end of the chapter I hope it is clear 
that the placebo effect is a phenomenon that simultaneously is a 
key concept in clinical science and irreducibly mental.
H e rm e n eu tic s
I will approach the humanistic aspect of medicine in a broad 
herm eneutical tradition. The herm eneutical tradition encircles a 
great part of this century’s continental philosophy and contains 
num erous complex philosophical discussions that will fall outside 
the scope of this work. I do not try to discus medicine and the 
herm eneutical philosophy as such, but intend to sketch an 
herm eneutical conception of the notions of causality, disease and 
therapy. One way of explaining the term hermeneutic is to contrast
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it with science. W ithout being too superficial one can say that 
science is concerned with objective facts where herm eneutic 
concern itself with subjective meaning. The goal of science is 
“truth” , or a “factual description” . The goal of hermeneutics is to 
“understand” the fundam ental conditions of being a subjective 
person. Its method is based on “interpretation”. “H erm eneutic” was 
originally a term  used for the method of interpreting the bible and 
the old Greek literature, texts that were looked upon as containing a 
special knowledge. It was transformed by Schleierm acher from  its 
original narrow theological and Hellenistic scope to a method of 
broad textual interpretation. Dilthey again broadened the term to 
mean the general method of humanities, contrasted to natural 
science.
Causes and reasons
The notion of a cause is from a hermeneutical point of view not 
interesting. Causes exist, no denial about that, but from the 
perspective of the individual it would be odd saying: “I was caused 
to buy an ice-cream”, or “The cause that made me wait two hours 
was that I had promised him to do so”. A person is probably caused 
to do many things, one sleeps when tired and eat when hungry: is a 
part of a biological causal field. However, the notion of reason  fits 
better with the experiences of the individual. We all have the 
feeling that we generally act freely. W hat makes John go to bed 
precisely then and there is not some objective “cause”, but his 
decision, based on his subjective reasons for doing so. The value 
system and other factors effecting the decision of a person are 
relative to time, place and person, but the experience that we have
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reasons for acting is part of being a human being. When I choose to 
stay at home today this is neither a random nor a determined 
event. I choose to do so, because I had a meaningful reason for 
doing so. Reasons can be seen as the cement of the person, as causes 
are the “cem ent of the universe”86.
M eaningless illness
A herm eneutical approach to the concept of disease would focus on 
the patien t’s subjective perception of his disease, the illness. There 
are many aspects of importance with regard to the patien t’s illness, 
but for the present purpose I will restrain m yself to look at the 
aspect of freedom limitation. A disease can be seen as nature taking 
over, as invading the intimate sphere of your body. The “silence of 
the organs”87 ends and it becomes painfully clear that though free 
in the sense that John can choose when to go to bed, the freedom is 
lim ited, he cannot choose never to sleep. A disease is a process 
were the range of freedom of action is being limited. Being ill with 
the flu' I am free to choose between going to bed or drinking tea 
with honey, but I am unable to run the 15 km I use to. M.S. 
K o n ra d 88 states that “all illness represents a state of diminished 
autonom y”. W ithout getting into a discussion of the notion of 
autonomy in medical ethics, I see his statement as emphasizing this 
narrowing of the scope of freedom. The disease behaviour initiated
86 Mackie referrs to Hume in an introductory quotation in "The Cement o f  
the Universe". Clarendon Press. Oxford 1974: p. v
87 Georges Canguilhem quoting Rend Leriche in "The Normal and the 
Pathological". Zone books. New York 1989: p.91.
88 Konrad, MS. A defense o f medical paternalism: maximising medical 
autonomy. The Journal o f Medical Ethics 1989;9:38-44.
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partly by the patient and partly by the family reflect the changed 
situation. Tough masculine men incorporate the sick-role and have 
the opportunity to behave like children. The family accepts the 
helplessness and egoistic behaviour: “he is sick”. The situation is 
well known and everybody play their roles, until normality is 
restored some days later days. The situation worsens severely if it 
is not a question of a banal flu', but a prolonged serious disease 
potentially fatal, chronic or invalidating. The question of the 
m eaning of the illness becomes of paramount importance to the 
patient and his relative. Fundamental notions as self respect and 
personal integrity are threatened: the meaning of life and death is 
suddenly of concrete importance.
H. Brody examines in his book “Stories of sickness”89 the use of
narrative in medicine. It is a general analysis of stories told by 
patients (symptoms etc), to patients (explanations etc), among 
doctors (case stories) and almost every possible constellation one
can think of. He sees stories, or the narrative, as the main coping
strategy for patients with a “meaningless” disease. As he puts it 
“suffering is produced , and alleviated , prim arily by the meaning 
that one attaches to one's experience. ”90 The ability of patient to 
cope with the meaninglessness of a serious disease depends on the 
specific illness, the support of the social network, and the structure 
of the life story ruptured by the disease. The meaning of the 
sickness depends on how successfully the break in one’s life story 
can be mended, made inevitable, reasonable or in any way
89 Brody, H. Stories o f Sickness. Yale University Press. New Haven and 
London 1987
90 Ibid: p. 5
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m eaningful. W illiam s and W ood91 analyse in an interesting article 
the lay beliefs concerning the aetiology of chronic rheumatoid 
arthritis. Not surprisingly, the patient's conception of the causality 
of the disease was radically different from the general 
acknowledged scientific explanation. However, instead of pledging 
for more patient information, and regard the lay beliefs as
"prim itive", they analysed the structure and purpose of the
patient’s conception, and found that patient "errors" are not easily 
open to correction: they form part of a valued framework which 
helps patients to cope with the consequences of disease. The 
patient's beliefs form part of a narrative or "autobiographical" 
reconstruction sometimes conflicting with, but always interacting 
with, the public scientific explanation.
The doctor enhancing meaning
The etym ology of the word “therapy”92 is in accord with the 
herm eneutical conception of the term. "Therapy" can be traced back 
to the new Latin “therapaia” , which again derives from the Greek
noun “therapeia”. Therapeia means: to serve or to attend, and is a
nounification of the verb “therapeuin”, meaning: an attendant or a 
servant. The herm eneutical concept of therapy takes for granted 
that the biological treatment of the patient is as good as possible, 
and then focuses on how the doctor more generally attends the 
patient. An attention that could imply enhancing the patien t’s
91 Williams, GH & Wood, PHN. Common-Sense Beliefs about illness: A 
Mediating Role for the Doctor. The Lancet December 20/27 1986:1435-7
92 Churchill Medical Dictionary. Churchill Livingstone Inc. New York 1989: 
“ T h e r a p y ”
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coping of his disease. It is important that a physician acknowledges 
the im portance of the narrative reconstruction as an essential part 
of the patient's coping. The role of the physician is limited, though.
A person suffering from cancer will not, after talking to his doctor 
suddenly become happy and content, however, a mediating role for 
the doctor implies that the crises a serious disease initiates, is 
respected and addressed, and it implies, beside providing the facts 
of the situation, that the doctor can present new analogies, 
m etaphors and explanations that will help the patient in the 
reconstruction of meaning. Doctors normally play a less im portant 
role than the family and close friends. If the physician is not aware 
of the possible schism between hermeneutical meaning and 
scientific truth he can, in the name of science, create unnecessary 
havoc in the narrative reconstruction.
A clinical example illustrates the conflict. A patient, having smoked 
for 40 years and recently successfully operated for a lung tumor, 
proudly tells his physician that, with great effort, he has quitted 
smoking. The scientific fact is that after 40 years of smoking the 
effect of stopping is very limited. How shall the physician react? A 
pure scientific approach would be to tell the patient to start 
smoking again as the great effort he refers is not worth the m inim al 
decrease in cancer risk. A herm eneutically inspired approach would 
be to support the patient's effort in coping with the main cause to 
his self-inflicted disease. There are elements of punishm ent or 
expiation that have to be taken serious, and m ost im portant it gives 
the patient a feeling of active participation.
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The Hypothesis of the Placebogenic Complex
It is difficult to describe specifically how the placebo effect and the 
narrative reconstruction of the patient interact, but I regard it as 
very plausible that the integrated value system and lay m an model 
of m edicine that both Brody and W illiams address is param ount to 
the causal interaction leading to a placebo effect. M ost attem pts to 
give a detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind the placebo 
phenom enon have been unsuccessful. The conclusion m ost 
researchers agree on is that the placebo effect is a result of the 
general clinical setting and the doctor-patient relationship. This is a 
rather broad and general description by any standard, and a 
natural question to ask is what factors or relations are the most 
im portant. In the previous chapter I presented some common 
factors, for example patient anxiety. My intention now is to give an 
account of the structure of the dynamics between the clinical 
setting and the patient and the physician, and to elaborate this into 
a hypothesis regarding the placebogenic situation. I refer to a work 
by Adler and Hammet93. Their approach is not explicitly a part of 
the herm eneutical tradition, but I include it in this chapter because 
a central term  of the model is identical with the herm eneutical 
term  that I focus on: “m eaning”, and because Adler and H am m et’s 
approach is in chord with the general hermeneutical way of 
thinking. My other source of inspiration is an article by Levi- 
S trau ss94 called” The Sorcerer and his Magic".
93 Adler, HM & Hammet, vBO. The Doctor-Patient Relationship Revisited- an 
analysis o f the Placebo Effect. Annals o f Internal Medicine 1973;78:595-8
94 L6vi-Strauss, C. The Sorcerer and his Magic, in Magic Witchcraft and 
Curing. University o f Texas Press. Austin 1967: p. 35.
From a history o f philosophy point o f view it might seem strange to place 
Levi-Strauss, one o f the leading figures o f structuralism, in a hermeneutical
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Adler and Hammet assert that the placebo effect can by explained 
by the patien t’s relation to what they call “Group form ation” and 
“System  form ation” . They write:
“ ... regardless o f  period or culture, those defined as patien ts- 
distressed or disabled-have always been helped by two aides o f  
incalculable importance: participation in a shared cognitive system  
that made otherwise chaotic symptoms understandable and access 
to a relationship with a culturally sanctioned parental fig u re . We 
label these system form ation and group formation r e s p e c t iv e ly . . .” 
(au tho r's  em phasising)
System form ation represents the world view, or the m edical model. 
It is the tacit conceptualization's of health, disease and therapy. It 
is a “com prehensive integrated coherent organisation o f  cognitive  
s tr u c tu r e s ” concerning life in general but also specifically how 
disease is to be explained. It is the medical “W eltanschaung” that 
m ost of us never verbalise explicitly, but nonetheless is necessary 
to make things “hang together”, to locate yourself as a person in 
relation to a disease. Group formation is not only the special 
relation to a doctor: the doctor-patient relationship, but also the 
patient’s relation to his social network, his family and friends. The 
importance of the social dimension is stressed in the article: “/n  the 
beginning was not the word but the group. ” They relate any
context. However,the use o f hermeneutics in this thesis and in medical 
philosophy generally is a fairly broad one, with no interest in 
distinguishing sharply between a phenom enological-herm eneutical and a 
structuralistic approach. Compared to medical science L6vi-Strauss and
hermenutics are relatives that can be treated under the same heading.
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therapeutic potential from group formation to a reactivation of the 
dyadic bond, the original m other-child relation, and conclude:
“It is suggested that these two factors -group form ation and system  
form ation- are as essential to psychic functioning as nourishm ent is 
to physical functioning, are the basic factors composing what is 
subjectively experienced as a feeling  o f  “m eaning”, are invariable 
used in all successful interpersonal therapies, and are the necessary 
and sufficient components o f  the placebo effect. ”
Though I am not at ease with their use of the terms “necessary and 
sufficient conditions”, or their postulating that a dyadic bond is 
reactivated, I think their general approach is interesting and 
fru itfu l.
Levi-Strauss writes in a totally different context. His intention is to
describe the dynamics between the Shaman and his patients, and
he does not even mention the notion of placebo in his article. 
However, the structure of the dynamics he describes is very close 
to one developed by Adler and Hammet. Levi-Strauss summarises 
his conclusion in the concept of "the shamanistic complex". The 
shamanistic complex is described as follows:
"... (the shaman) was fu lly  convinced o f  two things-first, that 
pathological conditions have a cause which may be discovered and
second, that a system o f  interpretation in which personal
inventiveness is important, structures the phases o f  illness, from  
the diagnosis to the cure. This fabulation o f  a reality unknown in 
itself-a fabu la tion  consisting o f  procedures and representations-is
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founded  on a threefold experience: f ir s t that o f  the shaman h im self 
who ... undergoes specific states o f  psychsomatic nature; second that 
o f  the sick person, who may or may not experience an 
improvement o f  his condition; and finally, that o f  the public, who 
also participate in the cure experiencing an enthusiasm and an 
intellectual and emotional satisfaction which produce collective  
support, which in turn inaugurates a new cycle. These three 
elements o f  what we may call the "shamanistic com p lex" cannot be 
se p a ra te d .  "
(au thors em phasising)
One difference that comes to mind when comparing Levi-Strauss" 
term  with modern western medicine is the role of individuality.
The shaman often practises his craft in public. The fellow tribesm en 
watched and were actively engaged in the healing process. A 
m odern doctor-patient relation is regarded as private. The m ost 
im portant axis is the one between doctor and patient; the 
individuality is even embodied through the promise of secrecy of 
the Hippocratic Oath95. However, this ideal of the doctor-patient 
relation reflects the praxis of a family physician, and is not in chord 
with the reality of most patients. In a hospital nurses and other 
patients create a public. The family and close friends is also a part 
of the modern public. A serious disease in every family creates an 
emergency situation, and the focus of the group is on the sick 
individual, in that sense a kind of public is created. The notion of
publicity here aimed at has little to do with a political
interpretation, as in the call for a free public press. It is m eant as a
95 See note 71 "The Oath": p 67. 
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theatrical notion, stressing the importance of a third person, an 
audience. A related difference between modern situation and the 
sham anistic complex, is the cultural heterogeneity of modern life. A 
tribe is culturally homogeneous in a way which makes a modern 
city seem totally chaotic. A parallel aspect of "the public" is the 
cultural meaning embodied in the term. The public does not only 
encom pass relatives and friends, but also people who share some 
basic way of relating disease to the rest of the world, who share a 
m edical model. "The public" is a term that in an anthropological 
situation is precise. However, I assert that in a medical context 
there are at least two aspects, one theatrical: the public as the 
audience, and one cultural: the public as the collective notions 
controlling and describing disease. In a modern setting the last 
version of the term is more important. The cultural-institutional 
basis of the doctor-patient relation is in medical term inology known 
as "the clinical setting".
My hypothesis is that a placebo response is generated through a 
m odified version of the shamanistic complex. In a dialectical or 
cyclical way the doctor, the patient and the clinical setting interact. 
The specific nature of this dynamic is probably far more 
com plicated than Levi-Strauss indicates when indicating it as a 
necessary condition that the interaction "is intellectually and  
em otionally  sa tis fy in g ", and based on the public “experiencing an 
en th u s ia sm . ” Instead, I think one has to regard the placebo complex 
as a highly complicated communicative process where the pa tien t's  
individuality, the doctor’s skills and the clinical setting in general 
support or accelerate a conception in the patient, but also in the
108
fam ily and close friends, that what is being done fulfil their 
expectations of how a doctor and a patient should behave.
Both the meaning model and the shamanistic complex describe a 
triangular relation: a patient, a doctor and the cultural-institutional 
setting of their meeting. Both stress the dynamics in the relation as 
crucial. Both stress the importance of the group, and the paternal 
status of the healer. The “system form ation” is synonymous with 
the “clinical setting” , and the “group formation” is in the 
placebogenic complex split in “the doctor” and the social network 
aspect of the clinical setting.
A detailed account of the specific elements in the patient, in the 
doctor and in the clinical setting that initiate a placebo effect is 
difficult in itself, and also not within the scope of this thesis. W hat 
is important, though, is that the concept of Placebogenic complex 
anchors the placebo effect in a cultural-hum anistic frame. At the 
moment it is not with any reasonable level of certainty and detail 
possible to define what factors, for example in the behaviour of the 
physician, that influence the placebo effect, but it is certain that the 
behaviour has cultural and symbolic implications. The placebo 
effect is a general therapeutical phenomenon that is initiated 
through the interaction between physician and patient in a way 
that transform s medical humanities from a pure academ ical to a 
therapeutical level. The placebogenic complex em phasises the dual 
character of the placebo effect: it is mediated through the patient's 
m ental interpretation of his clinical situation, thus being a 
herm eneutical phenomenon, but at the same time, it is an 
integrated and inevitable concept in clinical science. The dualism
1 0 9
between science and humanistic 
and body is one of the aspects I
or more specifically between mind 
focus on in the next two chapters.
1 1 0
Chapter seven:
The placebo effect and 
the Mind-Body problem
During the previous chapters I have avoided focusing on a problem  
imbedded most explicitly in the Bio-mechanical model, but wich, as 
well, im plicitly, lies in the contrasting, if not conflicting, ways the 
C linico-em pirical and the herm eneutical positions in terpret disease.
I think of the problematic relation betwen the psyche and the 
soma, the body and the mind. As I have approached the placebo 
effect m edical science and hermeneutics incorporate a conflicting 
concept of the nature of man. In philosophy it has been a 
predicam ent for many years how man at the same time is a part of 
nature and has a mind. The question is known as the mind-body 
problem . The contrast between the humanistic and scientific aspect 
of m edicine, and the different status the psychological causes have 
in the two scientific positions reflect this fundam ental m etaphysical 
predicam ent. The form er four chapters contained analyses of the 
epistem ological implications of the placebo effect on scientific 
medicine. The following chapter contains an analysis of the practical 
m edical distinction of body and mind, and the implication of the 
placebo effect on the mind-body problem.
Some m ental categories
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Before going on to discuss the competing positions of theory of 
m ind, m onism  and dualism, it would be useful to categorise the 
different experiences we call mental. The mind has been divided in 
many different ways. Plato divides it in three: reason, spirit and 
desire and correlates it to the three classes in the ideal society in 
The republic: the philosopher rulers, the auxiliaries and the 
workers. Freud much later divides the mind into the super-ego, the 
ego and the id. A generally acknowledged division is between 
feelings and reason, and in theory of mind the status of feelings is 
sometimes debated. There is a long tradition in philosophy claiming 
that reason, or intelligence, is superior to feelings. Descartes even 
regarded feelings as not belonging to his concept of mind, res 
cogitans. O f course it is an impossible task exhaustively and 
exclusively to name the elements of the mind, the categories one 
distinguishes will often overlap considerable and the richness of the 
m ental phenomena implies that some aspects always will be 
overlooked. The selection of mental categories reflects the intention 
of the analysis in which they are to be used, the present work 
inclusive. However, I hope that the categories I use are intuitively 
acceptable beside being normal philosophical term inology.
In the present context the mental categories I refer to are 
"sensations", "intentional states" and "subjective states". Pain is a 
m ental phenomenon; so is solving a mathematical problem, and also 
the subjective valuation of the program of a political party. The 
first is a "sensa tion"  or “phenom enological s ta te ”, often 
corresponding to an exterior influence, but not in the case of, for 
exam ple, hallucinations. The second category is "intentional s ta te s". 
Intentional states are the goal-directed features of the mind. We do
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not ju st think, we think of something, there is a focus, or a purpose, 
in many m ental actions. W hether we solve a m athem atical problem, 
think of tomorrow's agenda, or fantasizes on the existence of 
unicorns, all are examples of intentional states. The third category 
could be called the "subjective s ta tes". Subjectivism, or the 
particular point of view of the individual, is an im portant part of 
the m ental landscape.
A herm eneuticel approach focuses on the subjective character of 
experience. However, also analytical philosophers, like Thomas 
Nagel, stresses the subjectivity of experience. In his essay "What is 
it like to be a bat"96, he states: "It is difficult to understand what 
could be m eant by the objective character of an experience, apart 
from  that particular point of view from which its subject 
apprehends it. After all, what would be left of what it was to be a 
bat if one removed the viewpoint of the bat." Intentionality is 
sometimes m eant to include the subjectivity of experience, but I 
think it is valuable distinguish the two terms. Intentionality 
includes in its weakest teleological form many natural events, for 
exam ple the water of the river moving teleologically to the ocean, 
or the therm o-stat that perceives changes in the tem perature, 
reacts teleologically and counters the change. Both are examples 
that, in the weak sense, are intentional. Intentional states in a more 
restricted form I call "subjective states" and do not include the 
teleological character of many non-conscious natural events, but 
presupposes an intending subject, a conscious person.
96 Nagel, T. What is it Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 1974; 4 
LXXXIII:435-450
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A modern dispute, that I will comment on in this chapter, concerns 
the status of the intentional states. The m aterialists will generally 
focus on intelligence as the paradigmatic intentional state, and 
make analogies to pocket calculators and computers. The critiques 
of the m aterialists will insist on the strong form of intentionalism , 
and regard the subjectivity of experience as the m ost im portant 
m ental feature.
Dualism  and Descartes
The idea that a person is a union of something corporeal and 
something spiritual, body and soul, is almost universal. The notion 
of the soul in contrast to the body is old, and present, for example 
in the works of Plato. In "The Republic" the soal is described as 
"immortal", and "deformed by the association to the body..."97 The 
relation between the body and the soul, however, is very different 
in different cultures. In Japan, for example, the relation between 
soul and body is of a more integrated nature than in Europe. 
S a k a i98 regards this as partly expressed in the fact that, as one of 
the few industrialised countries, Japan does not recognise the brain 
death criteria .
In W estern philosophy the discussion of the m ind-body relation 
owes m ost of its basic concepts and problems to the strong dualism  
form ulated by Rene Descartes in his “M editationes de Prima
97 Plato. The Republic: 611 c.
98 Sakai, Akio. Biomedical Interventions and the Japanese View of life and 
D eath.
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Philosophia” from 1641. Descartes radicalises in the light of Galileo 
and the new natural sciences the distinction between body and soul 
into what has become known as Cartesian Dualism. He discerns two 
fundam ental entities: res extensa (matter), and res cogito (mind). 
Res extensa is physical matter, all that has extension, including the 
body. The body exists in time and space. It is subject to the 
m echanical laws governing all other lumps of matter, and can be 
inspected by external observers whose access to it is not direct and 
privileged, but must be guided via scientific method. The 
knowledge of one's own body is in principle uncertain, as it is 
logically possible to doubt its existence. Res extensa obeys the 
causal rules of nature. Res cogito is a radically different entity. It 
has no extension, is not a physical body. It exists in time but not in 
space. The mind is not observable by a third part. However, the 
private and internal character of my mind makes my access to it 
privileged. It is not logically possible to doubt the existence of one's 
mental activity, in so far as doubting is, in itself, a mental activity. 
As the mind is not a part of nature it is not subjected to 
determinism. Res cogito does not obey the causal rules of nature.
Descartes' problem, and the problem of all dualistic descriptions of 
a person, is to explain how two so fundamentally different entities 
can interact. W hen one deliberately lifts an arm, the dualists are in 
d ifficulties explaining how and where something non-spatial 
transform s into something spatial, how and where the mind (solely 
tem poral and not subjected to causality), interacts with the body 
(spatio-tem poral and subjected to causality). Descartes did not have 
any satisfactory answer to that question. His suggestion that the 
interaction took place in the pineal gland was not very helpful. In a
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letter to the German Princess Elisabeth, Descartes states that he 
cannot account for the interaction, but only observes the evident 
fact that it takes p la c e " .
D ualistic theories are often distinguished by referring to the 
character of the causal relation between mind and body. D escartes’ 
dualism  is an example of interactionism . He believed that the body 
causally could effect the mind and the mind could effect the body. 
However, the difficulty of describing the nature of this interaction 
has prom pted other dualistic variants. Parallelism  states that 
m ental events causally can effect each other, and bodily events as 
well effect each other, but that there is no causal interaction 
between body and mind. The lack of empirical examples of a person 
being happy and relaxed while, for example his hand accidentally is 
being squeezed in a vice makes parallelism  implausible. Finally ep i-  
phenom enalism  is the position that corporal events can causally 
effect other corporal events and mental events, but that mental 
events only are epiphenomenal in the sense that they cannot 
causally effect anything. Epiphenomenalism can account for the 
pain caused by the hand in the vice. However, other examples, like 
how I can command my hand to move, or the difficulty of 
explaining how a causal chain suddenly stops at a mental event, 
makes the theory difficult to defend.
M onism
99 Descartes Rene. Letter to Prices Elisabeth of Boemen, in "Oeuvres 
Philosophiques", volume three. Garnier Freres. Paris 1973: p. 123.
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The dualistic position, strongly inspired by Descartes, has not been 
unchallenged. The monists do not accept that man consists of two so 
radically different metaphysical entities. Focusing on the 
unexplained nature of the interaction between the m ind and the 
body, they reject the division itself. The monists can be divided in 
idealists, m aterialists and neutralists. The idealists try to reduce the 
body into some variant of mental abstraction: the body does not 
really exists, only the mind. This position is not defended by many 
today, but Bishop Berkeley was close to this approach. Another 
strategy is applied by the materialists who try to reduce m ental 
experiences to m aterial physical phenomena. They have no 
difficulty  explaining the so-called interaction between "m ind” and 
body as they see the mind as secondary. However, the problem  of 
the m aterialists is to explain the complexity of mental phenom ena 
satisfactorily: not only sensations but also intentional states and the 
subjectivity of experience. I will discus the most im portant 
m aterialistic positions later. A third strategy, sometimes referred as 
neutralistic, is to re-define "mental" and "bodily" as terms that both 
are reducible to some third substance or category. The difficulty 
with this approach is to make understandable the structure o f this 
third category and its relation to mind and body. An example of a 
m odern neutralistic theory is Strawson's so-called Person-theory.
The "official" theory
Gilbert Ryle is a philosopher whose influential book: "The Concept of 
M in d " 100 from 1949 changed the framework of the m ind-body
100 Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Penguin Books. London 1990 (first 
published 1949).
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discussion. He strongly criticised the dualistic position of his time as 
“the official theory” . The dualism criticised is the old Cartesian form, 
sometimes referred to as substance dualism. Res cogito is regarded 
as a form of “m ind-stuff” , a different category of substance than 
m atter, but still a some kind of substance. In his energetic style 
Ryle describes substance dualism as “the dogma of the ghost in the 
m ach ine” :
“... minds are not merely ghosts harnessed in machines. Though the 
human body is an engine, it is not quite an ordinary engine, since 
some o f  its workings are governed by another machine inside it- 
this interior governor-engine being one o f  a very special sort. It is 
invisible, inaudible and has no size or weight. It cannot be taken to 
bits and the laws it obeys are not those known to ordinary  
engineers. Nothing is known how it governs the bodily engine. ”101
The aim of the book is twofold. On one hand Ryle wants to refute 
dualism  as such, and on the other hand he wants to advocate a 
behaviouristic variant of materialism. His negative aim has been 
successful. Few philosophers today would support the variant of 
dualism  he aims at. In the half a century that has passed since the 
publishing of “The Concept of Mind”, the “official theory” has 
changed from a substance dualistic position to a m aterialistic. A 
dualistic theory still defended is a property  dualism . Property 
dualists do not regard the mind as some different form of quasi­
physical entity, but they conceive mental properties as 
fundam entally irreducible to any body event. Ryle’s main critique
101 Ibid: p. 21.
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was aim ed at substance dualism. Many m aterialists regard property 
dualism  as substance dualism in disguise, vulnerable to the same 
line of criticism  as substance dualism.
O verview  of m aterialist theories
Ryle's positive attem pt to solve the mind-body problem  was based 
on a behaviouristic  theory. In short behaviourism  tries to describe 
m ental phenomena as dispositions to behaviour. The term  can be 
divided into m ethodological and logical behaviourism. The form er is 
a research strategy in psychology aiming at correlating objective 
observable stimuli to behavioural outputs. Logical behaviourism  is 
a more radical position, as it states that language about mental 
phenom ena is only understandable if it can be referred to some 
behaviour, or a disposition to behave. Logical behaviourism is 
closely linked to logical positivism, and their ideal of meaning. The 
ideal description of both the logical positivists and the logical 
behaviourists is one that only refers to aspects that are observable 
by a third person. To be “in pain” is conceived as a term for a 
certain disposition to cry out, blow at your finger, run in circles etc. 
Referring to some internal un-observable entity as "the feeling of 
pain" is regarded as meaningless. The research program  of the 
logical behaviourists could be described as an interpretation of the 
norm al m ental terms of the language into behavioural categories 
only referring to observable behaviour. Regardless of the fact that 
behaviour and mental states are closely linked, the program  of the 
behaviourists did not succeed. One common sense objection is that 
they have left out some essential aspects of the mind. A person
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having the sensation of pain will never accept the reduction of the 
feeling of pain to pain behaviour. When an super-actor on stage 
treads on a nail and is in pain he does not necessarily scream and 
blow on his finger, but that does not mean that he cannot feel the 
pain. A parallel point of critique is that behaviourism do not 
recognise that pain-as-such causes pain behaviour. This lack of 
causal connection runs counter to a strong intuition in m ost people 
that have suffered from pain. Phrased more generally, if  beliefs and 
desires are to be defined in terms of behaviour, they cannot at the 
same time cause that behaviour. Even more difficult is it for the 
behaviourists to explain intentional states and the subjectivity of 
ex p e rien ce .
Type Identity theory or also called central state materialism  does 
not focus on behaviour, but claims that what we call mental events 
are identical with a brain event. As a case of scientific discovery 
"the mind" turned out to be the central nervous system, analogous 
to the re-definition of "water" as H20 or "lightning" as electrical 
discharge. Pain event X, then, is identical to neurophysiological 
event Y. The theory is attractive to many with a scientific 
background, and focuses the debate on a modern form ulation of the 
m ind-body problem : the m ind-brain problem . However attractive 
to scientists, the theory has some serious flaws.
There is little doubt that the the nervous system is the organ where 
mental events are initiated, but that is not the same as to state that 
they are identical. It was discovered by Babylonian astronom ers 
that the m orning star and the evening star were identical. However, 
the radical difference between the m orning-evening star exam ple
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and the m ind-body problem is that persons have, and stars have 
not, sensations, intentional states and a subjective experience.
These features of the mind are not explained by the scientific 
neurophysiological description of the brain. These states are caused 
by, or are functions of neurophysiological events, but to state that 
they are identical is to use the phrase "identical" in a 
unconventional way. W ith reference to Laplace's law "identical" 
mean that they have all their properties in common. This seems 
ju st not true. Imagine neurophysiological event Y: the pressure of 
the vice effects a nerve sensory organ, which changes its mem brane 
resistance to potassium  and sodium ions: in a split second the 
potassium  leaks out and the sodium leaks into the nerve cell, which 
propagates a series of nerve impulses towards the central nervous 
system. Imagine pain event X: the vice squeezes my hand and it 
hurts terribly. How can X and Y be identical? My subjective feeling 
of pain is caused by the vice and transformed into nervous signals, 
but my conception of the pain, my conscious being-in-pain is not 
id en tica l  with neurons firing. Event x is subjective, and event y is 
objective. The only way I can make sense out of this identity is to 
use a weaker identity criteria. In a weaker sense identity could 
mean having certain essential features in common. This weaker 
form of "identical" is used by the central state materialists. M ental 
events are regarded as "essentialy" identical to brain events. 
However, brain events and m ental events are not identical unless 
you reduce the subjective quality of a mental event, unless you find 
them  essentialy irrelevant. But then there is no ontological identity. 
The problem  is that the subjective quality of experience is an 
essential property of many mental events. The reduction of the
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m ind to nothing more and nothing above the brain leaves out a
proper explanation of the mental experiences.
A m aterialistic theory, that can be seen as a merging of both
behaviourism  and identity theory, is called elim ina tive  m aterialism . 
Instead of trying to define mental phenomena in terms of 
behaviour, or claim  its identity with neurophysiological events, 
elim inative m aterialism  bluntly denies the real existence of m ental 
phenom ena. Instead they see them as linguistic rudim ents from  a 
pre-scientific time. The criticism  that makes behaviourism  and 
identity theory implausible does not in the same grade affect 
elim inative m aterialism . As "the mind" does not really exist, the 
problem s of causal connection and identity criteria are neutral to 
the theory. It has to be taken seriously because it claims to be a 
radical reconstruction of our perception of "the mental". It is not, as 
behaviourism  and identity theory, an explanation. An elim initive
m aterialist will emphasise that our language about, for example 
diseases, has changed as medicine has introduced more precise 
terms. W e have stopped talking about demons and instead talk 
about bacterial infection. When our knowledge of m ental events 
increase we will learn to use more precise scientific terms, "I am in 
pain" will be exchanged by the term "my C-fibres are firing"102 
W hile an objection could be that I cannot be wrong about my pain, 
incorrigibility does not exist with regard to the c-fibres. The 
elim inative m aterialists would reply that such an objection shows
102 It is part o f philosophical terminology to describe nerve cells that 
transmit pain impulses as "c-fibres". This is, however, not precise in 
neurophysiologal terms. The c-fibre axons are only one type o f pain 
transmitting cells, others are, for example, A-delta fibres . The focus on 
fibres overlooks, as well, the importance o f the type o f nocireceptor 
initiating the pain signal.
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how muddled up we are in the use of mental language. He would 
claim  the situation is analogous to the physicist engaged in the 
phlogiston combustion theory opposing the existence of oxygen by 
saying "This sounds all right, but since there is no place for 
phlogiston, your theory must be wrong". The reconstruction of our 
language, meaning the elimination of mental terms, is a kind of 
philosophical linguistic revolution, similar to a scientific revolution.
An objection to eliminative materialism is to oppose the shift of 
m ental phenomena from a ontological to a linguistic status. M ental 
states, like consciousness, are real because they cannot be reduced 
w ithout reducing a fundamental feature of being human, the 
subjective experience of being a self. To say that one really never 
felt fear, love or pain runs counter to very strong intuitions. And if 
it is just a question of changing the name of the same entity, this 
seems to be unreasonable work, and is of little interest. The aim of 
the theory is not just to define black as white, but to elim inate the 
m ental states. Again a m aterialistic theory cannot explain central 
m ental phenom ena.
C om puter F unctionalism  is the fourth materialistic theory I want to 
focus on. Inspired by the research in artificial intelligence and 
computers the basic analogy is that the brain is the hardware or 
“wetware” and the mind a kind of software. The functionalists claim  
that the central nervous system has physical properties, but also 
properties that, at the same time, are causally linked to and 
functionally  independent of neurophysiological events: m ental 
properties. The causal connection between body and mind is built 
into this theory, and so is the irreducibility of the mind. The
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function of solving the quadratic equation can independently be 
form ulated in the software of a computer program, described in 
m athem atical terms on a piece of paper and can be stored in the 
brain of a student. The same property, or function, is individually 
causally dependent on its physical “hardware” (silicon chips, paper 
and ink, brain cells) but functionally independent. The 
intentionality of some computer programs copy the intentionality of 
m ental activity, for example solving a m athem atical problem  like 
calculating a quadratic equation. Functionalism  is a sophisticated 
theory that on the surface seems to merge dualism  and 
m aterialism . However, it has the similar flaws that most 
m aterialistic theories have. The subjective quality of consciousness 
is not addressed in functionalism. A computer may copy 
intentionality in a broad sense, but it has no consciousness and no 
individual meaning connected to its "intentional activity". The mind 
may have features in common with computer program s but that 
does not in itself make the mind a program. In a later part of this 
chapter I will focus on the problems regarding the m ind’s possible 
existence outside the brain, as well as on the hypothetical conscious 
c o m p u te r .
M ind-bodv in m edicine
M edicine is a sphere where the practical expression of the 
theoretical m ind-body problem  surfaces. The term inology in 
m edicine, however, is different from philosophy. W here a 
philosopher says mind and body a doctor uses the synonymous 
terms: psyche and soma. When speaking of “diseases” , w ithout the
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use of a prefix, what is tacitly meant are som atic d iseases , d isorders 
of the body, not caused by mental influence, and with no mental 
effects. An example is the fracture of a leg. However, when the 
m ind’s influence on a disease is evident the use of a prefix becomes 
urgent. Psychic d iseases , as neurosis or obsessive disorders, are 
diseases of the mind. Psychiatry has always been the “enfant 
terrible” of medicine, and I will omit the complex discussions 
regarding its methodology and relation to psychology. W hat I want 
to point out here is that the sharp distinction between somatic 
m edicine and psychiatry reflects an underlying dualistic perception 
of man. A further need for prefixes becomes evident when the 
bodily disease influence the mental capacity in a pathological way: 
som ato-psychic d iseases , as for example most neurological 
diseases. Probably the most well known term regarding the m edical 
distinction of diseases in bodily and mental, is p sy c h o -so m a tic  
d ise a se s .  It describes disorders that, at least partly, are m ental in 
their causation, but affect the body: Ventricular ulcer is often 
pointed out as a psycho-somatic disease.
The dualism  here expressed has a tendency toward both 
parallelism  and epiphenom enalism . The parallelistic tendency 
becom es clear by the fact that diseases of an interactional nature 
are much more controversial than psychic diseases as such. Few 
find the notion of neurosis as problematic as for example the 
nervous com ponent of Crohn's disease.The epiphenom enalistic 
tendency surfaces when one focuses on the different status given to 
som ato-psychic com pared to psychosom atic diseases. Som ato­
psychic, or in general neurological diseases do not cause nearly the 
same uneasiness among doctors as psycho-som atic diseases. Though
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encom passing tendencies both to parallelism  and epiphenom en- 
alism  the dualism  expressed in medical terminology is basically 
interactionistic. It is describing a two way causal interaction 
betw een body and mind.
Somatic diseases are the hard core of medical praxis and science. 
W ithin the scientific model the objective observable body, without 
the irregular subjective influence of the mind, is the ground on 
which certainty and regularity can be achieved in medicine. 
Psycho-som atic diseases are from an Clinico-em pirical position seen 
as peripheral cases where the mind has to be incorporated in the 
description of the disease. A bio-mechanical position would tend to 
bias toward epiphenomenalism, or not accept the real nature of 
m ental phenomena. Though medical term inology expresses 
interactionistic dualism, the status of the terminology is restricted 
to an epistemological level. Few physicians, when asked about the 
true nature of this terminology, would accept it as expressing an 
ontological truth. Most physicians think within the scientific model. 
The majority of them are ontological monists, or to be more precise: 
m aterialists. The mind is seen as a function of the brain. Neurons 
that individually function at a simple on-off level will, when they 
are organised in a complex neuro-physiological network- like the 
brain, provide the basis for mental capacity. The term inology used 
to categorise diseases in mental or bodily is seen just as a heuristic 
device in so far as our present knowledge of the complexity of the 
brain is not sufficient for a better alternative. The m edical mind- 
body relation can be described as an epistemological dualism  and 
an ontological materialism . The epistemological dualism  of m edicine 
is fundam entally interactionistic, but incorporates tendencies
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toward both parallelism  and epiphenomenalism. In other term s it 
can be described as soft dualism sprayed on hard m aterialism .
A t a practical clinical level this heterogeneity between the 
epistem ological and ontological level is not necessarily problem atic. 
Pragm atically the medical profession is more concerned with 
potential therapy than theoretical consensus. There may be good 
reasons for the m ind-body problem being prim arily a theoretical 
philosophical problem. The practical implications of theoretical 
disputes that have no conclusion is often therapeutic doubt and 
frustration. From  a philosophical point of view, however, it does not 
change the ontological problem of relating mind and brain that the 
m edical profession operates with contrasting epistem ological and 
ontological levels. The ontological position is the fundam ental one, 
and m edicine and philosophy share a general m aterialistic 
consensus. The interesting question with regard to placebo is then 
whether the placebo effect can be satisfactorily explained w ithin a 
m ateria listic  theory.
Placebo and m aterialism
How would a m aterialist account for the placebo phenomenon? In 
discussing this question one m ust distinguish between research 
strategies, and philosophical positions. Some work has been done in 
relating the placebo effect to both bio-mechanical functions and 
behaviouristic psychology. As I have pointed out earlier this has 
been partly successful. The analgesic effect of the placebo response 
have been linked with internal opoid secretion, and some aspects of 
the placebo effect has been explained as conditioning. However, this
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section is about the philosophical m aterialistic interpretation of the 
placebo. One thing is scientifically to try to uncover bits and pieces 
of the biological causal relations of the placebo effect. Something 
radically  different is to give the phenomenon as such a framework, 
that is philosophically to give a meaningful m aterialistic account of 
how a pharm acological inert pill can be medically effective.
The first m aterialistic theory I will focus on is logical behaviourism. 
One basic assertion of the logical behaviouristic position is that 
every statem ent about psychological or m ental states can be re­
form ulated in terms of observable behaviour. The "m ind” is a black 
box m odel and the only meaningful language about it m ust refer to 
observable behaviour. Can the placebo effect be re-form ulated in 
behaviouristic term s? A necessary condition for the placebo effect 
is that the patient is conscious and that he believes in the clinical 
setting. B elief states are re-formulated as dispositions to behave. “I 
believe in the clinical setting” is then translated into: “I am disposed 
to follow  instructions by the person in charge, to endure pain 
inflicted by diagnostical procedures” and if asked about being in a 
clinical setting the answer will be affirmative. However, this 
translation is if not incorrect then incomplete. True that m ost 
patients being in a clinical setting behave according to their 
situation. However, there are situations where a patient behaves as 
described w ithout believing in the clinical setting. I do not only 
think of an actor playing a trick, but also of patients who do not 
believe in the treatm ent they get, but continue because they 
believe in authority, or because their family make them. Similarly, 
one can truly believe in the clinical setting, but fear of the 
uncom fort and pain connected to a cure make you act differently. A
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reform ulation of the translation could make “disposed” include 
“having no desire to act ” or “understanding the significance of the 
situation” . However, then mental terms like “desire” and 
“understanding” have crept in, which defuse the intention of the 
behaviourist. The behaviourist can try again to reform ulate his 
"translation", but at least Putnam 103 regard this process as in vain. 
He sees this as a general feature of logical behaviourism: no 
psychological terms can be characterized adequately in such a way 
as to elim inate all psychological terms from the explanation. The 
placebo phenomenon being a psychological term, cannot be 
adequately explained by logical behaviourism.
Identity theory and elim inative m aterialism  are in their relation to 
the placebo effect so close that I will discuss them under the same 
paragraph. They would both have difficulty explaining the placebo 
phenom enon. They would emphasise that what really happens are 
neurophysiological events, triggered by complex cerebral 
integration of sensory stimuli. The behaviouristic black box is 
opened op and filled with neurons. However, the lack of detailed 
understanding of the neurophysiological events and the triggering 
mean that the account of the placebo effect is meagre. An 
alternative strategy would be to regard the placebo effect as a 
regression to a pre-scientific language, that from a heuristic point of 
view is understandable and epistem ologically convenient, but 
ontologically unacceptable. In other words, the placebo effect does 
not exist, it is just a convenient nominal term for biological 
processes we yet do not understand. The answer to such a
103 Putnam, H. Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Life? Journal of 
Philosophy 1961 ;668-91.
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reduction would be that the nominal character is something 
placebo share with other central medical scientific notions, like 
"disease". The reduction of placebo cannot be made without 
reducing the m edical scientific model to the classical bio-m echanical 
position. By elim inating the mental phenomena "placebo effect" the 
elim inative m aterialist in fact clashes with his own scientific 
foundation. Elim inative m aterialism  and identity theory cannot give 
a satisfactorily account for the placebo effect.
A functionalist would conceive the placebo phenomenon differently. 
From  a functionalist point of view any mental feature causally 
effecting the body is equivalent to the “mental software” causally
effecting the “bodily hardware”. There is nothing strange about this,
the analogy to a printer or other hardware functions comes to mind. 
Though possibly puzzled about the existence of a kind of mental 
"placebo-program" it is principally conceivable. However, the 
necessary condition of the placebo effect: consciousness, is difficult 
to relate to a computer analogy. A computer does not believe 
anything and is not conscious about anything. A functionalist could 
argue that consciousness and believe (for example in a clinical 
setting), is a function of a “consciousness program” of which the 
"placebo program" is a sub-program, but this tells us little. It would 
mean going far into cognitive science and neurological network 
theory to sketch what kind of “program” consciousness or the 
placebo effect is a function of. This exploration is in nature not 
philosophical but a part of what some call cognitive science. From  a
philosophical point of view the framework of the functionalists'
account of the placebo effect cannot be refuted as easily as the 
other m aterialistic theory, but the lack of coherent clarification of
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what a “consciousness program ” means make the functionalistic 
explanation of the placebo effect unsubstantiated.
P lacebo and dualism
The outlined m aterialistic positions cannot satisfactorily 
account for the placebo effect. In this section I will focus on the 
com peting dualistic attempts to clarify the phenomenon. However, 
before I do so I think it would be useful to categorise different 
types of m edically relevant mind-body interactions.
There are at least three levels of interactions between the m ind and 
the body: the first level could be called p sy c h o -p h y s io lo g ic a l  and is 
exem plified by the bodily changes relatable to every day m ental 
events: anger is associated with paleness, when one feels shame one 
blushes and the heart beats faster if one is scared. The second level 
could be called psycho-pathogenic  and describes when the mind is 
a non-redundant part of pathogenic causal field, prom ting a 
psycho-som atic disease. Beside ulcer I could mention several 
derm atological disorders, as for example psoriasis. The third level 
could be called p sy c h o -th e ra p e u tic a l , and aims at describing the 
situation when the mind is a non-redundant part of a causal 
therapeutical field. The cures of hysteric functional disorders by 
psychotherapy in the beginning of this century is an example. 
However, today the functional disorders are very rare, and the 
therapeutical potential of psychotherapy, follow ing a parallelistic  
trend, is directed towards psychic disorders as for example 
n e u ro ses .
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A dualist regards the placebo effect as a re-emphasis of this third 
level relation. The mind is not only causally effective with regard to 
ordinary psycho-physiological events, or potentially dangerous 
psycho-pathological events. The mind is, in certain situations, 
capable of influencing disease: the placebo effect is an im portant 
exam ple of the curing psycho-therapeutical interaction betw een 
mind and body. The concept of mind in medicine has been put 
under pressure by the bio-mechanical position. The placebo effect 
re-em phasises the importance of mind. It is not ju st a ghost in the 
machine, but a ghost that heals sick people. The parallelistic and 
epiphenom enalistic tendencies in the practical m edical dualism  
cannot explain the placebo effect. Not only does the mind effect the 
body, it interacts causally and therapeutically. In teractionistic 
dualism  has no difficulty explaining the placebo effect. The placebo 
effect is an example of a special therapeutical causal relation 
between the mind and the body.
Im plications of the placebo effect on the mind-body problem
At this m oment it seems as if the placebo effect illustrates the 
predicam ent of the mind-body problem. The shared m edical and 
philosophical position is scientific and seem incongruent with 
dualism . M ental phenomena, as for example the subjective quality 
of experience, however, seem unexplainable within a m aterialistic 
theory. An alternative name for the mind-body problem  could be 
the m ind-body paradox. Placebo is no different from other 
phenom ena that have essentially mental properties: it is well 
explained by an interactionistic dualistic theory, but not easily
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com prehended by a m aterialistic theory. The difference, though, 
between the placebo phenomenon and, for example, a mental 
property as self reflection, is that placebo is an integrated part of 
the scientific model of medicine. It cannot be eliminated from 
clinical science without thwarting what in the last half century has 
been regarded as the proper scientific method of clinical 
investigation. The placebo effect is an example of a m ental entity 
that thwarts any m aterialistic attempts of reduction, but for a 
different reason from m ost mental phenomena. Not only is it 
difficult for a m aterialistic theory to explain the nature of the 
placebo effect, in this way placebo is similar to many mental 
properties. But the placebo effect is, at the same time, part of the 
scientific model and a mental phenomenon, it cannot be reduced 
without at the same time reducing the scientific model to a bio­
m echanical position. This position represents a classical, in some 
sense obsolete, perception of medical science. The implications of 
the placebo effect on the mind-body problem is that it emphasises 
its true problem atic or paradoxical nature. By being a phenomenon 
sim ultaneously scientific and mental its irreducabillity has to be 
accepted even from a m aterialistic point of view.
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Chapter eight:
Biological naturalism and the 
placebo effect
W hat is redder, the rose or the communist?
W hen a philosophical question seems unsolvable, one possible 
explanation is that the question is asked in a wrong way. “W hat is 
redder, the rose or the communist?” is an example of a question 
where the syntactic logic is invalid. Few problems in philosophy are 
as simple as the example above, where the word “red” is used 
confusedly both as a colour and as a metaphor for a political 
position. However, what I want to illustrate is that a philosophical 
"Gordian knot” sometimes is tied up with the fundamental 
assum ptions implemented in the way the problem  is form ulated.
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Rene D escartes form ulated the mind-body problem, but beside 
being a great philosopher he was also a catholic and a scientist. His 
strong dualism  provided each area their subject m atter. Religion 
and philosophy was concerned with the mind. A mind that thus was 
freed from  the apparent determinism of nature. The exorcism  of 
the m ind from  the subject-matter of science, on the other hand, 
enabled scientists to focus on phenomena that were objective and 
measurable. However, as a foundation to this strong cleavage lies 
the assum ption that the mind cannot be irreducibly m ental and at 
the same time part of nature. The assumption is opposed by the 
American philosopher John Searle in his book “The Rediscovery of 
M in d " 104: "Dualists treat the irreducibility of consciousness as 
incontrovertible proof of the truth of dualism. M aterialists insist 
that consciousness must be reducible to material reality, and the 
price of denying the reducibility of consciousness would be the 
abandonm ent of our overall scientific world view." The intention in 
"The Rediscovery of Mind" is to show that the disjunctive ontology 
of som ething being e ith er  mind or nature is a heritage from 
Descartes that has to be confronted. The mind is neither a ghost, nor 
chem istry, but a unique part of nature that is irreducibly mental.
I will in the following chapter present Searle’s theory of mind: 
biological naturalism, and discuss whether he, as he claims, solves 
the m ind-body problem  and thus provides a congruent and 
defensible philosophical basis for the understanding of the placebo 
e ffec t.
104 Searle, JR. The Rediscovery of Mind. A Bradford Book, The MIT Press. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 1992: p. 116
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The mind is part of nature
In the previous chapters I described the scientific model of 
medicine. The strength of this model is not only that it gives an 
ontological description of the nature of diseases and that this 
description epistem ologically is under empirical control. Possibly its 
greatest advantage is that it harmonises with other scientific 
m odels as for example the atomic theory of matter, and the 
evolutionary theory of biology. It is an integrated part of a highly 
com plex but nonetheless relatively coherent scientific world view. 
The expanding character of this world view is expressed by a 
proword attributed to Galileo: "measure everything, and make 
m easurable what cannot be measured". The expansion of the 
subject m atter of science has continued in irregular leaps since 
Galileo's formulation of his laws of motions. It has steadily moved 
closer to the scientific basis for the mind itself. The fields of 
m olecular biology, genetics, and neurophysiology are exam ples of 
scientific fields having the central nervous system, or the brain, on 
the agenda. Today it would not be controversial to state that this 
research tells us something important about the the m ind, implying 
that the working of the brain is the basis of our metal capacity.
How can the relation between the mind and the brain be perceived 
from a scientific point of view? If one regards the theories of 
evolution and neuroscience as the most relevant scientific theories 
concerning man and the brain, the following outline would not 
surprise. During the evolution of animals, certain cells have 
specialised in the transmission of signals: nerve cells. In the 
beginning this transmission was comparable to simple reflexes.
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During the evolutionary process, however, the number and 
com plexity of the organisation of the nerve cells increased and 
"central nervous systems" developed. W hat constitutes the greatest 
difference between the species "homo sapiens" and its closest 
evolutionary relatives: the big apes, is the organisation and size of 
the central nervous system, primarily the cortex of the brain. The 
extrem ely complex organisation of the neural networks in the 
human brain is at the same time vulnerable to general chem ical 
m anipulation, as for example during alcohol intake, and capable of 
very specific tasks as intelligent behaviour, linguistic ability and 
fine discrim ination sense. The mental properties constituting the 
m ind are caused by the organisation of the brain, by the complex 
in teraction of nerve signals and neurotransm itters. Searle describes 
the central mental property of consciousness as: "a biological 
fea ture  o f  human and certain animal brains. It is caused by 
neurobiological processes and is as much a part o f  natural biological 
order as any other biological features such as photosynthesis, 
digestion, or m itosis."105
The importance of a correspondence with the biological knowledge 
of the human organism and its place in nature is expressed by the 
name Searle has given to his theory: "Biological naturalism". 
N aturalism  is a term giving emphasis on nature as we describe it, 
consisting of atoms, molecules, forces and electrical fields. There are 
no demons or ghosts in nature. The term "biological" emphasises the 
special place living organisms have in nature. One of the peculiar 
things about living organisms of a certain complexity such as
105 See note 104: p. 90
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humans, is that we have minds. The general scientific fram ework of 
biological naturalism  places it close to the m aterialistic theories, for 
exam ple, identity theory, but I must stress the difference. W here 
identity theory states that mental events are identical to brain 
events, biological naturalism  states that mental events are 
functions, or effects of brain events. From this perspective the mind 
is not a ghost in a biological machine, it is a causal effect or a 
function of the machine.
The m ind is irreducible
Many theories of mind focus on intelligence, intentionality, memory 
or sensations but there are few that emphasize c o n sc io u sn e ss .
Searle explains this by stating that consciousness has a special 
status in the mind. It is the fundamental capacity of the mind, the 
capacity that makes the mind truly mental. Any m aterialistic 
account of the mind will try to avoid consciousness. Any 
com prehensive theory of mind must concentrate on it. Searle says: 
"In one way or another all other mental notions, such as 
intentionality, subjectivity, mental causation, intelligence, can only  
fu lly  be understood as mental by their relations to 
consciousness. "106
He does not give a formal definition of what is meant by the term, 
but instead offers a broad description. He regards consciousness as 
a reho-stat: it is an on-off system, that once on, has a spectrum of 
possible intensities. Either one is conscious, as when awake, or one
106 Ibid: p. 84
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is not, as when asleep. Its on-off aspect is the necessary condition 
for all other mental features of the mind. Intelligence, for exam ple, 
is often seen as the true mental activity; however, intelligent 
behaviour would not be regarded as intelligent if the person 
behaving was unconscious. A computer may have a powerful 
processing capacity, but no one would use “intelligent” other than as 
a m etaphor to describe a computer, even if it solves the same 
questions as a person doing an IQ test. For anything to be m ental it 
m ust first be conscious. Being conscious, however, one can be less 
conscious as when one has just woken, or more conscious as when 
m aking love.
The positive structure of consciousness, the features that
transcends the simple on-off nature are difficult to define.
However, Searle asserts that the structure of consciousness can be 
described in terms of a number of features.107 Partly because of
space restrictions and partly because that part of his discussion has
more to do with psychology than the mind-body problem  as such, 
there is little reason for going into the detailed description of these 
features of consciousness. However, one of them is intentionality, a 
feature that I discused in the previous chapter. Another feature is 
that my consciousness has a centre and a periphery. At the m oment 
I am very conscious of writing on a PC (the centre) and less 
conscious of the pressure of the shirt against my skin (the 
periphery). Subjectivity is possibly the most im portant feature of 
consciousness. By the subjective feature of consciousness is m eant
107 The most important, beside the ones I mention, are: temporality, sociality  
unity and familiarity. Searle does not discuss the temporal or the social 
aspect o f consciousness in detail.
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its point of view aspect: the fundamental experience that I am an 
individual existence, different from other persons. I will in the 
follow ing discuss the distinction subject-object with regard to the 
m ind m ore generally.
The terms "subjectivity" can have at least two meanings. Firstly, an 
em otive or discursive connotation. For example, when making 
statem ents whether fish and chips taste better than pizza, or 
whether the water is too cold to swim in or not, we call such 
statem ents subjective. A synonymous term  is observer-dependent 
statem ents. There are no m easurable, m atter-of-fact relations that 
can settle such a dispute. The form of subjectivism here aimed at is 
called epistem ological subjectivism . Another more radical meaning 
of the term is called ontological subjectivism . When I say "I have a 
pain in my foot" I am not expressing some kind of emotive 
discussable preference. The statement is real in the sense that it 
refers to a factual matter: it hurts, and secondly I am the only 
person capable of assessing the feeling of pain. There can be no way 
of discussing the matter if, or if not it hurts, one cannot be m istaken 
about the feeling of a pain. One can deceive, and say it hurts when 
it actually does not, but it is a matter of fact whether it hurts or not. 
The existence of a pain is a first-person existence. I, as an 
individual, have a special relation to my m ental states108. The first- 
person existence is a general feature of consciousness. All my
108 It is worth noting that this is not equivalent to saying we have the 
traditional dualistic claim of incorrigibility and of a special sense o f  
introspection. They are not features that characterise consciousness, and are 
refuted by biological naturalism. What is stated is the humble fact that an 
individual by having a consciousness has a relation to his mental states that 
differs from his relation to other persons mental states. The complex other- 
mind problem is addressed by Searle, but will not we discussed in this thesis.
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conscious forms of intentionality founding any information of the 
world independent from m yself are from a special point of view. 
The world independent of me has no point of view, it is objective, 
but my access to it through my consciousness is always 
perspectival, always subjective in the ontological sense.
E pistem olog ica l objectivism  means the unbiased reconstruction of 
the world. I use the phrase "reconstruction” because this level of 
objectivity is methodological and aware of the possible biases 
related to the subjectivity of the observer. It makes no claim  of 
being the reality, but claims to be the best description of it.
However, one can speak of ontological objectivity  as well, meaning 
the world in itself, the real thing independent of any 
m ethodological discussion or uncertainty. W hat happens when we 
try to use the terms on the special biological feature called the 
mind? How can science with its ideal of epistemological and 
ontological objectivity observe mental properties that are 
ontologically subjective? W ell, they can try an behaviouristic 
approach or an identity theory approach, but the result has not 
been convincing. The problem is that it is impossible to objectivise 
the subjectivism  of consciousness without loosing an essential part 
of consciousness: its subjectivity. The scientific method, the idea of 
objective observation and the jettison of epistem ological 
subjectivism  is a relatively efficient and fruitful strategy when 
focusing on the part of the world that is ontologically objective. 
However, it is inefficient when it comes to accurately describing the 
mind: a part of the world that is ontologically subjective.
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The recognition of the metaphysical status of ontological 
subjectivism  is one of the main points of dispute in theory of mind, 
and has been so for many years. The discussion of subject-object is 
not new either, and can, for example, be found in the works of 
K ie rk e g a a rd 109. Discussing the relation between a person’s 
subjectivity and scientific objectivity he concludes, parallel to 
biological naturalism , that: "The way o f  objective reflection leads to 
abstract thought, to mathematics ... and it leads away from  the 
subject, whose existence or non-existence, from  the objective po in t 
o f  view quite rightly, becomes infinitely indifferent."
The traditional m aterialistic reply to the paradoxical objectivisation 
of the subject is to deny the subject an ontological status. In other 
words ontological subjectivism  is reduced to epistem ological and 
ontological objectivism. The following section will focus on the 
red u c tio n  o f the mind. The discussion is problematic because 
authors use the term ” reduction” in several different ways, and I 
have to clarify the terminology I want to use. One can at least speak 
of three main categories of reduction. Possible the m ost im portant 
one is the ontological reduction. Ontological reduction implies that a 
certain class of entities is nothing more than another kind of entity. 
A flash of lightning is nothing more than an electrical discharge, 
and a gene is nothing more than DNA.110 A second category could 
be called d e fin ito r ica l  or epistem ological reduction. An example is
109 Kierkegaard, S. Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift. Quoted in Wulff, 
HR. Philosophy o f Medicine (2. ed). Blackwell Scientific Publications. Oxford 
1990: p.132.
110 I use Searle1 s heuristic example, but am aware that a gen contains more 
than DNA, for example the different classes o f histons. However the point o f 
the argument is not affected by the fact that the redefinition refer to more 
than one entity.
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the logical behaviouristic attem pt to redefine m ental terms in terms 
of behaviour. Im plicit in this approach is that if the epistem ological 
reduction is successful the entities referred to can be ontologically 
reduced as well. Finally the third main category is causal reduction. 
Causal reduction implies that one type of things can be fully 
explained by the causal power of a second class of things. The first 
type of things are then reduced to the first type. For example 
solidity is a feature of a physical object totally causally explicable 
by the nature of the atoms and molecules in the structure of the 
ob ject.
W hat kind of reduction do the m aterialist aim at when claiming 
that m ental properties are reducible to the brain? W ell, there 
seems to be little doubt that they aim at ontological reduction, 
either directly (identity theory) or via epistem ological reduction 
(behaviourism ). However, their main argument is based on the 
scientific knowledge that mental properties are caused by brain 
events. The question of interest is then: does causal reduction imply 
ontological reduction? If one looks at the history of science for 
guidance it seems that it does. The colour red, for example, was 
once defined ostensively by pointing at a red object. The "real red" 
was then defined as what seemed red to "normal" observers under 
"normal" conditions. The discovery of the causal mechanisms 
underlying light: photon emission, wave-particle dualism  etc, a 
redefinition was inevitable. Red can today be defined as a photon 
emission of 600 nm. The ontological reduction of red from the 
colour of a rose, to photon emission of 600 nm was complete.
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The project of redefining colour to photon emission or heat to 
m olecular movement was based on the jettison of the subject from 
scientific exploration. The observer-independent qualities is the 
true scientific subject matter. In the continuous expansion of the 
scientific project the methodological jettison of anything observer- 
dependent does not restrict itself to subjective notions like heat and 
colour, but aims at ontological subjectivism as such. The logic of the 
jettison of the subject from scientific pursuit requires us to 
distinguish between appearances and reality. Heat is the 
appearance whereas m olecular movem ent is reality. Pragm atically 
there is no necessity in such an eliminative redefinition. As a 
subjective person I still feel hot while being in a sauna. Though as 
an intellectual game I may speculate about the therm odynam ics of 
a sauna oven, what quickly occupies me the m ost is the subjective 
feeling of heat. The idealists would start from this point and not 
accept this reduction at all. However, there are few today that 
would claim  that there is nothing more to reality than appearance. 
By focusing on causal connections in the physical reality around us 
we do achieve a better understanding, and perhaps more im portant 
a greater m anipulative control over that reality. The pragm atic 
em phasis of the meaningfulness of the use of subjective terms in 
daily language is, however, an epistemological attem pt to defuse 
the scientific objectivisation of the world. Every person speaking 
English uses the word “heat” , even an eliminative m aterialist, but 
the m aterialist would give the term a restricted epistem ological 
s ta tu s .
The crucial problem for a biological naturalist is to show that the 
relation consciousness-brain is different from the relation heat-
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m olecular movement. One possible strategy is to ask what happens 
if  one tries to distinguish between appearances and reality with 
respect to consciousness? It is difficult, not to say impossible, to do 
that. Once one tries, the mental disappears and one is trapped in 
the m aterialistic corner of not explaining the character of the mind. 
It seems that a crucial feature of consciousness is that reality and 
appearance merge, that the distinction so m eaningful with regard to 
other natural phenomena is meaningless when used on 
consciousness. Searle describes it as follows: "Indeed it is a general 
fea ture  o f  such reductions (from a subjective to an observer- 
independent term, A.H.) that the phenomenon is defined in terms 
o f  the "realityn and not in terms o f  "appearance". But we can't make 
that sort o f  distinction fo r  consciousness because consciousness 
consists in the appearances themselves. Where appearance is 
concerned we cannot make the appearance-reality distinction  
because the appearance is the reality. 1,111 Consciousness is a special 
part of nature where a causal reduction does not imply an 
ontological reduction. The ontological reduction of mind is 
impossible to conduct because consciousness, as the only part of 
nature we know of, has the status of ontological subjectivity. From 
this perspective the apparent paradox becomes logical: the m ind is 
ontologically but not causally irreducible, and a part of nature.
The mind-bodv problem  as a_JLeurophysiological problem
111 See note 104: p. 122 
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How does biological naturalism  respond to the classical interaction 
problem  between its two irreducible entities consciousness and 
neurophysiology? The apparently incom prehensible way the brain 
causes consciousness is a fascinating and highly problem atic 
question, but is it necessarily a philosophical question? It has been 
regarded as such for several hundred years with little success. Is it 
not possible to reinterpret the question so it is part of a 
neurophysiological research program instead of a conceptual 
philosophical problem? There is nothing wrong with a dual 
approach, but I think it is important to note that historically there 
are many examples of problems that have for many years been 
regarded as philosophical and which at the end was solved by a 
scientific analysis. For example electrom agnetism  was a subject that 
prom pted philosophical analyses of a Hegelian nature during the 
nineteenth century. Hans Christan 0rsted , the physicist that 
discovered that a magnetic field surrounds every electrical current, 
wrote a philosophical treatise called "Nature's Spirit" 112. However, 
after M axwell’s equations few would regard electrom agnetism  as a 
relevant philosophical problem. Biological naturalism  claim s that 
the brain-consciousness relation is as incom prehensible today as 
subatom ic physics before quantum  m echanics or electrom agnetism  
before M axwell's equations. From this point of view Searle’s 
“solution” of the mind-body problem is analogous to Popper's 
“solution” to the induction problem. Popper did not solve the 
induction problem; in a way he defused it by his falsificationist 
theory. From  a philosophical point of view the m ind-body problem  
could be said to be “defused” in the sense that it is expelled from
112 0rsted, HC. AAnden i naturen (Nature's Spirit). Naturvidenskabelige 
Skrifter. K0benhavn 1920.
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the subject m atter of philosophy. The way the classical body-m ind 
problem  is asked makes it impossible to answer. W hat is then left 
for philosophy? Is the mind-body problem one of the philosophical 
problem s that is going to be solved by science? From Searle’s point 
of view philosophy has little interest in the mind-body problem , 
but great interest in the mind and in consciousness. That the mind- 
body problem  is a neurophysiological problem does not mean that 
philosophy of mind is neurophysiology, on the contrary, freed from  
the corset of the Cartesian framework, im plicitly acknowledged by 
both dualists and m aterialists, the philosophy of consciousness can 
be explored. Apart from that, any success in the neurophysiological 
research project concerning how the brain cause consciousness, 
would probably be very interesting for theory of knowledge and 
philosophy of science and medicine. The mind-body problem  is a 
ph ilo soph ical pseudo-problem .
The Placebo effect and biological naturalism
Is biological naturalism  a theory that, in contrast to the theories of 
m ind previously discussed, presents a satisfactorily philosophical 
fram ework for the understanding of the placebo effect? Biological 
naturalism  does not regard itself as a variant of interactionistic 
property dualism . However, as a m atter of practical explanatorical 
capacity there is little difference between property dualism  and 
biological naturalism . The later theory insist that there 
m etaphysically  both exists something irreducible m ental 
(consciousness) and neurophysiology. The placebo effect is thus 
interpreted as a special capacity of the consciousness
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therapeutically affecting the body. However, if the placebo effect is 
compared to other conscious actions, for example the lifting of an 
arm, there clearly is a difference. I can decide to lift my arm but I 
cannot decide to be cured by a placebo effect. Though founded on 
consciousness as a necessary condition the placebo effect is not 
subjected to volition. The placebo effect is a phenomenon that, 
though on the one hand, is resting on the on-off feature of 
consciousness, on the other hand, it is sliding into the unconscious. 
The placebo effect points out a problematic feature in biological 
naturalism : the relation between consciousness, unconsciousness 
and the mental.
A feature of consciousness mentioned in the previous sub-chapter 
is the division into two categories: the centre or focus, and th e  
p e r ip h e ry . In an every day situation, as for example walking down 
the street, my centre of consciousness, its focus, is on the 
catastrophic love life of the friend I am going to meet. However, 
ju s t outside this centre I am, more periphericaly, conscious of not 
bumping into other people walking against me. Even more 
periphericaly I may be aware of the sound of the cars passing by at 
high speed, and at the outer lim it of my consciousness I am aware, 
but without thinking of it specifically, what day it is and in what 
city I am. This horizontal or attentional dimension of consciousness, 
m ust be contrasted to a vertical conscious-not conscious dim ension. 
The vertical dimension of the mental consists of the conscious and 
the unconscious. As discussed in the previous section consciousness 
is regarded as the central mental notion by the biological 
naturalists. Their conception of the unconscious can be stated in one 
line: Unconscious states are not mental, if they are not potentially
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conscious. There is a paradoxical resemblance to the behaviouristic 
account of mental states as dispositions to behave. Biological 
Naturalism  regards unconscious mental states as unreal if they in 
some way or another are not dispositions fo r  consciousness. The 
unconscious states that are not potentially conscious are nothing 
m ore than blind neurophysiological processes.
Definitionally there is no problem; those unconscious states that in 
principle are unable to become conscious are not mental, they are 
objective neurophysiological processes. However, when applying 
the distinctions on a practical example as the placebo effect, things 
get complicated. Is the placebo effect something that is potentially 
conscious, making it a mental phenomenon? On the one hand, "no”. 
It seems meaningless to speak of a conscious placebo. If I am 
conscious that the medicine I am receiving is a placebo I assert that 
the the doctor-patient relationship will be radically changed and 
the placebo effect not initiated113. It is a necessary condition that 
the patient believes in the placebo treatment. In other words he 
m ust be unconscious about the lack of, for example, 
pharm acological effect. On the other hand, in the placebogenic 
situation one is conscious of the clinical setting, and of the 
nervousness and anxiety often associated with the disease. If a 
placebo effect is initiated, one is also conscious of the decrease of 
pain or discomfort, or other symptoms that made a visit to the 
doctor necessary. One is conscious of the clinical setting possibly
113 I am awere of the frequently quoted article by Park, LC & Covi, L.
Nonblind Placebo Trial. Arch. Gen. Psychiat 1965;12:336-45. Though they 
conclude that the placebo effect can be initiated in patients specifically  
being told that they recieve a placebo, I think the design of the trial is 
m ethodologically problematic, and am sceptic about the generality o f their 
conclusion .
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initiating a placebo effect, and of the effects themselves, but 
w ithout being conscious of the placebo effect as such. In this sense 
one is conscious of the effect and of the cause but not of the real 
causal connection. Consciousness has two aspects. The on-off aspect 
and the positive phenomenological aspect. The placebo effect rests 
firm ly on the first on-off aspect. It is a necessary component o f the 
placebogenic complex that a patient is conscious. However, the 
phenom enological aspect is more complicated. The placebogenic 
complex implies an interaction between the patient, doctor and the 
clinical setting. This interaction presupposes some kind of m ental 
black box with at least a partly unconscious causal relation between 
the conscious input (placebogenic complex) and the conscious 
output (the placebo effect). The black box is thus situated on both 
sides of the line between consciousness and unconsciousness.
This analysis raises two important questions. Firstly what makes 
the unconscious states conscious? The second one is what is the 
causal relation between the non-mental and the mental. The last 
one a variant of the old interactionist problem, what is the causal 
nature between the mind and the body. The biological naturalists 
rest on the excommunication of that problem from the field of 
philosophy, and would simply answer that the ontology of the non­
m ental is neurophysiological. However, the first question m ust be 
answered. W hat is aimed at is the ontological framework for a 
psychology that operates only with the two basic notions of 
neurophysiology and consciousness. A minimal demand to this 
fram ework is that it makes the general interaction between the 
unconscious and the conscious comprehensible. In general we can 
control our centre of consciousness to a certain extend. However, we
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all have experienced difficulties with concentration, or experienced 
idiosyncrasies. We all have had sudden bursts of intuitions. The 
interesting question is whether there is some way of explaining the 
causal relations inside the blackbox, placed over the line of the 
unconscious.
A general account of the relation between consciousness and 
unconsciousness would be of great interest to psychology, and a 
specific account of the causal interactions leading to the placebo 
effect, would be of great interest to medicine. Such a project is 
needed if biological naturalism is to defend itself from sceptical 
critics, and claim  to have solved not only the general m ind-body 
problem , but also the specific therapeutical interaction between 
mind and body known as the placebo effect. However, such an 
analysis implies a frontal attack on the Freudian notion of the 
s u b c o n sc io u s .114 I will not comment on whether such a project can 
succeed, but emphasise that though biological naturalism  is a 
plausible and in many ways intriguing theory, it has unsolved 
problem s, problem s that if not addressed make the claim ed solution 
to the m ind-body problem  less palatable.
A hard core m aterialist would probably regard biological 
m aterialism  as ju s t another variant of property dualism , taking 
credit from  the scientific approach, but not being coherent as it 
operates with the irreducibility of mind. A dualist would probably 
regard it as materialism  in disguise, and not accept the mind as a 
phenotype among other biological phenotypes. A dry academ ical
114 See note 104: p.167-73
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reply would be that biological naturalism does not solve anything, it 
illustrates the paradoxical nature of the mind-body problem , and 
then exports the problem atic interaction to another intellectual 
discipline: neurophysiology. However, if the critic intends to be 
m ore comprehensive, one possibility is to focus on the 
epiphenom enalistic tendency in biological naturalism. The m ind is 
on several occasions characterised as an emergent feature of the 
brain, and compared to solidity as an emergent feature of ice115.T h e  
problem  of em ergent features in nature generally is that the 
em ergent features do not causally affect the underlying systems, as 
for example the hardness of a stone does not affect the atoms. 
Conscious states causally effect bodily functions, as when I decide 
to lift my arm. Instead of using the emergent property analogy, an 
alternative strategy is to use the computer analogy. The causal 
interaction between the "hardware of the brain" and the "software 
o f the mind" is simpler to explain. However, this does not affects 
the overall project of biological naturalism. The special conscious 
properties of the mind could be seen as a special "biological 
program ", and instead of a neurophysiological research program  
there would be a research program within cognitive science. The 
functionalistic analysis of a program 's causal dependence and 
functional independence of a hardware is, as I see it, very close to 
the distinction between causal and ontological reduction.
By arguing that the interactionist complexity is not a philosophical 
but a neurophysiological problem  biological naturalism  has a 
strategy that avoids the main philosophical critique of
115 ibid: for example p. 14 or p. 112 
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in teractionistic dualism. In that sense biological naturalism  can be 
regarded as a theory that provides a framework for the 
understanding of the placebo effect. It has the explainatorical 
capacity of the classical property dualistic theories, but cannot as 
easily  be criticised. It is a theory of mind that simultaneously gives 
credit to the mental character of the placebo effect and insists that 
the placebo effect is a neuro-physiological phenomenon. However, 
biological naturalism  has unsolved problems of its own. It has some 
tendencies to epiphenom enalism , but more im portant, biological 
naturalism  conflicts with Freudian psychology on im portant 
m atters, for example, the relation between the conscious and the 
unconscious. Before the mind-body problem can be heralded as 
solved, or reduced to a philosophical pseudo problem, biological 
naturalism  has to address its critics comprehensively.
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Conclusion
The clinical example in the first pages of the thesis mentioned a Dr. 
Pascal, who thought "a placebo is a strange thing." W ithout much 
reflection Dr. Pascal follows a common inclination in medicine not to 
distinguish sharply between "the placebo" and "the placebo effect". 
According to this inclination the placebo effect is simply the effect 
of a placebo. However logical this may sound it is none the less 
e rro n e o u s .
The placebo effect is a much more complex and general 
phenomenon than the placebo. A placebo, for example, a sugar pill, 
has no pharm acological effect whatsoever that can explain why, 
under certain conditions, it is effective as an analgesic. The 
explanation given to speculators like Dr. Pascal, is that the placebo 
pill serves as a symbolic token of the healing process, a m aterial 
point o f focus in a doctor-patient relation that in it self is non 
m aterial and interpersonal. Theories and hypothesis of the causal 
mechanism s of the placebo effect have been put forth but with
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little  success. Some elements of the placebo effect have been 
explained as conditioning, and the analgesic effect has been 
associated with internal opoid secretion. The problem of the 
initiation of a placebo effect, however, is not addressed by the 
illum ination of pits and parts of the causal network culm inating in 
the placebo effect. The reached consensus is that the clinical setting 
in general and the doctor-patient relation specially are the basic 
elem ents in the initiation of the placebo effect. The corporeal 
changes that the placebo effect represents are initiated by the 
patients interpretation and experience of the clinical setting. To 
em phasise the difference between placebo and placebo effect I 
introduce the term  placebogenic complex. A placebogenic complex 
initiates, or causes, a placebo effect, and consists of a triangular 
relation between a patient, a healing person, often a doctor, and the 
clinical setting in which the therapeutical encounter takes places. 
The clinical setting is not a passive form of the meting between 
doctor and patient, it is the background on which the doctor-patient 
relationship is profiled and characterised. The clinical setting 
contains the conceptual apparatus that enables a person to cope 
with disease. The clinical setting represents a dissonance room in 
which the symbolic nature of, for example, the doctor role is given 
full importance. The placebo as a pill, as a token, can play a part of 
the placebogenic complex, but is not a necessary part of it. A 
institutionalised m eeting between a patient and a doctor resulting 
in nothing more that a structured interview can initiate a placebo 
effect. A placebo on the other hand can never stand alone, it is 
always part of the broader placebogenic complex.
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The general muddled understanding of the interaction between a 
placebo and the placebo effect is not the only dimension of the 
placebo debate that is opaque. It is almost symbolic that even the 
name given to the therapeutical phenomenon in question,"placebo", 
is a sham, an error. The original Greek sentence from the 116th 
psalm  in the Septuagint Bible, meaning "I shall walk", was 
m istranslated into the Latin "I shall please". There are several 
reasons for the chaotic way the term "the placebo effect" is used. 
One reason is that the empirical material on which a 
characterisation of the range and size of the placebo effect is not as 
certain as often assumed. Another reason is that the causal 
m echanism s of the placebo effect, though describable in general 
terms, are not known in any detail. In continuation, the causal 
theory that can be presented is not a classical scientific theory, but 
a theory in medical humanities. The placebo effect puts strain on 
several founding notions and assumptions of scientific m edicine, 
both at an epistemological level, regarding the notions of causality, 
disease and therapy, but also on the metaphysical level regarding 
the nature of man: the status and relation of mind and body.
The scientific medical model is the term I use to concentrate the 
heterogeneity and diversity of contemporary medical science into a 
structure that is possible to describe and analyse. I regard the 
scientific m edical model as consisting of two founding positions, the 
Bio-mechanical and the Clinico-empirical position. Both share the 
basic characterisation of scientific medicine as "realism under 
empirical control", however on two important axis they differ in 
priorities. The first axis concerns what is regarded the proper level 
of scientific pursuit. The bio-mechanical position is prim arily
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ontologically  focused on the E rror-in-the-m achine-analogy whereas 
the Clinoco-em pirical position is primarily is em pirically concerned. 
The second axis touches on the relation between science and 
therapy. The Bio-m echanical position is prim arily oriented towards 
biological science, and regard therapy as something that, at least to 
a large extent, can be deducted from biology. The Clinico-empirical 
position is, as the name indicates, orientated towards clinical 
science, and regards therapy as something that never autom atically 
can be deduced from any theory.
One of the questions I asked myself in the beginning of the thesis 
was "what are the implications of the placebo effect for the 
scientific m edical model?" That the patients perception and 
interpretation of his situation can affect the course of a disease and 
change bodily symptoms is counter to the basic concepts of the bio­
m echanical position. The placebo effect is impossible to enframe in 
a sim ple one disease-one cause-one therapy structure. The 
m ulticausal placebo effect is difficult to harmonise with the 
causality concept rooting back to Newton and Bernard. That there 
exists a therapy that is initiated by the mental interpretation of the 
patient opposes the Bio-mechanical ideal of therapy, being a 
pharm acological or surgical intervention and correction of an Error- 
in-the-m achine. It is apparently paradoxical that the placebo effect 
represents an anomaly to the Bio-mechanical position, when one 
reflects on the fact that the placebo pill, or more generally the 
placebo as a token symbol, is a distorted reflection of the Bio­
m echanical position. In a way it is the Bio-mechanical position 
turned 180 degrees. The idea of a placebo could probably not have 
been developed w ithout the basic notions of the Bio-mechanical
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position, and one of the important features of the placebogenic 
complex is that the patient beliefs he is receiving non-placebo 
treatm ent. The placebo as an sham treatment is a theatrical 
’’m edical lye”116, a Bio-mechanical doctor, have to oppose, because 
of its airy content, but which nonetheless share the form of the 
"proper" treatment. The placebo effect, on the other hand, does not 
even share the form of the ideal Bio-mechanical therapy. If 
scientific m edicine was equivalent to the Bio-mechanical position 
the im plications of the placebo effect would be dram atic, however, 
the Scientific medical model contains a second position: the Clinico- 
em pirical position.
The placebo effect corresponds on important areas to the concepts 
of the Clinico-em pirical position. Most important is that the placebo 
effect as a multicausal phenomenon can be framed in terms of inus- 
factors. Also the pragmatic concept of therapy and the nom inalistic 
disease conception correlates with the placebo effect. The placebo 
effect is a phenomenon that on important areas reflect the concepts 
of the Clinico-em pirical position. However, there are two features of 
the placebo effect that the Clinico-empirical position has to address. 
The first regards the practical therapeutical implications of the 
placebo effect. The second regards the possibility of designing a 
trial that can quantify the placebo effect. Our knowledge of the 
specific factors in the placebogenic complex are very lim ited, and, 
at present, not sufficient for a therapeutical recom mendation of 
how to behave as a physician if one wants to enhance a placebo 
effect. At present the rules of thumbs that can be mentioned are
116 Plato, The Republic: 389 b-c.
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not more sophisticated than a general advice to be enthusiastic and 
self assured, and to be aware that anxious patients are prone to a 
placebo effect. The therapeutical implications of the placebogenic 
complex are promising if the rules of thumbs can be specified more.
The second problem is the most serious. The concept of 
placebogenic complex implies that it is impossible to design a 
clinical trial that contains a control group where a placebo effect 
cannot be initiated. One can design a trial divided in placebo 
m axim ising and m inimising groups, but the precise quantification of 
the size of the placebo effect will be associated with a principle 
uncertainty. That it is impossible to measure the placebo effect in it 
self is a problem for the Clinico-empirical position. On the one hand 
the clinical implications of the placebo effect are so prom ising that 
it makes the phenomenon interesting, on the other hand is the 
em pirical substantiation handicapped by the lack of a proper 
placebo trial. This is in a way paradoxical, because the notion of 
placebo effect, as understood today, is born out of the same clinical 
scientific m ethodology that emphasises the necessity of exact 
clinical trials. The terminology of the paradigmatical double blind 
trial has placebo effect high on the list, the control group is even 
sometimes called the placebo group. The notion of placebo effect 
associated with the double blind trials is a negative one, what is 
m easured is the pharmacological or surgical effect of a treatm ent, 
and the placebo effect is regarded as a very important 
phenomenon, but a bias, not as a therapeutical effect in it self. The 
paradox of the Clinico-empirical position is that the more precise 
the m easure of classical medical treatments are, the more 
im portant is the placebo effect as a potential bias, however, it is
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im possible to measure the placebo effect positively, and thus make 
a smooth empirical transformation of the placebo effect from  a bias 
to a therapeutical phenomenon. Though the placebo effect is born 
out of the Clinico-em pirical position and in many ways corresponds 
to its basic notions, the lack of a specific placebo measuring trial is a 
puzzle. I use the Kuhnian term puzzle consciously because I do not 
regard the problem  of the Clinico-empirical position as big enough 
to represent more than a challenge. The implications of the placebo 
effect on the Scientific medical model is primarily that the tension 
betw een the Bio-mechanical position and the Clinico-em pirical 
position is intensified and illuminated. The placebogenic complex 
places the placebo effect in the context of medical humanities, 
through its emphasis on the symbolic nature of token placebos, the 
im portance of doctor-patient communication and the clinical 
setting. The strong association between the placebo effect and the 
Clinico-em pirical position places the placebo effect, with equal 
solidity, within the context of the Scientific medical model.
The dual characterisation of the placebo effect as both a scientific 
and hum anistic phenomenon parallels the classical dualistic 
characterisation of the nature of man as consisting of two 
fundam entals: body and mind. Discussions about the status of the 
m ind in m edicine often creates uneasiness, especially when the 
discussion focuses on the mind's influence on disease.This is 
understandable when one thinks about the fact that the m ind-body 
problem  has occupied philosophers for centuries. M edical 
term inology operates with a strict distinction of body and mind by 
using the analogous terms psyche and soma. The interaction 
between the psyche and soma is acknowledged, for example
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through the acceptance of psycho-somatic diseases, but only at an 
epistem ological level. The terminology is regarded as a heuristic 
device that enables physicians to categorise and handle diseases 
that operates on the brain. It is silently assumed that when our 
knowledge of the mechanisms of the brain is good enough this 
term inology will be abandoned. At an ontological level the m edical 
position is m onistic and m aterialistic. The interactionistic dualism  
roots back to Descartes. The materialistic position is born out of a 
scientific world view and is the contemporary dom inant theory of 
the mind, not only amongst physicians but also amongst 
p h ilo so p h ers .
Though there is a dominant m aterialistic theory of mind, the mind- 
body problem  is not solved. The m aterialists are unable to explain 
the experience of m ental phenomena, for example the subjective 
character of experience. The dualists, on the other hand, are unable 
to give an account of how the two radically different entities of 
mind and body interact. The placebo effect does not in general 
change this pattern. An interactionistic dualistic theory will have no 
difficulty explaining the placebo effect, and the different 
m aterialsitic theories are unable to do so. However, the dualists can 
still not explain how body and mind interact, and are vulnerable to 
the attack from  the materialists, whose strategy it is to reduce the 
apparent m ental phenomena to bodily functions. W hat makes the 
placebo effect special in the mind-body problem is that the placebo 
effect is not only a mental phenomena, it is also a central part of 
clinical science. The placebo effect cannot be reduced without at the 
same time reduce medical science to the Bio-mechanical position. A 
reduction that m ost scientific m aterialsist would oppose because
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this would mean a regression to a scientific method practised half a 
century ago. The implications of the placebo effect on the mind- 
body problem  is that the true paradoxical nature of the problem  is 
em phasised. By being simultaneously scientific and m ental the 
irreducibillity of the placebo effect has to be accepted, even by 
m a te r ia lis ts .
The m ind-body problem  has been discussed as a serious 
philosophical problem  since Decartes without any solution yet at 
sight. Possibly it is unsolvable; however, the American philosopher 
John Searle has recently presented a theory, biological naturalism , 
that fundam entally opposes the way the m ind-body problem  is 
form ulated. Sometimes complex philosophical problem s are Gordie 
knots, not because they are to complicated for human intelligence, 
but because the assum ptions, implemented in the way the question 
is asked, are wrong. It is difficult to characterise biological 
naturalism  as m aterialism  or dualism, because features from both 
categories are present to a large extent. On the one hand biological 
naturalism  insists that there is no "mind-stuff". The m aterial basis 
of our consciousness is our brain. On the other hand biological 
naturalism  opposes the ontological reduction of consciousness to the 
brain. That consciousness causally can be reduced to brain function 
does not imply that it can be reduced ontologically. Consciousness is 
an irreducible higher function of the brain. So far the problem  
biological naturalism  has to address is how the brain and 
consciousness interact. This problem is a variant of the classic 
dualistic predicam ent. The response given, however, is not classic.
1 6 2
The interactionalistic problem  is regarded as not necessarily a 
philosophical problem . For centuries the interactionistic problem  
has been regarded as a relevant philosophical question to ask, but 
many ancient philosophical problems have later dissolved 
themselves, or been solved by science, for example, the 
philosophical analyses of electrom agnetism  before M axwell's 
equations. B iological naturalism  regards the interactionistic problem  
as a problem  analogous to electromagnetism prior to Maxwell, and a 
problem  that neorophysiology is best equipped to solve. By not 
accepting the classical problem of the dualistic position biological 
naturalism  has a strategy that avoids immediate refutation.
W hether biological naturalism  is the "solution" to the m ind-body 
problem  is doubtful, however, intrinsic problems with the theory 
have to be addressed. For one thing there are tendencies to 
epiphenom enalism . Secondly, the discussion of the relation between 
the m ental, the consciousness and the subconscious has to be more 
c o m p re h en s iv e .
Regardless of its potential problems biological naturalism  is an 
interesting theory with regard to the placebo effect because it 
insists on the irreducibillity of the mind or consciousness at the 
same time that the theory is anchored in a scientific world view.
The placebo effect presents the exact same characteristics, it is 
basically a m ental phenomenon, but also an unavoidable clinical 
scientific notion. Biological naturalism provides a broad 
philosophical fram ework for the understanding of the relation 
betw een m ind and body, that sim ultaneously acknowledges the 
scientific and mental aspects of the placebo effect.
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The sharp distinction between medical science and m edical 
hum anities cannot be uphold when confronted with the placebo 
effect. Karl Marx wrote in the Thesis of Feuerbach that the role of 
philosophy was not to interpret the world but to change it. The 
force of medical science is that it enables us to change unwanted 
pathological conditions. Medical humanities has been regarded as a 
passive form in which the scientific therapy took place. The placebo 
effect dem onstrates that the form of the doctor-patient relationship 
has an autonomous therapeutical component. The role of m edical 
hum anities is not ju st to interpret, but to actively engage 
therapeutically. A physician who does not recognise the 
therapeutical implications of the clinical setting and the doctor 
patient relationship does not only lack humanistic qualities, but is, 
as well, a bad clinical scientist.
